HE SERVED ON SAMAR



Hero or Butcher of Samar?



Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute, November 1979, p. 42-8







by Captain Paul Melshen, U. S. M. C.





     Was Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller the Hero

of  Samar or the Butcher of Samar?  "I wish you to kill and burn,"

the hot-eyed Army Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith  told  Marine

Major  L.  W.  T. Waller when Waller arrived on Samar. 

"The


more you kill the better it will please me."  But Smith 

had misjudged  his  man.    Tony  Waller 

was a firebrand, not a firebug -- a marine, not a martinet -- who let his

own  high character  and  conscience  guide  him 

as  he  led a 60-man expedition across Samar and onto the pages

of  Marine  Corps history.



     During the early afternoon of 20  January 

1902,  First Lieutenant  John  H. A. Day, U.S. Marine Corps,

marched nine Filipinos, natives of the island of Samar, under guard of 

a detachment  of  U. S. Marines down the main street of Basey,

Samar.  Upon  reaching  the  town  plaza, 

Day  ordered  his detachment  of  marines  to 

execute the Filipinos by firing squad.  The execution  of 

one  Filipino  had  already  been carried  out 

earlier  that  day,  and  one  more was yet to

follow.  Day had been  following  orders  of 

his  immediate senior, Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Littleton

Waller


Tazewell Waller.    On  17  March  1902, 

Major  Waller  was arraigned  in Manila and tried on a charge

of murder by a U.S. Army court-martial.  Waller's court-martial was

to become an ambiguous segment of Marine Corps history.



     Marine Corps  ground  involvement 

in  the  Philippines began on 3 May 1898, two days after Commodore

George Dewey's victory  over  the  Spanish  at 

Manila  Bay,   when   First Lieutenant  Dion 

Williams  and a detachment of Marines from the USS Baltimore planted

an American flag  at  the  Spanish naval  station in

Cavite.  The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 December 1898, ended America's

war with Spain, but  not  its military  involvement 

in the Philippines.  For the next six years,  U.  S. 

armed   forces   fought   against  

Filipino insurrectionists.  From 1898 until the fall of 1901, marines

took  part  in  a   number   of  

operations   against   the insurrectionists, 

primarily  on the island of Luzon, making several amphibious landings.



     By  the  fall  of  1901,

U. S. military actions against insurrectionists on Luzon had  come 

to  an  end.    General Emilio  Aguinaldo,

leader of that island's insurrectionists,


had surrendered to the American forces on  1  April1901 

and swore  allegiance  to  the  United  States. 

Later that same month, he issued a manifesto to his  Filipino 

followers  to "lay  down  their  arms  for 

`the  complete  termination of


hostilities.'"  The government of Luzon was now in the hands of  

American  civilian  authorities.    In  two 

provinces, Batangas  and  the  island  of  Samar, 

there   were   still hostilities.   

On  Samar  the  insurrectionists were led by Filipino General

Vincente Lucban.  American  supervision  of these provinces

was under the direction of Army General Adna Chaffee, who had taken 

over  command  from  General  Arthur


MacArthur in July 1901.



     Located in the equatorial tropics, Samar was

completely engulfed  with  dense jungles.  Not only did

American forces have to endure heat, humidity,  incessant  rain, 

and  dense vegetation,  but  in  addition,  they 

had  to  contend with snakes, leeches, and malaria-infested mosquitoes.  

Smallpox was  also  running  rampant  on  the 

island.    The hellish conditions on Samar in some instances

drove men insane.



     Lucban used the climate and the terrain of

Samar to his advantage in his guerilla was against the Americans. 

He had been on Samar for more than a year before the first American troops

arrived.  This had allowed him to recruit  among  the natives

intensively, and by the time the American troops did arrive, most of the

natives were either in Lucban's  command or  in sympathy with

the insurrectionists.  Lucban's control


over the natives was pure tyranny.  He  would  shoot 

anyone who  failed  to  support him, including Spanish priests. 

He once wrapped the  head  of  a  pro-American 

Filipino  in  a kerosene-drenched  American flag and set

a torch to it while


the man was still alive.



     Most  American commanders, Waller included,

based their operations on the fact that the majority of the natives were

hostile  to  U. S. actions and could not be trusted, despite

pretenses by the villagers to be pro-American, and that many of  these 

supposedly  pro-American villagers were, in fact, members of Lucban's

command. Because of this support by  the populace  for 

the  insurrectionists, along with the hellish


conditions of the natural environment, the U.  S.  Army 

was able  to  secure only a few coastal towns on Samar, enabling

Lucban to control the hinterland.



     Company  C,  9th Infantry, arrived

at Balangiga, Samar, on 11 August 1901, commanded by Captain Thomas 

W.  Connell, U. S. Army.  Connell, a strong advocate of President

William McKinley's "benevolent assimilation," attempted to establish this 

policy  at Balangiga.  Connell's naive assumption that since

"benevolent assimilation"  seemed  to  be  working 

on Luzon,  it  could  also  work on Samar, proved catastrophic. 

Samar was  populated  by  an  extremely  violent, 

primitive


society.   Because   of   cultural  

differences   and   the inhabitants' hostility toward

the American presence  on  the island, assimilation was impossible. 

One officer of the 9th


Infantry testified later that he considered the natives ". . . 

savages;  they  were  low  in  intelligence, treacherous,

cruel; seemed to have  no  feeling  for  their 

families  or


anyone else."



     On 28 September. led by town officials and 

members  of the  population  of  Balangiga,  Lucban's 

forces  plotted a surprise attack on Company C.  Only 26 of 

the  74  American soldiers survived the massacre.  Most

were tortured to death


and their bodies mutilated . . . Connell's  assessment  of 

the situation on Samar had proved fatal.



     The  insurrectionists  on  Samar 

habitually  committed atrocities, such as body mutilation of dead

soldiers, during their  guerilla  warfare  against 

the  Americans.    Lucban refused to honor any rules

of warfare: "The dead were mutilated . . . No prisoners were taken, 

Noncombatants were put to death.  Poison  was  used. 

Flags  of  truce  were  not respected.  The personnel

of the insurrectionary forces were composed, in numerous  instances

of  males  under military age, who were old enough to assist

in military operations, but not sufficiently mature from the point 

of  intelligence and experience to correctly apply or even to understand

the rules of civilized warfare."



     Under  these  circumstances, 

General  Chaffee  ordered Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, U.

S. Army, to command the 6th  Separate  Brigade  and 

handle  the situation on Samar.  Lacking enough soldiers to 

form  a  full  brigade,  General


Chaffee    requested   that   Admiral  

Frederick   Rodgers, Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Squadron, lend

him some  marines.  Rodgers  complied  by sending Waller,

with orders that read, "By direction of the senior  squadron 

commander  [Rodgers],


you  will  assume  command  of  a battalion

of United States Marines for duty on the island of Samar."  The Navy

left the conduct   of   operations  to  Waller's 

estimation  of  the situation.  The battalion of 315 marines

embarked aboard the USS  New  York  at Cavite on 22 October

and landed at Carbalogen, Samar, on 24aOctober.



     Waller,  unlike  Connell, took a

more realistic view of the situation on Samar.  The day before debarkation, 

Waller issued  explicit orders to his officers concerning relations

with the natives and rules of engagement: "Place no confidence in the natives,

and punish treachery immediately with death. . . .  Allow  no 

man  [marine] to go . . . anywhere without his arms or ammunition.

. . .  All  males who have not come in and presented themselves

by October 25th will be regarded and  treated  as enemies.  

It must be impressed on the men that the natives are treacherous, brave

and savage.  No trust, no confidence, can be placed in them. . . . 

The men must be informed of the courage,  skill, size  and strength

of the enemy.  WE MUST DO OUR PART OF THE


WORK, AND WITH THE SURE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE NOT TO  EXPECT QUARTER.

. . ."



     Waller viewed the situation as open combat

governed  by  the rules  of war.  The populace would

have to register with the marines or be considered combatants.  Waller's

orders to his officers  were  posted  and  the 

Naval high command took no


exception to them, nor did General Smith, Waller's immediate senior.   

Waller's  orders  were  within the limitations of General 

Order  No.  100  of  1863  dealing  with 

irregular warfare,  which  stated  that if enemy units gave

no quarter and became treacherous upon capture, it was lawful to 

shoot anyone belonging to that captured unit.



     General Smith's orders to Major Waller upon

arrival  at Samar  have  allowed  some historians to

give Waller an out.  These orders, stated orally and in an  unsigned 

note,  were subsequently proven at Smith's own court-martial: "I want

no prisoners.  I wish you  to  kill  and  burn. 

The  more you kill and burn, the better it will please me. .


.  .  [T]he  interior  of  Samar  must 

be  made  a  howling wilderness. . . ."



     Some historians feel that Waller was only following

the direct  orders  of  his  immediate  senior

officer.  But, as testimony in  General  Smith's  court-martial 

pointed  out, Waller  did  not  execute  Smith's 

orders.  Instead, Waller applied  the  rules  of 

civilized  warfare  and  the  rules provided 

under  General  Order  No. 100.   Waller testified

that he did not kill women or children and that  he  treated

prisoners  according  to  the  rules  of 

civilized warfare.  "Always when prisoners came in and gave themselves 

up  they were  saved,  they  were  not  killed."  

In essence, Waller


disobeyed Smith's direct orders,  which  refutes  any 

claim that  Waller was "just following orders."  Instead, Waller's

interpretation of Smith's orders demonstrated Waller's  high moral

courage and his effort to apply the rules of civilized


warfare. 



     The  marines'  tactical  area

of responsibility was the southern half of  Samar.   

Waller  was  relentless  in  his pursuit  of 

the  insurrectionists.    He  ran  patrol

after


patrol, amphibious operations, a  combined  land  and 

river attack  on the insurrectionists' camp on the Sohoton Cliffs,

and  small  raiding  operations.    The 

keys  to   Waller's successes   were  

the   flexibility  of  his  tactics,  his


endurance, and the stamina of his men.  Within a few months, the 

operations  were  beginning  to take effect, but marine

casualties were also frequent.  The insurrectionists,  armed

with  the Krag-Jorgensen rifles taken from Company C, bamboo cannon,

and bolo knives,  were  a  formidable  foe  for 

his marines.    While  running combat operations, Waller,

always alert for any treachery,  at  the  same  time 

attempted  to


register  the  natives  and  pacify  the 

towns.    Waller's successes  on  Samar 

were  heralded  through  the  military command in the

philippines.



     General Smith, desiring to get better communications

on Samar, ordered Waller to scout a telegraph route from Lanang on the

east coast to  Basey  on  the  west  coast.   

On  28 December  1901,  Waller, with 60 marines, two native

scouts, and 33 native bearers, started from Lanang and  headed 

into the interior of the Samar jungles, an area where few natives and no

foreigners had ever gone.  Within a few days,  almost


all the men were suffering from fever and other afflictions, as cited

by Waller: "Water  sores  [which] began to form where the clothing

bore on the skin were developing rapidly . .  .  we suffered 

from  sores  caused  by being constantly wet; also


from the cuts made by the thorns and from bites of  leeches. 

All these places festered and made very uncomfortable sores. . . ."



     The  terrain  was  exceedingly 

difficult.  The marines were running out of food and began to starve. 

By 3  January 1902, Waller decided to split his unit.  Leaving

behind with Captain David D. Porter, U. S. Marine Corps, the bulk of the

unit  who  were  unable to march any further, Waller set

out for Basey with 14 marines and arrived  there  on  6 

January 1902.    With  total  disregard 

for  his own health, Waller


personally led a relief column the next day in an attempt to reach 

Porter.  For nine days he searched for Porter without success.



     Porter,  in the meantime, had three options:

to attempt to follow Waller, whose trail was unsure; to stay  where 

he was  and  perish;  or to attempt to backtrack to Lanang. 

He chose to backtrack.  Leaving the sick and dying marines with First 

Lieutenant  A.  S. Williams, Porter headed for Lanang with seven

marines and six natives.  Hampered by  torrential rains,  

Porter  arrived  at  Lanang  on  11  January.   

He immediately sent out a relief column  to  pick  up 

his  own stragglers and to rescue Williams' command.



     Williams's fate was disastrous.  Realizing

that  if  he stayed where he was, he and his command were sure

to die, he decided to head back to Lanang.  His men,  "so 

nearly  dead from  starvation  and  exposure 

that  they began to crawl,"slowly perished along the way."  One

marine went insane.  By 18  January,  when  the 

relief column reached Williams, ten marines had died.  In addition,

the natives had mutinied.



     Waller  had  used  the 

natives  as bearers of food and supplies  on  the 

march,  but  had  no  confidence  in  the

allegiance  of  the  natives  to  the  marines

and kept ever mindful of an attempted attack, which he  and 

his  officers had  taken precautions to prevent.  Natives

could use a bolo knife only to help the  marines  hack 

through  the  jungle; every  evening  the  knives

were collected and counted.  The natives were kept spread along the

column with  the  marines and away from the rifles.  At

night and during rest periods, the natives were huddled in one area 

and  watched  over  by


marines.    The  natives  were  apparently

playing a waiting game; they would wait until the marines were in 

a  weakened state,  steal their weapons or overpower them one

at a time, and kill them.  First a native called Victor stole 

Waller's bolo  at  night  while Waller was asleep. 

Before the native could turn on him, Waller awoke, drew his pistol, and

seized the  bolo.    Upon reaching Basey, Victor was

imprisoned and became the first native to be shot by the firing squad on

20 January.    Waller  testified that Victor was revealed

to be the "`Captain Victor' that notorious and infamous captain of


insurrectos,  who  was  of  the  detail 

from  Basey  in the Balangiga massacre."  Second, the 

natives  with  Lieutenant Williams'  group became rebellious. 

Williams testified that "the mutinous demeanor of the natives caused me 

daily


fear  of massacre."  Third, the natives were hiding food

and supplies from the  marines  while  keeping  themselves 

well nourished and securing food for themselves on the march.



     Finally, there was  open  rebellion 

against  Williams' party.    Three  of  the 

natives,  armed with a bolo knife, attacked and wounded Williams. 

The  other  natives  watched while  Williams 

managed  to  fight  off  the attack.  These natives

were put  under  arrest  when  the  marines 

reached Lanang.    It  was this group of natives that

was sot by the firing squad on 20 January, charged  in  Day's 

words,  with "treason  in  attempting  to  kill

Lieutenant Williams, with treason in general, theft, disobedience and . 

.  .  general mutiny."    Waller  erred 

at  this point by not putting the charge in writing.  Williams'

men were in  such  a  weakened condition  that 

they  could  offer little assistance at the time of the incident. 

Soon  after  the  incident,  Williams formulated 

several  plans to kills the natives, but doubted the strength of his

weakened men.  He also felt that it  was better  to 

refer  the  incident  to his commanding officer,


Major Waller. 



     On  20  January,  the 

U.  S.  gunboat  Arayat arrived  at  Basey 

from  Lanangmand  offloaded  the  native prisoners.    

After  being  briefed  by  his  officers 

and non-commissioned   officers,   all  

of   whom   recommended execution,  Waller 

ordered  the natives to be shot.  Waller stated: "The reports

of the attempted murder of the men and other treachery by the natives, 

the  whole  plot  being unmasked,  caused  me

to hold an inquiry and consult with my officers.  The population of

the town  was  hostile  at  the time  . 

.  .  Using  my own judgement, and fortified by the opinion

of the officers and men, I had the guilty men  shot, releasing 

the  innocent.    The power exercised was mine by right

as commanding the district.  It seemed to the best  of


my  judgement,  the thing to do at the time.  I have

not had reason to change my mind."


Thus  the technical reason for Waller's court-martial was no so

much that he shot the natives,  but  that  the  shootings

were  summary.     This leads one to believe that

Waller was charged with the wrong offense.



     Waller  felt  that he had acted within

the framework of General Order No. 100, which did not call for a trial

of the accused,  and  within his authority as a district commander,

although this was disputed by the  Judge  Advocate  General. 

The  real  issue was that the responsibilities of a district

commander in the Philippines were never clearly defined  and that 

th tactical situation necessitated his actions.  On 22 January, Waller,

seeing no wrong in his actions,  sent  this message to General

Smith: "It became necessary to expend eleven prisoners.   

Ten were implemented [sic] in the attack on Lt. Williams and one who plotted

against me."



     On  19  February the marine battalion

on Samar received orders to return to Cavite and arrived there on 29 February. 

The  unit returned to a welcoming home salute and party, but there

was something else in store  for  Major  Waller  -- 

a murder charge.  Waller tended to place much of the blame for the

court-martial on Lieutenant Day, although not during the trial  or 

in  public;  during  the  trial  he  assumed

full


responsibility  for  his  actions.   

Day,   who   was   the battalion's adjutant

and had not gone on the expedition, had boasted about his part in the execution. 

It was  a  bit  of


"action"  for  him.    Waller  stated 

after the trial in an after-action report ". . . The charge was largely

instigated by  the  vail  boastfulness  of  one 

of  the officers of my


battalion."



     Waller's court-martial lasted from 17 March

to 12 April 1902.  The court consisted of seven Army  officers 

and  six Marine  Corps  officers  and  was 

headed  by Army Brigadier General William H. Bisbee, "a stalwart old

Indian  fighter."  Waller  argued that, because he had never

been detached from his marine unit, an Army court had no jurisdiction over

him.  The  court  denied Waller's lack of jurisdiction claim,

then


proceeded to the specific number of natives executed and the issue 

of  Waller's  guilt  or innocence.  General Smith was

called to testify concerning the orders  he  had  issued 

to Waller  prior  to  the  Samar campaign. (His testimony

later


instigated his own court-martial.)



    Waller  could have made excuse for his actions

by saying that he was injured and lying in a hospital when  he 

issued his orders.  But instead, he stood committed to his actions:

"As the representative  officer  responsible  for the 

safety  and  welfare of my men, after investigation and from

the information I had, ., . . I ordered the eleven  men


shot.    I  thought  I  was  right

then, I believe now I was right.  Whatever may happen to me I have

the sure  knowledge that  my  people  know, and I believe

the whole world knows, that I am not a murderer."



     The court voted eleven to two for acquittal. 

Headed by an old troop leader and field officer,  General  Bisbee, 

it must  have weighed the tactical situation and the mitigating factors

involved in the case.  Many of the court's  officers had 

been  through  guerilla warfare in both the Philippines and the

American West.  It  seems  that  they,  as 

Waller's peers,   realistically   assessed  the 

factors  influencing Waller's decisions.  Later, in the United

States,  the  Army Judge Advocate General dismissed the entire

case as illegal, agreeing that a Marine Corps officer was not subject 

to  an


Army court. 



     The type of combat fought on Samar was some

of the most brutal  of  the  Fil-American  War. 

When his native bearers turned on him and his officers, Waller guided his

actions on doctrinal  orders,  the  rules  of civilized

warfare, and an


estimation of the tactical situation as he  saw  it.   

Upon consultation  of his officers and non-commissioned officers,

Waller had the natives executed.



     The  decisions  and  conduct 

of  men  during war or in trying  environments  may 

seem  questionable  to  outside observers,  but 

seldom  questionable to the participants at the time.  The purpose

of court-martial is to obtain justice by  one's  military 

peers.   The officers of the court were little affected by public

opinion and  high-level  politics.


The  overwhelming  majority  of  the  court 

agreed with the opinions of Waller's officers and the accused, and acquitted

Waller for his actions.



     Waller's court-martial had effects on its 

participants and  on  the  country  as a whole. 

It informed the American public as to the type of warfare that was 

taking  place  in the  Philippines.    Even 

to  its  most  ardent supporters, "benevolent  assimilation" 

had  its  limits.    The   trial frustrated 

American civilian authorities and their attempts to implement their policies

in the Philippines.



     On 21 April 1902, General Smith was brought

to trial on the charge of "conduct to the prejudice of  good 

order  and military  discipline"  for orders issued to Waller

at Samar.  He was found guilty and was eventually forced to 

leave  the service.   Lieutenant Day was also court-martialed

but, like Waller, was acquitted.



     Waller  continued  to  serve 

in  the Marine Corps with distinction.  In 1910, the "outstanding

troop leader of  the period"  was passed over for Commandant,

probably because of his one blemish, the court-martial.



     Another  result  was  marine 

respect.   For many years afterward, marine  messes 

would  stand  whenever  a  "Samar battalion" officer

was present and toast, "Stand, gentlemen, he served on Samar."