MARINES AT
MIDWAY
HISTORICAL SECTION
Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. U S M C
DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. MARINE CORPS 1948
Marine Corps Monographs
in This Series
The Defense of Wake
The Battle for Tarawa
Marines at Midway
THE COVER OF THIS NARRATIVE shows the obsolete fabric-covered
SB2U-3 dive bombers of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 241 taking
off to attack the Japanese fleet striking force on the morning
of 4 June 1942, during the battle of Midway.
II
MARINES AT MIDWAY
Foreword
The name Midway means much to Marines. At the very outset of war, when
Midway's sole garrison consisted of a Fleet Marine Force defense battalion
stationed there in advance of hostilities, the Japanese found that here, as at
Wake, Marines were ready. Subsequently, in the battle of Midway, the heroism
of Marine fighter and dive-bomber pilots, who attacked effectively and
unhesitatingly against tremendous odds, demonstrated once again that courage
and discipline are among the high traditions of our Corps.
There is another lesson to be derived from the Marine story of Midway,
however, and that is the unity of the Fleet Marine Force as a completely
integrated air-ground team. This, too, is traditional, but it has never been
better demonstrated than by the integration of Marine artillery and infantry
(who secured the base) with Marine air which struck the first blow at the
Japanese carriers from that base. While Marine fighters were slashing at enemy
air, Marine artillerymen were shooting the Japanese planes down, and Marine
dive bombers were harrying the enemy fleet.
This coordinated interaction by land and sea and air embodied the
time-tried and proven doctrines of the Marine Corps in one of its primary
fields: that of the defense of advanced bases. To all students of this
subject, I commend the story of Marines at Midway.
C. B. CATES, GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.
III
MARINES AT MIDWAY
Preface
"Marines at Midway" is an account prepared by the Historical Section, Division
of Public Information, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, of the role
played by Marines in the base-development and defense of Midway Atoll. It is
the third of a series of narratives intended to provide both student and
casual reader with accurate and complete information on Marine Corps
operations in World War II. As a sufficient number of these monographs are
brought to completion, these in turn will be edited for final compilation into
an operational history of the Corps during the past war.
This account is exactly what its title implies: the Marine story on
Midway. Its scope is intentionally limited to Marine history, and no attempt
is made to give full treatment of Navy or Army operations in this locale,
except as these impinge upon activities of Marine units.
Acknowledgment for generous assistance must be made to the Historian of
Naval Operations, Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, and to Lieut. Roger
Pineau, USNR, of the Office of Naval History. Commander E. John Long, USNR, of
the Office of the Secretary of National Defense, provided much assistance in
assembly of illustrations. Cartographic services were furnished by the
Reproduction Department, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., and all
photographs are United States Marine Corps, Navy or Army official. All
personnel are referred to herein by the rank held at the time described in the
narrative. Dates and times are West longitude and local zone time unless
otherwise indicated. Citations of United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS) material, unless otherwise indicated, are from "Interrogations of
Japanese Officials," Naval Analysis Division, USSBS, 1946, and are indicated
briefly by the NAV-interrogation numbers found in that publication.
Finally, however, credit must be given to the officers who, having served
on Midway, unstintingly furnished much additional information of historical
value by interview or in reply to Historical Section questionnaires. It is
strongly hoped that these and others with first-hand experience will make
possible further improvement of this narrative either by submitting comments
or, when in Washington, by visiting the Historical Section, Division of Public
Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, for interview and discussion of the
points involved.
W. E. RILEY,
BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION.
IV
MARINES AT MIDWAY
Contents
Original On-Line
Page Page
BIRTH OF A BASE............................................. 1 8
WAR COMES TO MIDWAY......................................... 11 18
GIRDING FOR BATTLE.......................................... 16 23
THE BATTLE, 4-5 JUNE 1942................................... 26 34
Appendix I Documentation and Bibliography 43 52
Appendix II Midway Chronology 45 54
Appendix III Navy Unit Commendation,
6th Defense Battalion, FMF 47 56
Appendix IV Events at Battery D, 7 December 1941 48 57
Appendix V Preparations of MAG-22 for Battle 51 60
Appendix VI Dive-Bomber Pilot's Narrative,
Battle of Midway 53 62
Appendix VII Staff and Command List, Marine Corps
Units Participating in Battle of Midway 55 64
V
MARINES AT MIDWAY
CHAPTER I
Birth of a Base
* * * the Pacific strategy of 1941 contemplated rendering our bases
relatively secure against air raids, hit-and-run surface attacks, or
even minor landings. * * * Within and about the structure of such
lightly-held but secure bases, the Pacific Fleet was expected to ply,
awaiting the moment when battle could be joined with enemy naval
forces--"to get at naval forces with naval forces," Admiral Kimmel put
it--in decisive action for control of the sea.
--United States Marine Corps historical monograph, "The Defense of Wake."
Despite their entire disparity in outcome, Midway and Wake, the two
Central Pacific base-defense operations in which the Marine Corps participated
during 1941 and 1942, had much in common. Even their differences, the very
differences which spelled surrender for Wake and victory at Midway, were those
of degree and not of quality.
Each atoll was defended by a combination of Fleet Marine Force
base-defense artillery and aviation. From the viewpoint of these defenders,
each action was conducted with much the same type of materiel, and based upon
identical tactical concepts. Only in that Midway's fortification and
development had commenced sooner; that more planes, troops, and weapons were
available earlier; that Midway was farther away from island enemy air bases;
and, most important of all, that the Pacific Fleet of June 1942, had recovered
to some extent from the shock of December 1941--only in these matters of
degree did the two Operations differ. Yet it was this question of
degree--especially in regard to Fleet support--which permitted the successful
defense of Midway.
The strategic importance of Midway had long been recognized. In 1938, the
famous Hepburn Report, dealing with United States requirements for naval
bases, had this to say:
From a strategic point of view, an air base at Midway Island is
second in importance only to Pearl Harbor.<1>
The Board, which derived its name from the senior member, Rear Admiral Arthur
J. Hepburn, USN, accordingly recommended immediate development of Midway as a
naval air and submarine base with facilities for two patrol-plane squadrons;
two divisions of submarines; and pier, channel and turning basin within the
lagoon for large auxiliaries. In conclusion, the Board included Midway in a
select group of projects "necessary of accomplishment at the earliest
practicable date,"<2> and recommended for Midway expenditures amounting to
$13,040,000, which would, by 1943, accomplish the desired development.<3>
Lying approximately 1,137 miles northwest of Oahu, Midway, outer rampart
of the Hawaiian chain, had been recognized to be strategic as early as 1867
when the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, directed that Brooks Island, as
it was then known, be claimed and surveyed for the United States. In 1869,
Congress actually appropriated $50,000 for dredging an entrance channel and
----------
<1>"Report on Need of Additional Naval Bases to Defend the Coasts of the
United States, Its Territories and Possessions," House. Document No. 65, 76th
Cong., 1st sess., 27 December 1938, hereinafter cited as HEPBURN REPORT. par.
102.
<2>Ibid., par. 151 and "Summary of Recommendations."
<3>Ibid., "Estimates of Obligations and Expenditures."
1
MIDWAY'S CABLE STATION in the days when there was nothing hut sand
on Sand Island. This picture was taken in the early 1900's before
Marines came to Midway.
clear anchorage within the lagoon.<4> On 29 April 1903, its importance was
further enhanced by establishment of the Commercial Pacific Cable Co.'s
station on Sand Island, where the station still remains.
Shortly after surveys by the U. S. S. WRIGHT in February 1934, Pan
American Airways, quick to realize Midway's importance from the viewpoint of
Pacific air operations, commenced development of a commercial seaplane base,
likewise on Sand Island. Pan American's construction work began on 15 April
1935, and on 6 June of the same year, the first clipper landed at Midway.<5>
Although popularly known as Midway Island, Midway is in fact a circular
atoll, about 6 miles in diameter, enclosing two islands, Sand and Eastern.
Both were originally sand patches covered by sparse, tough shrub. On Eastern
Island, guano had accumulated. As a result of years of experiment, the cable
company, aided by the United States Department of Agriculture, discovered that
a type of wire grass found on the sand dunes near San Francisco would bind the
sands of Midway, and, with this as a starter, it became possible to plant
ironwood trees from the Hawaiian Islands and eucalyptus from Australia. As a
result, by 1934 Sand Island supported a grove of 40-foot ironwoods, subsidiary
growth including grass, and truck gardens about the cable station. At the
northeast end of Eastern Island, stood three or four scrub trees. Throughout
both islands there grew the scaevola bush <6>--locally described as a dwarf
magnolia because of its leaves and on all sides were to be encountered the
ubiquitous "gooney-birds,"<7> actually albatrosses, together with several
other species: flightless rails, moan-
----------
<4>The 19th century history of Midway is colorful and replete with
adventure which runs from shipwreck to murder and smuggling. See "The
Wrecker," by Robert Louis Stevenson, 1891.
<5>Historical data from "Midway the North Pacific's Tiny Pet," Homer C.
Votaw, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 1606-1607, hereinafter cited as
VOTAW. The first airplane flight from Midway lagoon was carried out by a Naval
aircraft on 10 October 1920. Cable Station Diary that date, hereinafter cited
as CABLE DIARY.
<6>Pronounced by countless Marines as "skavoli."
<7>There were two species, one black, and the other black and white. The
former is properly entitled the "Black-footed Albatross"; the latter, the
"Laysan Albatross," "Midway Islands," Fred C. Hadden, undated, hereinafter
cited as Hadden.
2
ing birds, gannets, frigate birds, terns, and boat-swain birds, to name the
most common.
Of the two islands, Eastern is the smaller and lower, being
one-and-one-quarter miles long and but 12 feet above sea level at its highest
point. Sand Island, however, attains a height of 39 feet and is almost two
miles in length. Both islands lie in the south half of the lagoon, close
aboard the reef. Welles Harbor, the prewar roads, and entrance to the lagoon
is just west of Sand Island, the western of the two islands, but a new
entrance to the lagoon, Brooks Channel, between Sand and Eastern Island, was
dredged in 1938, and is now the only one in use.<8>
From 1935 to early 1940, Midway's development progressed smoothly, first
under the aegis of Pan American, and, from mid-1939 on, under the Navy as a
result of the Hepburn recommendations. By the end of 1939, heavy construction
was well started on Sand Island, and Brooks Channel had been partially blasted
and dredged open by United States Army Engineers. Eastern Island, however,
remained unchanged, occupied only by two "retired" burros from the cable
station.
In early 1939, the military history of the defense of Midway might be
said to have commenced when Colonel Harry K. Pickett, assisted by Captain
Alfred R. Pefley, was sent to the atoll--as well as Wake and Johnston--to
conduct a military reconnaissance and prepare tentative defense plans for
fortification of all three.<9> These plans, which were completed almost a year
later,<10> were approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold W.
Stark, USN, who then directed,<11> on 20 December 1939, that the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, establish,
MARINES CALLED IT "SKAVOLI"--the dwarf magnolia, or scaevoli
bushes, which virtually cover the surface of Sand and Eastern
Islands.
----------
<8>Data from "Sailing Directions for the Pacific Islands, Volume II," H.
O. 166, U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office, p. 451; Votaw, p. 1607; and note by
Lt. Col. Samuel G. Taxis.
<9>Letter from Col. Alfred R. Pefley to CMC, 13 January 1948.
<10>Official report of Col. Harry K. Pickett to MGC submitting defense
plans for Midway, 14 October 1939, hereinafter cited as Pickett report.
<11>CNO serial 397, 20 December 1939.
3
SAND ISLAND IN 1935, when the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, FMF,
held amphibious landing exercises at Midway. Note the Marine
camp on beach in right foreground.
when practicable, a Marine detachment as a garrison on Midway.<12>
With this very mission in prospect, the 3d Defense Battalion, Fleet
Marine Force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Pepper, was at this
time under orders for movement from the East coast to the Hawaiian area; and
the Battalion arrived at Pearl Harbor in U. S. S. CHAUMONT after an uneventful
voyage from Charleston, S. C., on 7 May 1940.
Following the 3d Defense Battalion's establishment at Pearl Harbor, it
became apparent that facilities at Midway were not sufficiently advanced to
permit garrisoning the atoll with anything approaching the full strength of a
defense battalion, or even an appreciable cadre sufficient in number to
commence installation of weapons or construction of fortifications. Colonel
Pepper accordingly recommended on 23 May that Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch,
USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, authorize the sending of an
advance reconnaissance party to Midway. This group, to consist of two officers
and not more than 16 enlisted Marines, would conduct detailed reconnaissance
of the ground, propose up-to-date defensive plans and dispositions for a
defense battalion, execute the painstaking surveys required for accurate
artillery fire, and would, in addition be available to the Navy's resident
officer in
----------
<12>This was not, however, the first Marine detachment to garrison
Midway. To protect the cable station and prevent Japanese poachers from
violating Midway's status as a bird sanctuary, a detachment of one officer and
20 enlisted Marines served on Midway from 1904, through 1908, occupying a camp
site on rising ground near the center of Sand Island. VOTAW, p. 1605; Annual
Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps 1904. Fleet Marine Force landing
exercised conducted by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines--were also held at
Midway in May 1935, CABLE DIARY, that month.
4
charge of the Midway construction project<13> for assistance should emergency
arise among the motley group of civilian contract laborers.<14>
Admiral Bloch's reaction to this proposal was immediate. Within a week,
on 31 May, Captain Samuel G. Taxis, then commanding the 5-inch seacoast group
of the 3d Defense Battalion, was ordered to Midway with a reconnaissance party
(First Lieutenant James G. Bishop, eight enlisted Marines and two Navy
hospital corpsmen)<15> for six weeks of preliminary work. He was to establish
a small Marine camp, prepare tentative recommendations for the seacoast
defense of Midway by the three 5-inch batteries of his group (as well as
certain antiaircraft recommendations), survey the base lines required for
accurate fire control, and block out the tactical communication net which
would be needed by the defending battalion. Within six weeks, his
instructions added, he could expect relief by a similar detachment with
further missions.<16>
Shortly after, on 5 June, Admiral Bloch--as a result of Colonel Pepper's
further recommendation ordered Lieutenant Commander Julian Love (MC) USN, the
3d Defense Battalion medical officer, to Midway to carry out a sanitary and
medical survey. This officer sailed from Pearl Harbor in the U.S.S. SIRIUS,
reached Midway on 11 June, and completed his survey by 16 June. Love's report,
an extremely thorough and detailed document, pointed out many aspects of life
on Midway which would become characteristic to future Marines in garrison.
Midway he found to be temperate to tropical in climate, with cool nights.
He noted the brilliant, white sand, which resulted in intense ground glare
from the sun.<17> Of the birds he stated:
Certain considerations should be made or continued for the
preservation of these birds for they are a great source of amusement,
and the cheerful calls (sic)<18> add much to the island and will in a
latent way add to the morale of personnel. * * *
There were cattle and poultry at the cable station, and abundant fish in the
lagoon. No significantly dangerous sanitary or epidemiological factors
existed, and, in conclusion, he opined:
This island is very pleasant and beautiful and should offer a happy
outlook to married personnel. For single officers and men it will
probably be better to rotate duty between there and Pearl Harbor at 3 to
6 month intervals during peacetime to avoid monotony and to give
consideration to natural desires of the men.<19>
On 9 July, Captain Kenneth W. Benner, with First Lieutenant Donald J.
Decker, eight enlisted Marines, and two Navy hospital corpsmen, was ordered to
Midway to relieve Captain Taxis and his detail. Captain Benner's instructions
were substantially similar to those of Captain Taxis, except that the former,
who commanded the 3-inch antiaircraft group of the defense battalion was to
devote his reconnaissance and survey to that required for antiaircraft defense
of the islands.<20>
Meanwhile, acting on Captain Taxis's initial information and Colonel
Pepper's urging, Admiral Bloch ordered the latter to establish on or after 1
September what was provisionally designated the Midway Detachment, Fleet
Marine Force, consisting of nine officers, 168 enlisted, and approximately
one-third of the 3d Defense Battalion's materiel, including one 5-inch battery
(two guns). This detachment was to act in turn as an advance echelon of the
whole battalion, personnel being rotated between Pearl Harbor and Midway on a
four- to six-month basis.
Major Harold C. Roberts (to be killed in action five years later while
commanding the 22d Marines on Okinawa) was in command of the Mid-
----------
<13>This was Lt. D. B. Ventres (CEC), USNR.
<14>CO, 3d Defense Battalion, memorandum to Com14, 23 May 1940.
<15>Taxis, Samuel G., Lt. Col., official reply to Historical Section
questionnaire regarding Midway, hereinafter cited as TAXIS, p. 3.
<16>Commandant, 14th Naval District, letter of instructions to Capt.
Samuel G. Taxis, 31 May 1940.
<17>Col. Kenneth W. Benner comments on this point: "The tender-skinned
boys were sunburned under their chins because of reflected glare."
<18>On reviewing this passage, Lt. Col. Stuart M. Charlesworth, another
Midway pioneer, commented: "The call of the sooty tern is anything but
cheerful * * *" and HADDEN, p. 5, says that the cry of the moaning bird
(Wedge-Tailed Shearwater) " * * * sounds as though all the devils in hell
are crying out in anguish."
<19>Love, Julian, Lt. Comdr. (MC) USN, report to Com14, 21 June 1940.
<20>Commandant, 14th Naval District, letter of instructions to Capt.
Kenneth W. Benner, 9 July 1940.
5
THE UBIQUITOUS GOONEY-BIRDS provided amusement for Marines
and problems for aviators.
way Detachment when it sailed from Pearl Harbor on 23 September 1940, in three
ships, the U.S.S. SIRIUS, a World War I Hog Islander, and two
destroyer-minecraft made available for the trip. Six days later, on 29
September, Major Roberts landed his detachment via barges and began the
arduous task of making camp and installing the defenses of Midway.<21>
The Roberts<22> detachment was quartered in the temporary barracks of an
Army Engineer unit which had been working on Midway in connection with harbor
improvements within the lagoon. During the next six months, the Midway
Marines' duties would consist of the unceasing arduous grind which perhaps
above all other aspects characterized duty in the defense battalions of
1940-1. Heavy weapons and fire-control materiel were gradually emplaced and
magazines and shelters were dug--largely by hand tools, for engineering
equipment was a scarce commodity in Marine units of those days. In addition to
the foregoing military duties, the Marines also--on order of the Fourteenth
Naval District--were required to act as stevedores and longshoremen for ships
coming to Midway.
Highlights of life on Midway during this initial period are described by
one officer in the following passage<23>:
Considerable effort was expended in filling and manhandling sandbags
from the beach areas to the gun positions; this was necessary to
preserve the limited camouflage furnished by the scaevola. Much sweat
and ingenuity was required to install the 5-inch guns on top of the
20-foot sand dune fringing Sand Island.
It was impossible to stand on one high point of the * * * dune and
recognize changes in elevation and direction of contours on Sand Island with
its covering of dense scaevola brush. To attempt to locate known points while
walking through the scaevola was also impossible due to the height and density
of foliage. The final solution in locating positions for magazine
installations to be constructed
----------
<21>Muster roll, 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, September 1940. These were
not, however, the first defensive installations to be made on Midway. VOTAW,
p. 1605, states that "two quick-firing cannon were installed" during the 1904-
08 garrisoning of Midway by Marines, but that a magazine explosion caused
their use to be terminated.
<22>The Roberts detachment was partially relieved by a similar group
under Major Kenneth W. Benner in December 1940. This unit remained on Midway
until the full battalion arrived in 1941.
<23>Letter by Lt. Col. Stuart M. Charlesworth to CMC, 15 January 1948.
6
in accordance with future planning was to send out a two-man team of officers
on a TD-9 tractor to press down trails along the inside of the fringing dunes
and to various points in the center of the island. This was accomplished by
one officer standing up on the back of the tractor in a position from which he
could look above the scaveola and give general directions to the driver. It
proved to be hot work in the direct sun without benefit of breeze and many
spills were taken from the pitching "cat." * * *
The "gooney" birds were a considerable problem within the
position-areas because once they fell into a gun pit they did not have
the intelligence necessary to find their way out. Actually the birds
created quite a diversion for the men working on the guns; and if
paint were hereditary, I imagine that many a "gooney" bird is still
wearing the red-lead splotches so delicately given his ancesters by the
Midway Detachment.
Recreation in the Midway Detachment consisted generally of swimming,
limited boating and fishing, a small amount of beer on occasion, and a
somewhat haphazard outdoor movie which came into being late in the tour.
Actually the birds seemed to enjoy the movie as much as the men because the
sooty tern and moaning bird would invariably flock around the sound box and
emit their mournful wail.
During the laying season the island was literally covered with eggs so
that in certain areas it was almost impossible to walk without stepping on
one. There probably wasn't a man in the detachment who didn't at one time or
another sit down to a dinner of tern eggs, whether of necessity or for the
experience.
While the advance echelon of the 3d Defense Battalion labored on Midway,
the Chief of Naval Operations, increasingly concerned over the international
situation, directed, early in 1941, that the entire battalion be established
at Midway; and that the 6th Defense Battalion, then in training at San Diego,
but without its heavy material, be transferred to Pearl Harbor for advanced
training, and for service as a rotational pool of replacements for Marine
garrisons shortly to be established at Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.<24>
The orders had been anticipated, and, on 7 February 1941, when CinCPac
issued implementing instructions with regard to Midway, it was a matter of
only three days before the balance of the 3d Defense Battalion, approximately
28 officers and 565 enlisted Marines, with all heavy organizational equipment
loaded in U.S.S. ANTARES, sailed from Pearl Harbor distributed among the ships
of Cruiser Division 8.<25> The movement was executed without incident, and, on
14 February, the battalion arrived and commenced disembarkation at Midway.
This, however, was by no means a simple dockside operation. A heavy sea
was running, which forced Task Force Three to lie off for 24 hours before even
attempting to get the Marines ashore, which was done by ships' boats "running"
Brooks Channel from the open roadstead beyond the reef. A number of the motor
launches swamped due to heavy seas, and, in one instance, a Marine was washed
overboard, only to be neatly retrieved by the boat following. The whole
flotilla was piloted in by a Marine officer, Captain Taxis, who by now was
thoroughly familiar with Midway and its waters.<26>
Despite the hard work of the Marines in the advance echelon, Midway was
by no means entirely ready or ideally suited to receive its full garrison.
Admiral Kimmel, then CinCPac, realized this as reports came back from the
atoll, and within two months actually proposed a reduction of the Marine
force, on the basis that the overcrowding at Midway imposed an undue strain on
supporting agencies and deterred progress of work.<27>
But the march of events in 1941 could hardly be reversed.
Only one day after Admiral Kimmel's recommendation, Admiral Bloch,
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, had issued an operation plan for
defense of his outlying islands, premising the possible outbreak of
hostilities, emphasizing the restricted status of the sea areas about those
bases, and ordering defense forces, without parleying, to--
* * * fire on suspicious and unidentified air-
----------
<24>CNO serial 0638, 17 January 1941. Marine garrisons, from the 1st
Defense Battalion, had been set up at Johnston on 24 July 1941, and Palmyra on
14 April 1941.
<25>The new light cruisers SAVANNAH, PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, and
NASHVILLE. It is an indication of the increasing tension of the times that the
movement designated Task Force Three--proceeded to Midway with ships darkened
and within a destroyer screen provided by DesDiv 11. PacFlt Operation Order
31, 6 February 1941.
<26>Letter by Lt. Col. Samuel G. Taxis to CMC, 6 January 1948.
<27>CinCPac serial 0496 to CNO, 3 April 1941.
7
craft * * * stop unidentified and suspicious vessels * * * if
necessary by firing a shot across the bow.
Submarine, surface or air raids prior to any declaration of hostilities were a
possibility, he warned.<28>
To CinCPac's proposal for even a temporary and partial reduction of the
Midway force, the Chief of Naval Operations therefore replied with a firm
negative, rejoining that the international situation was such that even
further augmentation of Midway's defenses was under consideration.<29> This
augmentation contemplated the installation at Midway of four 7-inch naval
guns,<30> together with four 3-inch naval guns, all over and above the defense
battalion's normal quota of weapons. These weapons were to become available
for installation about 1 November.
During the summer of 1941, the grind continued unabated. In the words of
Lt. Col. Erma A. Wright, who comments on Midway as it then was:
The morale of the troops, of course, was of major importance since
there were no USO shows to attend, nor beautiful Red Cross girls to
serve coffee and doughnuts. Actually there were only two imported
morale-builders-movies and the arrival of the Pan-American clipper
twice weekly. To make up the difference, Colonel Pepper insisted on hard
work and hard play seven days per week. This combination worked
miracles. * * *
By midsummer, however, Colonel Pepper and a group of 3d Defense Battalion
personnel who had been longest at Midway were relieved by a similar detachment
under Lieutenant Colonel Bert A. Bone of the 1st Defense Battalion, which
remained until arrival of the 6th Defense Battalion later in the year.
In August, two events of note took place. The first was commissioning of
the Naval Air Station, Midway, on the first of the month, under prospective
command of Commander Cyril T. Simard, USN, a veteran Naval aviator destined to
play a vital role in the defense of Midway. The second was arrival of the
advance detail of the 6th Defense Battalion, commanded by another officer
whose name would be linked in history with that of Midway: Lieutenant Colonel
Harold D. Shannon, battalion executive officer.
Bringing out his echelon (10 officers and 130 enlisted) in U. S. S.
CHESTER and NASHVILLE, Colonel Shannon reached Midway on 11 August and
immediately set to preparing for the relief of the 3d Defense Battalion.
Throughout the month, turn-over of vital information and key jobs was
progressively accomplished so that when, on 11 September, the main body of the
6th Defense Battalion arrived, under command of Colonel Raphael Griffin,<31>
the relief was rapidly concluded.<32>
Thus, one year after the original Midway Detachment, FMF, had been
established, the 3d Defense Battalion could step aside for a well-earned
period of rest and rotation in the Hawaiian area.
A few weeks after the relief of the 3d Defense Battalion, in late
November, Midway received a most important visitor<33> (the term "VIP" had not
yet come into general use)--none other than Mr. Kurusu, Saburu, the
last-minute "peace" envoy of Japan, who was flying to the United States from
Tokyo via Pan American clipper. The fol-
----------
<28>In compliance with these instructions (14th Naval District Operation
Plan 21, 4 April 1941), the 3d Defense Battalion designated a boarding
officer, 1st Lt. Charles J. Seibert, II. At about this time, likewise, a
Japanese freighter appeared off Midway, just beyond gun range, lay to, and
then circled the atoll before proceeding. This ship was challenged but gave no
reply. Letter by Lt. Col. Harry F. Noyes to CMC, 28 December 1947.
<29>CNO serial 047412,6 May 1941.
<30>Major General Commandant, USMC, serial 434941-2, to Brig. Gen.
Charles F. B. Price, 12 September 1941. The history of these and certain other
7-inch guns likewise installed at outlying bases is a story which spans both
wars. The guns were originally mounted aboard predreadnaught battleships of
the early 1900's; were dismounted during World War I to serve as medium
artillery ashore for the 10th Marines in France, and were finally distributed
between Samoa, Midway, Bora-Bora, and Guantanamo Bay in 1941-42. Those
emplaced at Midway are now mounted in front of Iolani Barracks in Honolulu.
<31>Colonel Griffin was shortly afterward relieved as commanding officer
of the battalion by Colonel Shannon, in a routine change of command.
<32>The 6th Defense Battalion, FMF (34 officers and 750 enlisted) had
reached Pearl Harbor in the U.S.S. Wharton on 22 July, and its main body
sailed from Midway on 7 September. Muster rolls, 6th Defense Battalion; and
letter from Lt. Col. Ralph A. Collins, Jr., to CMC 12 January 1948.
<33>Another "VIP" visitor whose arrival at Midway received much publicity
at this time was Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, then on a world flight. From her point
of view, the stop was eventful because of sudden seizure with a digestive
upset while on the atoll.
8
owing account, by one of the officers then on Midway, tells of the Marines'
experience with Mr. Kurusu:
We had advance notice of his arrival date and the ostensible nature
of his mission, but did not expect him to remain the full three days
that he did as result of extremely bad weather. Colonel Shannon and
Captain Simard (sic) decided to arrange a reception calculated to
impress him with the alertness and strength (largely nonexistent) of
the Midway garrison. Elaborate plans involving precise timing were
drawn up so that when Mr. Kurusu disembarked from the Pan American
bowser barge (he was traveling in one of the old Pan Air flying boats
which anchored out in the lagoon) onto Midway, the first thing to meet
his eyes would be an endless line of Marines in light marching order
filing past. In addition, all available aviation strength, consisting
of a squadron of PBY's, was drawn up on the seaplane apron in full view
of the dock.
The plans worked out perfectly. The head of the column, which was
on the road between the dock and the Pan Air Hotel where Kurusu was to
stay, was started moving toward the hotel just before he decked. The
tail of the column of Marines, in file with about two yards between
men, stretched back toward the hangar as far as he could see. After
being greeted by Captain Simard and Colonel Shannon and given plenty of
opportunity to see the planes, he was driven in the captain's car past
the continuous line of silently plodding Marines, carrying their rifles
slung, with fixed bayonets. Their presence along the road was explained
nonchalantly Colonel Shannon as a routine training maneuver of a small
part of the command. Actually every available man, including the cooks
and messmen, had been scraped together to make a single line long enough
so that Kurusu could not see how pitifully few were the defenders of
Midway. The captain went on to apologize for not rendering honors and
explained that every minute was required for intensive training--he was
sure Mr. Kurusu would understand. That this statement was true must have
been apparent to Kurusu during the next 3 days, and entirely without
premeditation on our part.
It just happened that Fox (Silvey)<34> Battery was right in front of
the Pan Air hotel, being separated only by a coral road, and was due to
fire a calibration shoot followed by some extensive trial fire and
burst-adjustment problems for training. * * * The colonel saw no
reason for not going ahead with the firing; on the contrary we
embellished it some what. So for the duration of his enforced 3-day
stop-over, Mr. Kurusu listened to the slamming of the 3-inch AA guns
outside his window from early morning until sunset. The practice was
culminated with the firing by all guns of 15 rounds adjustment at full
firing rate on a burst target, which made quite an impressive noise for
our guest, as well as giving our gun crews some badly needed loading
practice. He was not permitted to leave the hotel, in accordance with
established procedure for civilian Pan Air guests (except for one night
as the captain's and colonel's guest at our officers' mess and movie),
so any impressions he may have gotten of Midway were necessarily those
of the "march-past," the planes, and the firing.
In the Marine Corps concept of defense of advanced bases, the artillery,
both seacoast and antiaircraft, represented only part of the rounded whole,
and local aviation was realized to be essential for balanced defense of a base
such as Midway. Therefore, as soon as development of the airfield on Eastern
Island warranted, it was determined that Fleet aviation, to be drawn from
Marine Air Group 21, then based at Ewa Mooring Mast, T. H., would be assigned
to Midway, where, in fact, the air field was already in partial use as a ferry
point for Army B-17's then being flown to the Far East. To support this latter
activity, a detachment of one officer and four enlisted radiomen of the Army
Signal Corps had been established with appropriate radio equipment on Midway
in October, and, on 19 November 1941, a Marine aviation advance detail
consisting of one officer (Second Lieutenant Loren D. Everton) and 60 enlisted
was sent forward, to prepare the field for use by Marine Scout Bombing
Squadron 231 (VMSB-231) which would remain at Ewa until Midway could receive
them.<35>
Progress of Everton's detachment on Eastern Island was such that,
immediately after the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE had delivered Marine Fighting Squadron
211 to Wake for a similar role, the U. S. S. LEXINGTON embarked VMSB-231 for
Midway on 5 December, with the intention of flying off the squadron on the
morning of 7 December.<36>
----------
<34>Although subsequently known as Silvey Battery from the name of a
future commanding officer, this unit was at this time actually commanded by
Capt. Hoyt McMillan. Letter from Lt. Col. Hoyt McMillan to CMC, 27 January
1948.
<35> Larkin, Claude A., Col., letter to CinCpac, 5 April 1943, p. 2.
<36>Larkin, Claude A., Col., personal letter, 18 December 1941.
9
On 1 December 1941, meanwhile, as Marines of the 6th Defense Battalion
and the ground echelon of VMSB-231 were putting final touches on their
respective construction programs, two 1,800-ton Japanese destroyers,
comprising Destroyer Division 7, AKEBONO and USHIO, under command of Captain
Konishi, Kaname, sailed from Tokyo Bay with orders to proceed via carefully
planned routing to Midway. A fleet tanker, Shiriya, would fuel them and act as
their train. A small task unit of the larger fleet which had sailed from
Hitokappu Bay against Pearl Harbor four days earlier, on 26 November, the
destroyer division and its tanker was provisionally designated as Midway
Neutralization Unit, their mission being to neutralize the Naval Air Station
that place.<37>
Unknowing of all this, however, the forces on Midway spent the week of 1
December much as they had spent past weeks; that is, in improving gun
emplacements, and unloading a cargo ship; and to them Sunday, 7 December, was
merely the day on which the airplanes of VMSB-231 were scheduled to fly in to
Eastern Island.
----------
<37>"Campaigns of the Pacific War," U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946,
pp. 13 and 20-21, hereinafter cited as Campaigns.
10
MARINES AT MIDWAY
CHAPTER II
War Comes to Midway
On the morning of 7 December, Midway's patrol planes were out early and
on schedule. Five of VP-21's PBY's were dronning along prescribed routine
searches, and two more patrol bombers, enroute for ultimate delivery to the
Netherlands East Indies, had taken off for Wake at first light. On the Sand
Island seaplane ramp, two PBY's warmed up to rendezvous with and guide in the
expected Marine dive-bombing squadron, VMSB-23 1.<1>
At 0630 (0900 Pearl Harbor time), a Navy radio operator's "Z"-signal from
Oahu broke through to Midway with an inkling of the disaster at Pearl Harbor;
a few minutes later, just as the Army Signal Corps detachment was receiving
the same word from Hickam Field, an official despatch from the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, confirmed the news and directed that current war
plans be placed in effect.
After recalling the Dutch PBY's (which were forthwith commandeered for
VP-21) and establishing additional patrol sectors for the remaining aircraft,
the Island Commander at 0918 directed that the 6th Defense Battalion--which
had at 0900 already acted in anticipation of such orders--go to general
quarters.
The remainder of the day was spent in much the same type of activity as
was frantically going ahead on other outlying United States Islands:
preparations for blackout, issue of additional ammunition, digging of
foxholes, and check of communications. All lights and navigational aids were
extinguished.
By nightfall, with defenses still manned, Midway--which now was not to
receive VMSB-231, due to the LEXINGTON's diversion to an attempt to locate the
Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force--was buttoned up, and all search planes
had returned with negative reports.
At 1842, however, just after evening twilight, a Marine lookout observed
a flashing light some distance to the southwest of Sand Island. Although this
soon disappeared, it was, undoubtedly, a visual signal among the Japanese
ships of the Midway Neutralization Unit. Although lights were not again seen,
the one operational radar on Sand Island began picking up what seemed to be
surface targets southwest of Sand Island about 2130. At almost the same time,
observers in two searchlight positions, which were equipped with powerful 8X56
night glasses, reported "shapes" to seaward in the same area as the radar
contacts just mentioned. The commanding officer of the searchlight battery
(Battery G, First Lieutenant Alfred L. Booth) immediately requested permission
to illuminate, but this was refused on the ground that it might disclose our
positions prematurely. Further, at this time it was erroneously believed that
friendly ships were in the vicinity, and this doubt had resulted in issuance
of strict orders against any firing or illumination except on specific orders
from the battalion commander.<2>
----------
<1>These and subsequent details as to the day of 7 December on Midway are
taken from War Diary, NAS, Midway, for that date, hereinafter cited as NAS
Diary.
<2>Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Alfred L. Booth to CMC, 27 January
1948, hereinafter cited as Booth; and letter from Lieutenant Colonel Loren S.
Fraser to CMC, hereinafter cited as Fraser.
11
JAPANESE DESTROYER, USHIO, which shelled Midway on the night of
7 December 1941, rides at her last anchorage, after the end of
the war. Of all the enemy vessels which participated in the
Pearl Harbor attack, this lone destroyer was the only one afloat
on VJ-day.
Akebono and Ushio, the two enemy destroyers whose mission was to bombard
Midway, made their land fall about 2130, having left the tanker, Shiriya, at a
rendezvous some 15 miles to southwest ward. Within a few minutes they were on
station southwest of Sand Island for the first firing run, and their twin
5-inch mounts were already trained toward Midway.
At 2135, the first salvo cracked out, and war had come to Midway.
During the first part of his run, Captain Konishi's shells landed short:
just between Sand Island's west beach and the reef. Then, as the Japanese
destroyers steamed slowly northeastward, closing the range somewhat, the
salvos walked onto target, first hitting near Battery A, the 5-inch seacoast
unit at the south end of Sand Island, and then bracketing the Sand Island
power plant, a reinforced-concrete structure also in use as a command post by
one platoon of Battery H (.50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun).
At this juncture, not having yet received return fire, and seemingly not
having inflicted damage, Captain Konishi ceased firing while his ships closed
the range and took station for a second run.
Ashore, meanwhile, Condition One had been immediately resumed by the
defense battalion, and the telephone lines leading to and from Colonel
Shannon's headquarters were jammed with excited reports.
Although the Japanese commander did not realize it, his initial shelling
had put a round through an air port into the reinforced concrete
12
power plant just mentioned. This station was manned by First Lieutenant George
H. Cannon and three enlisted assistants, all of whom were ether wounded or
stunned. Cannon himself was mortally injured; his communication chief,
Corporal Harold R. Hazelwood, sustained a fractured leg; and Platoon Sergeant
William A. Barbour had an ankle smashed. Despite his own wound, a crushed
pelvis accompanied by profuse bleeding, Cannon remained conscious and refused
evacuation, directing reestablishment of communications and the evacuation of
others from the structure, the interior of which had been scarred and raked by
blast and fragments. Finally, after Hazelwood, despite his own wound, had
managed to get the damaged switchboard back into operation, Cannon was removed
forcibly from his post, to die a few minutes later at the battalion aid
station.<3>
At 2148, as Konishi's destroyers reopened fire at closer range, Commander
Simard gave Colonel Shannon permission to engage enemy targets as disclosed.
The Japanese ships were now steaming, northeast, firing up the long axis of
Sand Island. Although they were being tracked visually by the crews of
Lieutenant Booth's searchlights, the congestion of communications still
prevented the latter from gaining permission to illuminate.<4>
Already, Japanese shells had hit the new Sand Island seaplane hangar, the
roof of which burst into flame while the Marine antiaircraft machine gunners
thereon concentrated, despite the enemy fire, on lowering their weapons and
ammunition to the ground before the flames could consume them. With the
blazing hangar as a beacon, the Japanese shifted fire to other structures on
the island, including the Pan Air radio beacon, the laundry, and adjacent
shops.<5>
At 2153, orders finally reached the searchlights to illuminate enemy
ships. By now, only Searchlight 2, on the south end of Sand Island, would
bear, and this promptly flashed on, silhouetting the AKEBONO approximately
2,500 yards south of
1STLT. GEORGE H. CANNON, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor
for his heroic refusal to be evacuated from his post, despite
mortal wounds, until his unit's communications had been
re-established during the Japanese bombardment of 7 December 1941.
the position. A moment later, an enemy salvo fell within a few yards, and
concussion knocked the light's feed mechanism out of position, thus
extinguishing the beam. Acting in a split second, one of the crewmen, trained
for just such an emergency, readjusted the delicate (and red-hot) mechanism in
the dark, and the light was back in action and on target.<6>
A few minutes earlier, just at the instant when word was being passed to
commence firing, an enemy shell hit and burst within 18 inches of the plotting
room of the 5-inch battery (A) on the south end of Sand Island, and severed
all telephone lines of the battery's interior and exterior communications.
This was particularly unfortunate since Battery A was the unit under whose
guns the enemy destroyers were about to be illuminated, and the loss of
interior communication prevented firing data or any fire commands from
reaching the guns themselves.<7>
----------
<3>Letter from Col. Lewis A. Hohn to CMC, 30 January 1948, hereinafter
cited as Hohn. For this devotion to duty, Lieutenant Cannon was posthumously
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, being the first Marine to be so
honored in World War II. Corporal Hazelwood received the Navy Cross.
<4>Booth.
<5>Hohn,p. 2.
<6>Ibid.
<7>Fraser.
13
Only one battery could now bear effectively. This was a 3-inch
antiaircraft unit (Battery D, Captain Jean H. Buckner) on the southeast shore
of Sand Island, from which Buckner could even discern the large Japanese
battle-flag flying from the Akebono's foremast.
As soon as the enemy target had been illuminated, Buckner ordered his
battery into action, taking care, however, to direct gun captains to make sure
that their fire would not endanger adjacent sections. Each gun captain checked
his line of fire, and then, in Buckner's words,
Sergeant Lefert on Gun 2 loaded his gun but upon checking for safety
* * * discovered that it was pointed directly at the pit occupied by
Gunnery Sergeant Pulliman and me. He informed Pulliman of this fact over
the gun control phone and wisely held his fire. * * *
Battery D's other guns, however, commenced firing as Buckner and his fire
controlmen prepared to spot when the splashes appeared. None could be made
out, however, despite the excellent illumination, which seemed to indicate
that the shells were either passing through the superstructure or into the
hull.
Meanwhile, Battery B, a 5-inch unit on Eastern Island (First Lieutenant
Rodney M. Handley), made preparations to open fire, and .50 caliber
antiaircraft machine guns, well within range, peppered the enemy ships,
arching solid tracer streams toward their targets.
At 2158, five minutes after Searchlight 2 had struck arc, just as it
appeared to observers that Handley's opening salvos had hulled the Ushio, now
visible astern of Akebono, the Japanese succeeded in shooting out the
searchlight. Smoke appeared to be "pouring" from Ushio, and the enemy ships
ceased fire, retiring to the southwest into their own smoke.<8>
What damage had actually been sustained by the Japanese ships remains a
moot question. Battery D had fired 13 rounds of 3-inch, and
SAND ISLAND SEAPLANE HANGAR, A TWO-TIME LOSER under the enemy
attacks of 7 December 1941 and 4 June 1942, smoulders as a result
of its status as the most conspicuous target on Sand Island.
----------
<8>Some observers on Midway believed that this was a smoke screen and not
the result of our fire. For a detailed account of Battery D's duel with
Akebono, see appendix IV.
14
COL. HAROLD D. SHANNON, senior Marine officer at Midway during the
battle, and commanding officer of the 6th Defense Battalion during
the atoll's most critical period.
Battery B, nine rounds of 5-inch. Enemy records and logs are neither fully
available nor specific with regard to this engagement. Midway observers agree
that the 3-inch battery secured at least three hits, yet it is equally certain
that both ships returned to Japan under their own power as planned.<9> Some
light, however, is shed upon this question by the report of Capt. J. H.
Hamilton, pilot of the Pan American aircraft, PHILIPPINE CLIPPER, which was in
flight at this time from Wake to Midway.
The PHILIPPINE CLIPPER, flying at 10,000 feet in bright moonlight, saw
below it an intense fire on the surface of the sea, by the light of which
could also be discerned the wakes of two ships, apparently cruisers.<10> Their
position was 35 miles west by south of Midway, and their apparent course was
240 degrees magnetic, reported Hamilton. It seems at least probable that these
were AKEBONO and USHIO, and, if so, that one of them was then on fire, which
would indicate that the Marine batteries had left their mark upon the
enemy.<11>
On Midway, meanwhile, all action centered on damage control, care for the
casualties, and a not altogether successful attempt to send out PBY's to
locate and attack the hostile force, a project further confused by a profusion
of dubious radar reports which came in throughout the night. Several buildings
had been hit or partially destroyed, and a considerable quantity of Navy
stores lost, mainly incident to the burning of the hangar.
In casualties, the raid had cost the 6th Defense Battalion two killed and
10 wounded, while the Naval Air Station had lost two killed.<12>
----------
<9>Campaigns, p. 20.
<10>In common with die defenders of Wake, Midway's men, unfamiliar with
enemy vessels, mistook destroyers for cruisers. Further, in the confusion of
the initial attack, Colonel Shannon believed that the enemy force had probably
totaled four ships instead of two, as was actually the case. In this
connection, Colonel Hohn comments:
"It is perhaps understandable why the report was made of four enemy ships
made a firing run heading in general in a northerly direction, after which
there was silence and darkness for some minutes; then two ships started a
firing run from a position much further south. It was discussed and realized
at the time by a number of people * * * that it was probable that the same two
ships had made both runs, but it is seldom that conservatism wins out in
reports of action against the enemy."
<11>Interview of Capt. J. H. Hamilton by Assistant DIO, 14th Naval
District, 8 December 1941, p. 2, hereinafter cited at Hamilton.
<12>Statistics from Casualty Division, Marine Corps Headquarters, and
Bureau of Naval Personnel.
15
MARINES AT MIDWAY
CHAPTER III
Girding for Battle
After the somewhat shaking events of 7 December, Midway, no less than
Pearl Harbor, prepared for the worst with full anticipation that it would
come. Wake, it was known from scant despatches and by rumor, was undergoing
continuous attack; Johnston and Palmyra had been shelled; VP-21, with all
combat aircraft then on Midway, had been withdrawn; and it was believed that,
with the Fleet in its crippled status, little could be attempted to assist
Midway should that atoll become the next target. In this frame of mind, and on
short rations,<1> the 6th Defense Battalion worked grimly to make every
possible improvement in existing defense installations.
On 17 December, however, the first reinforcements arrived. These were 17
SB2U-3's of Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 231 (VMSB-231) which the LEXINGTON
had originally set out to deliver 10 days earlier, on 7 December, when
diverted after the attack. Led by the squadron commander, Maj. Clarence J.
Chappell, Jr. (and assisted in overwater navigation by a PBY of Patrol Wing 1)
the obsolescent Vindicators, as they were styled, had successfully completed
between 0630 and 1550 the 1,137-mile hop from Hickam Field, Oahu. This was
then the longest single-engine landplane massed flight of record, and had been
carried out with no surface rescue craft available.<2> As one of the defense
battalion officers (First Lieutenant David W. Silvey) reported:
The men stood on top of their gun emplacement and cheered when
the planes droned overhead. They represented a real Christmas present.
Within less than two days, ground reinforcements, hardly less needed than
VMSB-231, had been embarked at Pearl in the U.S.S. WRIGHT and on 19 December
were underway for Midway. These were Batteries A and C, 4th Defense Battalion,
FMF (both 5-inch seacoast batteries, under command of Capt. Custis Burton,
Jr.) bringing with them, in addition to miscellaneous supplies of all types,
the Navy 7-inch and 3-inch guns, with necessary materiel, which had been
shipped to Pearl Harbor for Midway prior to the outset of war. On Christmas
Eve the reinforcements arrived, and Colonel Shannon lost no time in turning
over to Captain Burton with one battery (A) the mission of installing,
organizing, and manning the 7-inch and the 3-inch batteries to be emplaced on
Eastern Island. To First Lieutenant Lewis A. Jones, who commanded Battery C of
this group, the assignment was to carry out a
----------
<1>Instituted originally as an economy against possible isolation during
the first days of the war, this custom carried over for reasons of convenience
and conformity to the daily routine which subsequently prevailed. (See p.18.)
<2>CO, MAG-21 serial 1173, to MGC, 19 December 1941. The reason for this
flight's take-off from the Army field, Hickam, was that Ewa's runways were too
short to permit such heavily loaded planes to get off with entire safety. One
additional pilot, 2d Lt. Richard L. Blain, made the same flight 10 days later,
in order to bring the squadron to full complement of 18 planes. Blain
accompanied a PBY, and, due to headwinds, required 12 hours to complete the
trip.
16
similar role with regard to the Navy 3-inch battery planned for Sand
Island.<3>
This reinforcement, amounting to approximately 100 officers and men, was
followed, next day, by a welcome Christmas gift in the form of 14 Brewster
F2A-3 Marine fighters, composing the air echelon of Marine Fighting Squadron
221 (VMF-221), which flew in from the U. S. S. SARATOGA, then near Midway,
retiring after the abortive attempt to relieve Wake. VMF-221, commanded by
Major Verne J. McCaul, had originally been slated to reinforce Wake's depleted
VMF-211, and Midway was the next most important destination. Without delay,
the fighter squadron (the first such to garrison Midway), commenced its daily
routine of airsearch and patrolling.<4>
On 26 December Midway received its final major reinforcement of the
month; the arrival of U. S. S. TANGIER, the seaplane tender also originally
despatched to Wake bearing a relieving force of Marines and much defensive
material. From the TANGIER the 6th Defense Battalion received Battery B, 4th
Defense Battalion (First Lieutenant Frank G. Umstead); additional machine
gunners and 12 antiaircraft machine guns from the Special Weapons Group of
that same battalion; an aviation contingent of three officers and 110 enlisted
Marines (the ground echelon of VMF-221); aviation supplies; additional radar;
and much-needed base-defense artillery materiel. Lieutenant Umstead's 5-inch
battery (B) was given the assignment of installing and manning the other
7-inch battery to be located south of the radio station on Sand Island.<5>
As of New Year's Day, 1942, therefore, Midway was already garrisoned by a
Marine force consisting of a strongly reinforced defense battalion, one
fighting and one scout-bomber squadron.
The build-up on Eastern Island had been, and would continue particularly
impressive as a major air base took shape. A report submitted early in January
1942, by Lt. Col. William J. Wallace, who on 9 January had been ordered out as
commanding officer of the entire Marine Aviation Detachment, tells of the
erection of individual aircraft bunkers and underground personnel shelters, of
emergency and stand-by fueling expedients being devised, of radar calibrations
so that inexperienced operators could learn something of the then-mysterious
instruments. To assist during this phase, Colonel Wallace was fortunate in
having with him Major Walter L. J. Bayler, the Marine aviation officer who had
been sent back from Wake with that atoll's last reports.<6>
That the zeal and vigor with which defensive preparations and training
were being prosecuted on Midway were not wasted, was shortly to be
demonstrated.
On 25 January, at 1748, during twilight general quarters (an element of
Midway's daily routine which would pay off on subsequent occasions as well) a
Japanese submarine, the I-173, surfaced abruptly, due south of the mouth of
Brooks Channel (between Sand and Eastern Islands), and opened fire on Sand
Island. Although the sun had set more than 20 minutes previously, the enemy
ship was distinctly visible in the afterglow as she cruised slowly westward,
apparently trying to knock out the radio station, the masts of which afforded
a conspicuous directfire target. Within less than one minute, Battery D
(3-inch) had a two-gun salvo on the way; followed by another, both on local
control; thereafter, as the battery's director picked up the problem and
electric power went on, the entire four-gun unit went into action. A bracket
was quickly obtained, followed by a reported water-line hit, after which the
submarine crash-dived at 1751. In the brisk three minutes of action, Sand
Island and the adjacent lagoon had received 10 to 15 indiscriminate hits, and
Captain Buckner's Bat-
----------
<3>Historical Section interview with Lt. Col. Custis Burton, Jr., 26
September 1947, hereinafter cited as Burton. The two Eastern Island batteries
assigned to Captain Burton were located side by side on the south shore of the
island, near the western tip, and the Sand Island 3-inch Navy battery was to
be set up hard by the Cable Station, along the north shore of Sand Island.
(See map 1.)
<4>History of Marine Fighting Squadron 221," undated and without
indication of authorship, p. 5 (believed to have been initialed by Second Lt.
Francis P. McCarthy). Hereinafter cited as VMF-221 History.
<5>Ibid, p. 5, and Burton, p. 1.
<6>Wallace, William J., Lt. Col., personal letter to Col. Claude A.
Larkin, 18 January 1942.
17
tery D had expended 24 rounds, with what effect no one on Midway could say.<7>
Less than 36 hours later, however, the officers and men of the U. S. S.
GUDGEON, a submarine on war patrol northwest of Midway, found themselves able
to close the books on I-173.
In a position some 240 miles west by north of Midway on the morning of 27
January, the GUDGEON, cruising partially submerged, came upon the I-173
underway on the surface, proceeding at approximately 16 knots. It was the
matter of a moment to maneuver into position for a shot; a spread of three
torpedoes was fired; and within two minutes the unmistakable concussion of
torpedo hits announced destruction of the enemy submarine which had shelled
Midway.<8>
To weeks later, almost to the minute, at 1805, 8 February, under
identical conditions, another enemy submarine appeared due south of Sand
Island, less than 1,000 yards offshore, and again opened fire on the radio
towers. This time it was a 5-inch battery (A) Captain Loren S. Fraser which
spotted the bombarding enemy by her initial gun-flash. Before three Japanese
shells had hit, Battery A had returned two rounds, and the submarine ceased
firing and submerged. Damage ashore had actually been sustained, although
serious only in potentiality--a concrete magazine had been hit; fortunately
the small-arms ammunition within was not detonated.<9>
Probably it was the same Japanese submarine which reappeared two days
later at 1758 on 10 February. This time--unfortunately for the Japanese--when
the ship surfaced at much the same position as the first marauder (south of
the entrance to Brooks Channel), a section of two Marine fighters--flying the
sunset antisubmarine patrol established as a result of the two previous
bombardments--was almost directly overhead at 1,500 feet. The submarine had
time to get off two rounds, both of which hit in the lagoon, before First
Lieutenant John F. Carey, pilot of one of the aircraft, observed the ship,
notified his wingman (Second Lieutenant Philip R. White) and pulled up into a
brief climb in order to arm bombs and gain altitude for a diving attack. Both
pilots released bombs, secured gratifying close near misses and strafed as the
submarine began to submerge, just at the moment when the 6th Defense
Battalion's batteries were going into action, and this was the last time for
many months that Midway was troubled by enemy submarines.<10>
By this date the pattern of wartime life on Midway had been well
established. Since--except on Johnston Island, where similar routine
prevailed--this pattern was unique in the Marine experience of the Pacific
war, its description in the following passage by Lieutenant Colonel
McGlashan<11> is of particular interest: of particular interest:
Since Midway was, to my knowledge, the only place (sic) in our
armed forces where underground living prevailed, except while in
contact with the enemy or under attack, brief comment on our way of
life is in order. Breakfast, supper, and a midnight snack with hot
coffee were served to all positions from the central galley in food
containers by truck. Since we stood a morning and evening stand-by
there was not time to serve a noon meal during the day, as the
process of distributing food to the widely dispersed gun positions
by food container and getting them returned and cleaned for the next
meal was a lengthy one. All food was prepared at the main galley in
the newly completed barracks where the men would also go during the
day in increments to bathe. The lack of a noon meal was quite
disconcerting to new arrivals, but they soon became accustomed to it
and actually were in much better health. When conditions permitted,
movies were held in a blacked-out warehouse during the day and men
off watch could go. But the high point of each day was the noon
libation of two beers at the
----------
<7>CO, 6th Defense Battalion Report to Commandant 14th Naval District, 26
January 1942.
<8>JANEC, p. 19, appendix of submarine sinkings; and report of GUDGEON's
first war patrol.
<9>CO, 6th Defense Battalion report to CO, Marine Forces, 14th Naval
District, 8 February 1942, and NAS Diary, that date.
<10>CO, VMF-221 report of submarine contact to CO, MAG-21, 11 February
1942, and CO 6th Defense Battalion report to CG, Marine Forces, 14th Naval
District, 10 February 1942. Despite the pilots' aggressive and prompt attack,
however, there is no record of the loss of any enemy submarine in this area or
about this time, JANEC, p. 1. A Japanese sandal, washed ashore shortly
afterward, led to speculation as to whether the gun crew might not have been
abandoned when this submarine crash-dived.
<11>McGlashan, Robert C., Lt. Col., official reply to Historical Section
questionnaire, 12 August 1947, pp. 16-18, hereinafter cited as McGlashan.
Colonel McGlashan served as operations officer (Bn-3) of the 6th Defense
Battalion throughout this period, and is one of the most important surviving
sources.
18
Map of MIDWAY ISLANDS
LTCOL. IRA L. KIMES, Marine air commander during the battle of
Midway, stands in front of his camouflaged underground command
post on Eastern Island.
PX * * * Swimming was allowed in certain areas but helmets and side
arms had to be worn to the beach and at all other times. (Colonel
Shannon's insistence on the wearing of the helmet and carrying of
rifles at all times was the subject of an excellent cartoon, which the
colonel hugely enjoyed. It depicted a Marine, naked save for a helmet,
cartridge-belt and rifle, dipping a toe in the water prior to diving
in.)
All activities away from battle stations had to be carried on
during the day, and after the evening stand-by everyone went
underground for the night except for the men on watch above ground.
Sleeping underground has its good points as it is quiet, there is no
early sun to bother one after a night on watch, and there is a great
feeling of security from surprise submarine attack. It is true that
the dugouts were often hot in the summer months and cold in winter and
at first were much too crowded and lacked proper ventilation, but by
and large it was a very pleasant existence.
Colonel Shannon "slept" in a small room off the main CP operations
center and heard nearly every phone call or report that came in. One
thing that could never be said of the old man, was that he lacked
energy or attention to duty. He would end a 25-coffee-cup day with
three or four cups of hot black coffee at midnight and then turn in
and fall asleep instantly. If anything happened he was immediately
awake and he never slept later than 0500, being awakened about a
half-hour before morning twilight. The staff officer on watch would
have to furnish him with a report of conditions obtained from the
lighthouse tower lookout immediately upon awakening him. The report
would include: radar reports, weather (wind, clouds, height of
breakers on reef, visibility, tide, moon, events of the night, and
status of communications). And woe to the officer who didn't know
every one of those things accurately and in the specified terminology.
After the report was properly rendered, the colonel would relax and
start his coffee marathon with the cup that was always hot and ready
for his awakening.
As the winter wore on, Midway's Marine aviation component began to feel
the effects of the general expansion of Marine Corps aviation as a whole. The
two squadrons and their small provisional headquarters were formed on 1 March
into what they in fact already were, an air group: MAG-22. At the same time,
each squadron was split in two and brought again to strength by new personnel.
As a result--for the time being MAG-22 consisted of VMF-221 and VMF-222; and
of VMSB-241 and VSMB-242.<12>
On 20 April, Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, who had seen MAG-22 through its
teething stage, was relieved in command by Major Ira L. Kimes. At the same
time, Major Chappell (VMSB-241) was replaced by Major Lofton R. Henderson.
This was a busy time for MAG-22, which was then engaged in converting Eastern
Island from a small advanced air base to a major installation capable of
handling as many squadrons and types as could physically be accommodated and
protected. A detailed account of the Marine Air Group's labors and
tribulations during this period are contained in appendix V.
----------
<12>VMF-222 and VSMB-242 were transferred (personnel only) from Midway on
12 April 1942 and play no further role in this history, the ultimate net
effect of the reorganizations being that Midway's Marine aviation was now
organized into MAG-22 composed of VMF-221 and VSMB-241, with the same
complement of aircraft as previously. VSMB-231, in name only, was transferred
on paper to MAG-23, in the Hawaiian area, but the squadron's personnel
remained at Midway under the new designation. VMF-221 History, p. 16.
19
On 10 March, shortly after this reorganization, the Marine fighter
squadrons got their first opportunity against enemy aircraft. Radar contact
was made that morning at 1030 on what developed to be a Japanese four-engined
"Mavis" (Kawanishi 97, probably from Wake) approximately 45 miles west of
Midway (which, in the argot of its fighter-director officers, was code-named
"Alcatraz"). Twelve fighters, under Capt. Robert M. Haynes, were vectored out,
of which a four-plane division commanded by Captain James L. Neefus made
contact with the enemy flying boat at 10,000) feet. Following this, in the
words of the Squadron's historian:
Captain Neefus made the first pass, drew smoke from one engine, and
the target dove for a cloud bank at 3,000 feet. Lieutenants McCarthy
and Somers made modified overhead passes (one each) before the patrol
bomber reached the cloud ba Marine Gunner Dickey made a tail approach
an received a wound in his left shoulder and seven bullet holes in his
plane. * * * Captain Neefus was able to return and make a second
pass. Dropping below the clouds, scattered, burning debris was observed
on the surface of the water. This was the first enemy plane to be shot
down by Group 22. The officers that participated in the fight received a
bottle of bourbon and congratulations from Lieutenant Colonel Wallace
and his staff.<13>
"MIDWAY ACTS AS A SENTRY FOR HAWAII," said the Japanese high command
in planning their thrust to capture the atoll. This view, looking
southeastward down the chain of shoals and islets, shows Midway's
strategic position directly astride the enemy's line of thrust toward
Oahu.
----------
<13>VMF-221 History, p. 17. In addition to the bourbon, these individuals
subsequently were were decorated by Admiral Nimitz. Full names and ranks of
the other pilots participating were 1st Lts. Francis P. McCarthy and Charles
W. Somers, Jr., and Marine Gunner Robert L. Dickey.
20
ADMIRAL NIMITZ FINDS OUT FOR HIMSELF that Midway's defenders are
ready to meet the forthcoming Japanese attack. The Pacific commander
in chief is just emerging from one of the hundreds of Marine dugouts
and defensive positions which he personally inspected during his
dramatic pre-battle visit to Midway.
During the month of April 1942, although Marines on Midway did not know
this, the Japanese Combined Fleet was commencing carrier operational training
and rehearsals for an operation against Midway, in the plans for which the
Japanese high command rightly stated, "Midway acts as a sentry for Hawaii."
In order to reach the Hawaiian prize which had been so nearly in their
grasp during December 1941, it would be necessary to obtain Midway, reasoned
the enemy.<14> When, on 18 April 1942, Army planes launched from the U. S. S.
HORNET, raided Tokyo, it was believed by the Japanese that these had come from
Midway, an estimate which further whetted Japanese eagerness to obtain control
of the atoll.<15>
Set in a background of strategic diversionary operations, the enemy plan
against Midway called for three days of attack and prelanding softening by a
powerful carrier task force variously entitled the First Air Fleet, First
Attack Force, Mobile Force, or Striking Force; this force (and a supporting
surface force) was also to await favorable opportunity for surface action
against whatever strength the still-weakened United States Pacific Fleet could
muster. Proceeding toward Midway via a different route would be the Occupation
Force, a heavily escorted slower group of am-
----------
<14>"The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway," The ONI Review, May
1947, p. 5, hereinafter cited as ONI Review.
<15>"USSBS, Interrogation Nav No. 13, Captain Watanabe, Y., IJN, 15
October 1945, p. 66; hereinafter cited as Watanabe.
21
phibious shipping bearing landing force and base-development elements which
were also to establish a seaplane base at Kure Island, Midway's nearest
neighbor, approximately 55 miles west by north.
The actual landing on Midway was to be accomplished by approximately
1,500 Special Naval Landing Force troops who would storm Sand Island; and by
1,000 Army troops of the Ikki Detachment, to land<16> on Eastern Island.
Summarizing the enemy landing plan, Captain Toyama stated:
We were going to approach the south side (of Midway), sending out landing
boats as far as the reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats but did
not think that many would be able to pass over the reefs. If they got stuck
the personnel were supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We had plenty
of equipment for a three months' occupation without help, but were not sure of
our boats.<17>
Assault elements in the landing would be backed up by the 11th and 12th
Construction Battalions plus miscellaneous base-development detachments. "The
Navy," added an operation plan for the Ikki Detachment, "plans to destroy the
sortieing enemy fleet."<18>
By late April, it was suspected strongly by the United States Pacific
High Command that the enemy plans just described were well along toward
consummation, and, although Admiral King in Washington still included Oahu as
a possible target, Admiral Nimitz placed Midway as most probable.
To Marines on the atoll, the first inkling of all this was betrayed on 2
May by the unexpected arrival via PBY-5A of Admiral Nimitz himself.
Accompanied by a considerable staff group, the Commander-in-Chief inspected
every installation on Midway with the greatest thoroughness, and, at the
conclusion of a hard day's climbing, ducking, and keen observing, the admiral
asked Colonel Shannon to enumerate the major items he would require to hold
Midway against a largescale attack. After Shannon had stated his requirements-
-which were necessarily considerable--Admiral Nimitz asked, "If I get you all
these things you say you need, then can you hold Midway against a major
amphibious assault?"
"Yes, sir"; replied Colonel Shannon.
Smiling and appearing to relax, the admiral then ordered the Marine
commander to submit direct to CinCPac a detailed list of all supplies and
equipment required for a decisive defense of Midway. If available, he
promised, these would be obtained immediately.<19> On 7 May, Colonel Shannon
had compiled his list, and this was then duly submitted by the naval
commandant of the atoll, Commander Simard.
Within less than a week, in fulfillment of Admiral Nimitz's promise,
Marines and materiel were being embarked in the Hawaiian area to reinforce
Midway, which, the Fleet command was now certain, was the intended enemy
target.
Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteries (12 guns in all) a 37-mm.
antiaircraft battery (eight guns) and a 20-mm. antiaircraft battery (18 guns),
were to be attached temporarily from the 3d Defense Battalion, then at Pearl
Harbor.<20> Two rifle companies of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, together
with a platoon of five light tanks, would augment the small infantry reserve
already at Midway;<21> and, for MAG-22, which was still flying its Brewster
fighters and Vought Vindicator dive bombers ("Wind Indicators" or "Vibrators,"
some pilots called them), there would be provided some 16 SBD-2 dive bombers
and
----------
<16>USSBS Interrogation Nav. No. 60, Capt. Toyama, Yasumi, IJN, 1 October
1945, p. 250; hereinafter cited as Toyama. Further details as to the plan and
the Ikki Detachment are from "Japanese Land Forces No. 2," 20 October 1942, a
translation by JICPOA, hereinafter cited as Ikki Report. The Ikki Detachment
mentioned here is the same one which was destined to be annihilated by Marines
at the Battle of the Tenaru, 21 August 1942, on Guadalcanal. The unit is
sometimes referred to as the Ichiki Detachment because the Japanese characters
for "ikki" and "ichiki" are identical.
<17>Ibid.
<18>Ibid.
<19>McGlashan, p. 19. Captain McGlashan was an eyewitness to this
conversation.
<20>CG, Marine Garrison Forces 14th Naval District memo to Com14, 20 May
1942.
<21>McGlashan, p. 30 and Enclosure (M). The infantry units already there
were the 22d and 23d Provisional Marine Companies, which provided interior
security, beach patrols by night and a small mobile reserve. Each company
included a weapons platoon armed with 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars, light machine
guns and old-type 37-mm. guns.
22
seven of the relatively new Grumman F4F-3 fighters.<22>
Shortly after his return to Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz addressed a
joint personal letter to Captain Simard and Colonel Shannon, in which, after
congratulating them on the fine work which had been done at Midway and on the
"spot" promotions to captain and colonel which he had just secured for them,
he described in detail the prospect of hostile attack in store. After listing
the enemy units which were soon to approach Midday, he enumerated the steps
being taken to reinforce the atoll, and assured both officers of his complete
confidence in the Marines' ability to hold Midway. D-day, he predicted at this
time, would be about 28 May.<23>
Among his own staff officers, Admiral NimItz forecast, as far as the
enemy were concerned, that "The Midway operations will be an enlarged Wake
attack. A study of events at Wake will be valuable and may indicate procedure
which the Japs will follow."<24> Early offensive action against the enemy
carriers, the CinCPac staff reasoned, was the only means by which victory
could be assured. Midway planes must thus make the CV's their objective,
rather than attempting any local defense of the atoll. On the other hand,
however, reinforcement of Midway's antiaircraft defenses was realized to be of
crucial importance. As Capt. Arthur C. Davis, USN, stated to Admiral Nimitz,
"There cannot be too many antiaircraft defenses for Eastern Island."<25>
To summarize all, Admiral Nimitz rejoined,
Balsa's air force must be employed to inflict prompt and early
damage to Jap carrier flight decks if recurring attacks are to be
stopped. Our objectives will be first--their flight decks rather than
attempting to fight off the initial attacks on Balsa. * * * If this
is correct, Balsa air force * * * should go all out for the carriers
* * * leaving to Balsa's guns the first defense of the field.<26>
Upon receipt of the Nimitz letter at Midway, Simard and Shannon spent the
day in conference, to coordinate and determine final plans for the defense.
That evening, Colonel Shannon assembled his key subordinates and warned
them in general terms of the impending enemy attack. Additional defensive
measures and priorities of final efforts were outlined, including special
measures of advance reconnaissance and preliminary preparations to enable the
3d Defense Battalion's forthcoming batteries to occupy positions in minimum
time. All recreational activities within the Marine force were suspended, and
25 May was set as the deadline for completion of the measures ordered.<27> To
insure maximum effort by all hands, this information was disseminated in
general terms to all Marines in the garrison.
On the 25th, however, two welcome changes took place. The first took the
form of further information from Admiral Nimitz to the effect that the
estimated target date would now probably fall in the period 3-5 June, almost a
week later. The second was arrival, partially via the light cruiser, St.
Louis, of the first reinforcements: The 3d Defense Battalion's 37-mm.
antiaircraft battery (Captain Ronald K. Miller), together with Companies C and
D, 2d Raider Battalion (Captain Donald H. Hastie and First Lieutenant John
Apergis). The 37-mm. guns were promptly emplaced, four on each island, while
one raider company (C) went into bivouac in the woods on Sand Island, and the
other (D) was sent to Eastern Island.<28>
The next day, 26 May, will long be remembered by those responsible for
the defense of Midway because of the anxiously awaited arrival of the U. S. S.
KITTYHAWK, an aircraft tender bear-
----------
<22>War Diary, MAG-22, May 1942, p. 5, hereinafter cited as WD, MAG-22.
<23>MCGLASHAN, pp. 21-22. This letter was shown, within the Marine ground
forces, only to Captain McGlashan, on an "eyes-only" basis, inasmuch as his
planning responsibilities required that he possess this knowledge.
<24>Admiral Nimitz's memorandum to Captain Milo F. Draemel, USN, 23 May
1942.
<25>Captain Davis's memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, 26 May 1942.
<26>Admiral Nimitz's memorandum to Captain Davis, undated. Balsa was the
current code-name for Midway.
<27>Ibid., p. 23.
<28>Loc. cit., pp. 26-27. The author adds this note in connection with
the 37-mm. guns:
"It was felt necessary to use these guns as dual-purpose guns. Since the
pointer and trainer seats were high on either side, well above the gun barrel,
the result of emplacing the guns high on the dune line for surface firing was
that the crews were silhouetted on the sky line like sitting ducks. It is
fortunate that no landing attempt was made at least for the 37-mm. gunners."
23
ing not only the 3-inch antiaircraft group of the 3d Defense Battalion (Major
Chandler W. Johnson)<29> and the light tank platoon so urgently needed for the
mobile reserve; but, most important, 16 new (to Midway, that is) SBD-2 Douglas
dive bombers, and seven F4F-3's. "The planes," an eye-witness reported, "* * *
were unloaded, wheeled over to the short seaplane apron, fueled, and flown off
to Eastern Island with a simplicity and rapidity that was so characteristic of
those superbly led and well trained Marine air units of the early war
days."<30>
The week which followed 27 May was, for Midway, a period of the most
intense activity. Army and Navy aircraft arrived at Eastern Island until it
seemed that the field could accommodate no more.<31> One aviation report
seriously complained that even the numerous birds overhead were being crowded
out of the air by the concentration of traffic.
For the ground defense forces (as well as the group of key civilian
workers who voluntarily had remained at Midway to assist in final
fortification work) the week was equally busy. Not only were the reinforcing
weapons installed, tanks tested in the sand, and all defensive concentrations
shot in, but the extremely extensive system of obstacles, mines, and
demolitions projected by Colonel Shannon was brought to final completion.
By now Sand Island was surrounded with two double-apron tactical wire
barriers, and all installations on both islands were in turn ringed by
protective wire. Antiboat mines made of sealed sewer pipe, and obstacles
fashioned from concertina-ed reinforcing-steel lay offshore. The beaches were
sown with home-made mines consisting of ammunition boxes filled with dynamite
and 20-penny nails; although electric detonation was planned, every such mine
also had a bull's eye painted on an exposed landward side, so that it could be
set off locally by rifle fire. Cigar-box antitank mines were filled with
dynamite to be fired on pressure by current from flashlight batteries, and
whiskey-bottle molotov cocktails of high-octane gasoline and fuel oil stood
ready at every position. A decoy mockup airplane--dubbed a JFU ("Jap
fouler-upper") was prominently placed on the seaplane apron. Finally, all the
underground fuel storage on Sand Island was prepared for demolition by the
adjacent planting of large charges of dynamite.
Inevitably, after the extensive system of demolitions for fuel supply and
other vital installations had been installed (by Marine Gunner Dorn E. Arnold,
the defense battalion's munitions officer), on 22 May, a Naval Air Station
sailor, at work on the fuel storage firing circuits, pulled the wrong switch,
thus causing a major explosion which destroyed a substantial quantity of fuel
and further damaged the distribution system. This resulted in an enforced
curtailment of avgas consumption so that the new pilots who had reached Midway
in the KITTYHAWK were deprived of any proper opportunity to check out in the
newly received SBD-2 dive bombers. It also forced the already hard-worked
Marines of MAG-22 to conduct all refueling operations (including those for
Army B-17's) by hand, from 55-gallon drums. Marine Gunner Arnold, however, had
the last word, after being exonerated on the spot of any responsibility for
the mishap:
----------
<29>Major Johnson was subsequently to be killed in action on Iwo Jima,
where men of his battalion raised the U. S. Colors on Suribachi Yama. Lt. Col.
Charles J. Seibert II, then a member of Major Johnson's command at Midway,
notes the following regarding one battery:
"The 3-inch Antiaircraft Group included Battery L (Captain Seibert), a
provisional organization equipped with that curious hybrid known as `the dual
20.' Due to uneven production * * * there was an excess of 40-mm. mounts and
20-mm guns, and a corresponding shortage of 40-mm. guns and 20-mm. mounts. The
rules of addition to the contrary, two 20-mm. guns * * * a 0-mm. mount did
not produce the equivalent of a 40-mm. gun, and the `dual 20' soon became
extinct."
<30>Ibid., p. 28, and WD, MAG-22, p. 5.
<31>As of 31 May, the daily aviation gasoline consumption of planes based
on Eastern Island was 65,000 gallons, and the following numbers of planes were
based there: U. S. Army: four B-26's and 17 B-17's; U. S. Navy: 16 PBY5A's and
six TBF's; U. S. Marine Corps: 19 SBD-2's, 17 SB2U-3's, 21 F2A-3's and seven
F4F-3's. It was no wonder that the Army Air Force liaison officer on Midway,
Maj. J. K. Warner, AUS, wrote in his official report (of the performance of
Colonel Kimes, Major McCaul, and Captain Burns, the operating staff of
MAG-22):
"These three officers never stopped from the day I arrived. They actually
did the work of a Wing Staff * * *"
For the comments of Colonel Kimes on Major Warner, see appendix V.
24
THE JAPANESE ADVANCE ON MIDWAY in two main forces, their carriers
approaching the target area under cover of a North Pacific
bad-weather front.
Well, that proves that the damn thing works, anyway."<32>
Ignorant of the intense preparations being made to receive them, the
enemy meanwhile had likewise been going through his final arrangements.
Assembly and final training of Admiral Nagumo's striking Force was carried out
at Hashira Jima, and on 26 May (west longitude date) the enemy carrier force
sortied from the Inland Sea toward Midway. The amphibious shipping of the
Occupation Force, together with the landing force, sailed from the Marianas
two days later on 28 May.<33>
As the enemy neared Midway, however, the Marine defenders--progressively
alerted from preliminary contacts could be content with their preparations and
their effort. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel McGlashan:
Of course, there were a thousand things more that could have been
done; but all the essential things had been done--and not a day to
spare. As I turned in that night knowing that the Japs would arrive by
morning, I felt that, come what may, we had done all we could.<34>
----------
<32>"McGlashan, pp. 5,24 and 31-34; also notes by Major Iron M.
Williamson, and by Colonel Verne J. McCaul, 10 January 1948.
<33>ONI Report, p. 9, and Ikki Report, p. 3.
<34>McGlashan, p. 37.
25
MARINES AT MIDWAY
CHAPTER IV
The Battle, 4-5, June 1942
At 0300 4 June, when reveille sounded on Midway, the Japanese Fleet was
approaching its objective in two main forces, the Striking Force, commanded by
Admiral Nagumo, Chuichi, IJN; and the Occupation Force, under over-all command
of Vice Admiral Kondo, Nobutake, IJN. The former unit, as we have seen, was
composed of four carriers, plus an escort of battleships and smaller combatant
ships; and the latter included a substantial portion of the Second Fleet:
Battleships, cruisers, and the amphibious shipping necessary to mount the
projected landing operation against Midway, the objective now designated by
the Japanese code term as "AF."<1>
At this time the striking force was approximately 250 miles northwest of
the atoll, engaged in making final preparations to launch planes which were
intended to wipe out Midway as an effective air base<2> and pave the way for
its assault and occupation. The occupation force, which had been attacked from
the air without appreciable damage during the day and night previous, was
almost due west of Midway, approximately 450 miles away.<3>
Two United States carrier task forces, including, altogether, three
carriers, together with covering cruisers and destroyers, were in the area 250
miles northeast by north of Midway. The first of these, Task Force Sugar,
ENTERPRISE and HORNET, was under command of Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,
USN; the second, Task Force Fox, built around the YORKTOWN, came under Rear
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USN. Stationed about Midway, on radii of 200
miles and less, patrolled some 25 submarines of the Pacific Fleet,<4>
At 0430, only 15 minutes after an early dawn search group of 11 PBY's had
been sent out from Midway to locate his Striking Force, Admiral Nagumo headed
carriers upwind and launched the Midway Attack Force, composed as follows:
First wave: 36 carrier attack planes.
Second wave: 36 carrier bombers.
Third wave: 36 fighters.
These 108 planes were commanded by the air officer of the Hiryu, whose name
has not survived.<5>
Meanwhile, after the PBY's had gone out, Midway devoted itself to final
preparations for battle. Marines of the ground defense force were at general
quarters, manning every weapon and warning device; the pilots and ground crews
of MAG-22, which already had fighters aloft to cover the sortie of the PBY's,
were standing by for orders. The latter were not long in coming.
At 0545, a PBY made what Admiral Nimitz
----------
<1>ONI Review, pp. 3, 6, and 41; and Toyama, p. 249.
<2>ONI Review, p. 39.
<3>Battle of Midway, p. 10.
<4>Battle of Midway, frontispiece chart and pp. 3-5.
<5>Review, p. 7.
26
Map of STRIKES BY MARINE AIR GROUP 22
afterward characterized as "the most important contact of the battle."<6> Its
pilot had sighted planes of the enemy's Midway attack force, 150 miles out
from the objective.
At 0552, moreover, after apparently trying to get this vital message
through for almost a quarter of an hour (see footnote 6), a PBY reported
visual contact with two enemy carriers and the balance of the Japanese main
body, some 180 miles from Midway, bearing 320 degrees.<7>
Three minutes later, at 0555, the 6th Defense Battalion logged a radar
report, "Many planes, 89 miles, 320 degrees."<8> Almost simultaneously, the
Naval Air Station noted substantially the same contact. In a matter of
seconds, the air-raid sirens were sounding, Condition One was set, and the
pilots of MAG-22 were manning their planes.<9>
Within less than 10 minutes, both squadrons of the Marine Air Group<10>
were in the air and being vectored toward their respective targets. VMF-221
was to intercept the massed carrier air of the Midway attack force, and
VMSB-241 would rendezvous 20 miles east of Midway, at which point further
instructions would be issued.
Commanded by Major Floyd B. Parks, VMF-221 was, as we have seen, a
squadron of mixed composition, being equipped mainly with Brewster F2A-3's,
augmented by a few F4F-3's of the type which had already drawn blood at Wake.
On this morning, 26 airplanes were operational out of the squadron's 28.<11>
Organized largely by performance and type into five unequal divisions, the
fighter squadron was sent out in two major groups, one (Major Parks, eight
F2A-3's and five F4F-3's) being vectored directly toward the incoming Japanese
force, still on bearing 3200 from Midway; and the other (Captain Kirk
Armistead, 12 F2A-3's and one F4F-3) was, for the time being, vectored
slightly westward on bearing 310 degrees, to be withheld temporarily against
the contingency of a second enemy strike from another direction. Within a few
minutes, however, Major Park's group had made contact, and Armistead's was
immediately committed in support of the former.<12>
At 0616, approximately 30 miles from Midway, from an altitude of 14,000
feet, the pilots with Major Parks saw 2,000 feet below them a large formation
of Aichi Type 99 (Val) dive bombers screened by several divisions of Zero
fighters. Captain John F. Carey, leading one of Park's divisions in an F4F-3,
gave "Tally-ho," and pushed over into a dive to attack the bombers, followed
by his wingmen, Captain Marion E. Carl and Second Lieutenant Clayton M.
Canfield. As Carey and Canfield commenced high-side runs on the bombers, Carl
and other pilots of the squadron mixed it with a swarm of Zero fighters which,
they noted, climbed astoundingly even in comparison to the Grummans, let alone
the F2A's.
----------
<6>CinCPac action report to ComInch on Battle of Midway, p. 7,
hereinafter cited as CinCPac Report. Other reports indicate that Midway had
warning of the approach of enemy planes prior to this time. The first of these
is the chronological log included in 6DB Report, which contains a radar report
of unidentified planes on bearing 320, distant 100 miles, at 0528. The second
is the statement in CO, MAG-22's preliminary report on the Battle of Midway, 8
June 1942 (cited as MAG-22 Report), that the patrol plane contact under
discussion was made, not at 0545, but at 0525. Third, it is recorded in 6DB
Report, p. 1, that, at 0537, the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station,
Midway, informed Colonel Shannon's headquarters that an enemy carrier had been
sighted on bearing 330 degrees, 150 miles distant. Lieutenant Colonel
McGlashan, who, as operations officer, was present in the defense battalion
command post at this time, adds the following note: "I am sure that the first
contact was about 0525, not 0545, as Admiral Nimitz * * * stated."
<7>CinCPac Report, p. 7.
<8>6DB Report, p. 1.
<9>MAG-22 Report, p. 2.
<10>Verbal orders had likewise been delivered by Captain Burns for the
six Navy TBF's and the four torpedo-carrying Army B-26's to take off and seek
the enemy carriers. MAG-22 Report, p. 2.
<11>"What seems to be insoluble contradiction prevents positive knowledge
of how many fighters VMF-221 had operational and took off on the morning of 4
June. VMF-221 Report, evidently written in haste after combat, contains
internal contradictions which cannnot be resolved, and further cross-check of
available casualty figures against reported plane losses produces yet more
conflict. Twenty-six aircraft at take-off seems to be the figure supported by
the weight of evidence, but Maj. Marion E. Carl, one of the surviving pilots,
leans to 25, which may possibly be due to the fact that one F2A-3 suffered
engine trouble after take-off and was forced to return to base prior to making
contact with the enemy, as reported in CO, VMF-221 report to CO, MAG-22, 6
June 1946, herein cited as VMF-221 Report.
<12>"MAG-22 Report, p. 2.
27
"TALLY-HO" FOR THE MARINE FIGHTERS. An official Navy photo-model
concept of the first contact between Marine Fighting Squadron 221
and incoming Japanese fighters and bombers of the Midway Attack
Force. Twenty-five Marine fighters tackled 108 enemy aircraft.
Inasmuch as only three of the original 12 Marine pilots of Major Parks's
group<13> survived this unequal encounter, it is impossible to reconstruct
details of the melee, but survivors' accounts, together with evident results
observed subsequently, indicate that the first attack took a formidable toll
of the enemy bombers and even a few of the 36 covering Zeroes. To the three
who survived, the duel was a brief moment of surprise for the enemy, followed
by desperate dogfights to keep off the incessant Zeroes, as the few remaining
Marine pilots attempted to reform.
Approximately 10 minutes after Major Park's gallant attack, Captain
Armistead's 13 fighters--all old F2A's but one-launched the second Marine
strike against the enemy air groups, still disc posed in two waves which
Armistead counted to include 40 bombers each.<14>
Perhaps the best account of this second encounter is contained in
Armistead's personal report, which is as follows:
At about 0620, I heard Capt. Carey transmit "Tally-ho" followed by
"Hawks at angels 14, supported by fighters." I then started climbing,
and sighted the enemy at approximately 14,000 feet at a
----------
<13>"Survivors were Captains Carey (wounded in action) and Carl; and
Lieutenant Canfield. The squadron commander was lost in the first part of the
flight. VMF-221 Report, encl. (A).
<14>VFM-221 Report, p. 1. These were actually the respective attack and
bombing formations, 36 planes each, of the Midway attack force.
28
distance of 5 to 7 miles out, and approximately 2 miles to my right. I
immediately turned to a heading of about 700 and continued to climb. I
was endeavoring to get a position above and ahead of the enemy and come
down out of the sun. However, I was unable to reach this point in time.
I was at 17,000 feet when I started my attack. The target consisted of
5 divisions of from 5 to 9 planes each, flying in division V's. I
figured this group to consist of from 30 to 40 dive bombers of the Aichi
Type 99. I was followed in column by 5 F2A-3 fighters and 1 F4F-3
fighter, pilot unknown. I made a head-on approach from above at a steep
angle and at very high speed on the fourth enemy division which
consisted of 5 planes. I saw my incendiary bullets travel from a point
in front of the leader, up through his plane and back through the planes
on the left wing of the V. I continued in my dive, and looking back, saw
two or three of those planes falling in flames. Some of the planes in my
division centered their attack on the fifth enemy division. After my
pull-out, I zoomed back to an altitude of 14,000 feet; at this time I
noticed another group of the same type bombers following along in their
path. I looked back over my shoulder and about 2,000 feet below and
behind me I saw 3 fighters in column, climbing up toward me, which I
assumed to be planes of my division. However, they climbed at a very
high rate, and a very steep path. When the nearest plane was about 500
feet below and behind me I realized that it was a Japanese Zero fighter.
I kicked over in a violent split S and received three 20-mm. shells, one
in the right wing gun, one in the right wing root tank, and one in the
top left side of the engine cowling. I also received about twenty
7.7-mm. rounds in the left aileron, which mangled the tab on the aileron,
and sawed off a portion of the aileron. I continued in a vertical dive
at full throttle, corkscrewing to the left, due to the effect of the
damaged aileron. At about 3,000 feet, I started to pull out, and managed
to hold the plane level at an altitude of 500 feet.
Needless to say, at this juncture Armistead headed for base.
In terms of Marine casualties, the results of this second attack were
somewhat better. Perhaps the outstanding factor in these two courageous
onslaughts by VMF-221 was the almost incredible disparity between the
outnumbering enemy Zeroes--new airplanes of performance then quite
extraordinary--and the old Marine F2A's. This comparison seemed keenly evident
to the pilots of VMF-221, one of whom stated in his action report:
I saw two Brewsters trying to fight the Zeroes. One was shot down,
and the other was saved by ground fire covering his tail. Both looked
like they
SLEEK BUT SLOW, the obsolescent F2A-3 fighter of the type shown here
was all that the Marine pilots of VMF-221 had (except a token group
of Wildcat F4F-3's) to pit against the Zeroes and Nakajimas of Admiral
Nagumo's Air Attack Force.
29
were tied to a string while the Zeroes made passes at at them. I
believe that our men with planes even half as good as the Zeroes would
have stopped the raid completely.
For better or for worse, however, the fighter defense of Midway had been
expended. The problem now passed to the defense battalion's antiair-craft
gunners on the ground.
Ever since the Marine fighters had gone out, Midway had been on the qui
vive. At 0619, its visual observation post had seen two aircraft falling in
flames, some 25 miles away, as VMF-221 slashed at the Japanese. With all guns
manned, and fire controlmen steadily tracking in the enemy formation, the
Marines awaited only the correct moment to commence firing. At 0629, the
Midway attack force was but eight miles away, and at 0630 Colonel Shannon gave
his orders: "Open fire when targets are in range."
One minute later, at 0631, every antiaircraft battery on Midway had
commenced firing.
Of this instant, wrote an officer then in the 3d Defense Battalion:<15>
The entire island was deathly silent after the buzz of the planes
taking off. It was a beautiful sunny morning. The men all strained for
a first glimpse, and I had to sharply remind the lookouts to keep the
other sectors covered against surprise. Then we saw the Japs, and the
tension snapped. A moment later we were in action.
Delivering a horizontal attack, the first wave,
BURNING DIESEL-OIL TANKS on the north end of Sand Island after
aircraft from the enemy carrier, KAGA, had plastered the area with
500-pound bombs.
----------
<15>This was Major James S. O'Halloran, who commanded Battery E, one of
the 3d Defense Battalion's 3-inch units.
30
which had originally numbered 36 bombers from the KAGA and AKAGI,<16> now was
counted by 3d and 6th Defense Battalion observers to contain only 22
aircraft,<17> two of which were promptly shot down at extreme range before
they could release bombs. Evidently VMF-221 had drawn blood. The next wave,
which struck just as the first sticks of bombs began to hit all along the
north shores of Sand and Eastern Island, was composed of Aichi 99
dive-bombers, which had also started out 36 strong. According to witnesses on
the ground, they did not now exceed 18.<18>
The KAGA group in the first wave, whose mission was to attack the patrol-
plane facilities on Sand Island, dropped nine 242-kg.<19> bombs on and about
the seaplane hangars, setting them afire and starting a large oil fire in the
fuel-oil tanks 500 yards to the north. The AKAGI group plastered the north
shore of Eastern Island, destroying the Marine mess hall, galley, and post
exchange, which the returning enemy pilots described as hangars.<20>
Battery D (3-inch antiaircraft) 6th Defense Battalion, located midway
along the southeast coast of Sand Island, was one of the principal targets of
the SORYU's group of Val dive bombers, which duly reported that the battery
had been silenced. Actually it had sustained a damaged
FIRES ON EAST SHORE OF SAND ISLAND resulted after Val
dive bombers attacked the 3-inch battery located nearby.
----------
<16>ONI Review, p. 7.
<17>"Maj. William S. McCormick, an experienced antiaircraft officer,
counted 22, and so reported to CMC on 5 January 1948.
<18>VMF-221 Report, p. 1. Capt. Marshall A. Tyler, a VMSB-241 pilot with
a grounded plane, made the count.
<19>One kilogram equal approximately 2.2 pounds.
<20>This and subsequent information as to the enemy air strike is derived
from ONI Review, pp. 4548. Unless otherwise noted, all information on the
ground defense is from 6DB Report, pp. 1-8.
31
heightfinder. Other targets of the dive bombers included the already burning
fuel storage at the north end of Sand Island, the Sand Island dispensary, and
the Eastern Island powerhouse, which suffered direct hits from two 805-kg.
bombs, destroying virtually the entire plant. At the very end of the strike,
the 6th Defense Battalion's Eastern Island command post received a direct hit
which killed the Marine sector-commander, Major William W. Benson, and wounded
several other personnel. As the dive bombers completed their runs, Zero and
Nakajima 97 fighters from the KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU made numerous
strafing passes at targets on both islands.
It should be understood, however, that all this enemy air activity had
not been carried on without cost. All six Marine 3-inch antiaircraft batteries
fired continuously, and every low-flying enemy attack was made through
curtains of 37-mm., 20-mm., and .50 caliber antiaircraft fire. Admiral Nagumo,
in his official action report, confirmed this by his mention of the Marines'
"vicious AA fire."<21> Admiral Nimitz, praising the antiaircraft shooting,
credited our batteries with 10 enemy planes, a total which may well have been
exceeded since returning pilots reported seeing many damaged enemy aircraft
down in the water and falling out of formation.<22>
At 0648, the enemy planes had expended their ammunition and were enroute
back to the carriers. Twelve minutes later, the air officer of the HIRYU (who
had been in command of the strike) radioed back to Admiral Nagumo: "There is
need for a second attack wave."
This less than optimistic report, however, was to some extent canceled by
a second message, sent
BOMBED-OUT EASTERN ISLAND COMMAND POST of the 6th Defense Battalion,
where Maj. William W. Benson was killed by a direct hit from a Japanese
dive bomber.
----------
<21>ONI Review, p. 72.
<22>CinCPac Report, p. 8.
32
at 0707, by one of the subordinate enemy aviation leaders, the air officer of
the Kaga, who reported in a typically Japanese fashion: "Sand Island bombed
and great results attained."<23>
Save for the brief appearance, at 0701, of one or two Zeroes just south
of Sand Island, when these were fired on by Batteries D and E for about 20
seconds, Midway had received its final air attack of the war.<24> At 0715, the
"all clear" sounded, and, in the words of Colonel Kimes,<25> commanding
officer of MAG-22:
* * * a message was broadcast, "Fighters land, refuel by divisions,
5th Division first." No answer was received although the message was
broadcast repeatedly, so a message, "All fighters land and reservice"
was broadcast several times. A pitifully few fighters returned in
answer to this message, and it was strongly suspected that there were
no more to land.
Of VMF-221's fighters which had participated in the battle, only 10
returned, of which in turn but two were still in condition for combat flight.
Thirteen F2A-3's and two F4F-3's were missing.<26>
Meanwhile, almost an hour earlier, at 0605 Colonel Kimes, acting on the
0552 visual contact of the enemy carriers, had broadcast the following orders
to his dive bombers in VMSB-241:
Attack enemy carriers bearing 320 degrees distant 180 miles course
135 degrees speed 20 knots.
No acknowledgment of this vital message could be picked up, and it was feared
that, for unknown reasons, the dive bombers had not received their orders, and
that the strike on the enemy carriers would never materialize.<27> Needless to
say, the
"SAND ISLAND BOMBED AND GREAT RESULTS ATTAINED," reported a Japanese
flight leader by radio to Admiral Nagumo, after looking over a view
similar to this one, which shows fires burning on Midway just after
the enemy strike.
----------
<23>This and preceding details from ONI Review, p. 17.
<24>Report, p. 4.
<25>MAG-22 Report, p. 3.
<26>Ibid., p. 3.
<27>Ibid., p. 2. According to Capt. Marshall A. Tyler, the senior
surviving officer of the Marine dive-bombing squadron, the message was
promptly received and acknowledged by both Majors Henderson and Norris, the
respective unit commanders of VMSB-241 as it was divided. Report of CO,
VMSB-241, 7 June 1942, hereinafter cited as VMSB-241 Report.
33
message was retransmitted periodically from 0605 on, and was, in fact, picked
up not only by VMSB-241 but by several fighter pilots of VMF-221, some of whom
actually set course for the enemy fleet, despite their damages and dwindling
fuel and ammunition.
VMSB-241, was, like the fighter squadron, divided into two
striking-units, the first composed of 16 SBD-2's under Major Lofton R.
Henderson, the squadron commander; and the second, of 11 SB2U-3's, led by
Major Benjamin W. Norris. The division of the squadron accorded with its
mixed composition, inasmuch as the obsolescent SB2U-3's were far outmatched by
the Douglas SBD's.<28>
THE CARRIER "AKAGI," UNDER ATTACK on the morning of 4 June 1942,
attempts evasive action from the 20,000-foot bombing of Army B-17's.
This is the only known photograph of this ship taken during the
action, and is of particular interest because it was this carrier
which VMSB-241 shortly afterward bombed and set afire in the day's
first successful action against the enemy carriers.
----------
<28>These and subsequent details regarding VMSB-241's attack are, unless
otherwise noted, from VMSB-241 Report, pp. 1-2.
34
Divided into two bomber boxes, Major Henderson's group of SBD's climbed
to 9,000-foot altitude and set out to locate the enemy carriers, which were
even then coming under the gallant but unsuccessful<29> attack of the six Navy
TBF's and four Army B-26's which had been sent out previously.
At 0755, through broken cloud formations below them, the Marine pilots
sighted their target, Admiral Nagumo's striking force, four carriers,
battleships, and numerous smaller combatant ships. Just below was the
26,900-ton AKAGI, and it was this ship which Major Henderson determined to
attack.
Because of the relative unfamiliarity of most of his pilots with the SBD-
2 (a result of the curtailed fuel allowances during the week before),
Henderson planned on a glide-rather than a dive-bombing run, and commenced a
let-down to 4,000 feet, from which he intended to launch his attack. As the
SBD's spiralled down, they began receiving violent fighter attacks from
Nakajima 97's and Zeroes, which were momentarily reinforced by more fighters
from the carriers below. Aboard the AKAGI, their target, Marine pilots could
see three fighters take off. Heavy antiaircraft fire began to thicken the air,
and, below, the AKAGI commenced evasive maneuvers at flank speed.
The balance of the attack can best be described in the words of Capt.
Elmer G. Glidden, leader of the second division in Major Henderson's group:
The first (enemy fighter) attacks were directed at the squadron
leader in an attempt to put him out of action. After about two passes,
one of the enemy put several shots through the plane of Major Henderson,
and his plane started to burn. From the actions of the leader it was
apparent that he was hit and out of action. I was leader of the second
box immediately behind the Major. As soon as it was apparent that the
Major was out of action I took over the lead and continued the attack.
Fighter attacks were heavy so I led the squadron down through a
protecting layer of clouds and gave the signal to attack. On emerging
from the cloud-bank (sic) the enemy carrier was directly below the
squadron, and all planes made their runs. The diving interval was about
5 seconds.
Immediately after coming out from the protection of the clouds the
squadron was attacked again by fighter planes and heavy AA. After making
my run I kept heading on for the water, and I headed on an approximate
bearing home. Looking back I saw two hits and one miss that was right
alongside the bow. The carrier was starting to smoke.<30>
Captain Glidden's observation of the two bomb hits (each by a 500-pound
bomb) is confirmed by the commanding officer of the AKAGI, who was
interrogated after the war, as well as by other enemy sources. Until the end
of hostilities, there had been some question as to which of the enemy carriers
VMSB-241 had actually hit, but the AKAGI's records, together with Admiral
Nagumo's report of the battle, jibe quite accurately with the reports of the
Marine squadron.
According to the Nagumo report, at 0800 the AKAGI sighted "16 enemy
planes bearing 85 degrees, elevation 7 degrees, distant 17,000 meters." At
0805, further, she launched three fighters, which were evidently those noticed
taking off by the Marine pilots. Prior to 0810, reports of other ships in the
task force indicated that AKAGI had received bomb hits.<31> Under
interrogation, her Captain stated that his ship's first damage had occurred by
fire as a result of--
* * * two bombs by dive bombing, about 2 hours after sunrise (one
started fire at after elevator). Planes were loaded up with bombs
inside the hangar and caught fire.<32>
Since sunrise that day took place prior to 0600, it could only have been
the 16 Marine dive-bombers which drew first blood from the enemy carriers.
The SBD-2s' retirement was executed at masthead level or lower, in order
to stave off incessant fighter attacks<33> which followed them clear of the
enemy fleet, but only eight of the original group made the trip back to
Midway. All of these, of course, had sustained battle damage of varying
degree, mostly extensive, and one SBD (Bureau No. 2106, flown by First
Lieutenant Daniel Iverson, Jr.) received 259 counted hits, but neverthe-
----------
<29>ONI Review, p. 17.
<30>Statement of Capt. Elmer G. Glidden, 7 June 1942, p. 1, hereinafter
cited as Glidden.
<31>ONI Review, p. 18.
<32>USSBS Interrogation Nav No. 4, Capt. Aoki, Taijiro, IJN, 9 October
1945; hereinafter cited as Aoki.
<33>The rear gunners of this strike group are credited with having shot
down four enemy fighters plus two additional probables. Battle of Midway, p.
18.
35
less succeeded in getting back for a one-wheel, no-flap landing.<34>
While Major Henderson's SBD-2's were pressing home their attack against
the enemy carriers, Major Norris's aging SB2U-3's were approaching the enemy
fleet at 13,000 feet, and B-17's from Midway were about to deliver a
20,000-foot bombing attack which, according to Admiral Nagumo's report,
resulted only in a number of distant misses.<35>
At 0820, approximately 165 miles from Midway, the Norris group sighted
the enemy fleet through an almost solid cloud cover. Before they could even
commence their let-down, however, the SB2U-3's were hit by three Zero fighters
on combat air patrol, one of which was promptly shot down by the combined fire
of four Marine rear-gunners.<36> More fighters pressed in, however, and the
group began to find itself seriously embarrassed. At this juncture, the Marine
pilots crowded every knot of speed out of their old airplanes and then went
into column for a standard glide-bombing let-down. As the Zeroes slashed in,
Major Norris led the formation to shelter within the clouds, emerging at only
2,000 feet, almost on
"MY PLANE WAS HIT SEVERAL TIMES," summarized 1st Lt. Daniel
Iverson, Jr., in describing the attack by Marine SBD's on the
carrier, AKAGI. Iverson's dive bomber, shown here, sustained
more than 259 counted hits, including one which shot his throat
microphone off the pilot's neck.
----------
<34>Information from photo caption submitted with accompanying
photographs by CO, MAG-22 to CMC, 29 June 1942. Iverson, whose throat
microphone was shot off his neck during the action, dismissed the subject in
his report, dated 7 June 1942, with the statement: "My plane was hit several
times." A brother officer commented after ward, "Without doubt, he was one of
the most unperturbed war pilots who ever flew an airplane."
<35>ONI Review, p. 19.
<36>Statement of Capt. Leon M. Williamson, 7 June 1942, hereinafter cited
as Williamson. The author was second in command of Major Norris's group, and
senior surviving pilot at the close of the battle.
36
SAND ISLAND HANGAR BURNING AGAIN as a Navy fire and damage-control
party plays a stream over the charred rafters and of the structure
during the Battle of Midway.
37
top of the Japanese battleship HARUNA,<37> which was in company with a sister,
KIRISHIMA.
The position in which Norris now found himself called for an instant
decision. Should he--or could he--attempt from this altitude to seek out the
carriers, flying through the now intense flak of an entire fleet, or should he
attack the target at hand? Reasoning<38> that his unit might readily be
destroyed between fighters and flak, and that the carriers had been
forewarned, Major Norris therefore elected to take advantage of surprise and
hit the battleship. This he did in a gliding attack, described by one of the
pilots, Second Lieutenant George Lumpkin, as follows:
Major Norris started his dive immediately from 13,500 feet. It was a
fairly shallow dive with my air speed about 240 knots. We dove through
the overcast, I was flying No. 2 on Major Norris and came out in the
clear on the port side of a large battleship, Major Norris immediately
peeled off to the right in a fairly steep dive, Lieutenant Campion, who
was No. 3 man, followed him, and I dove third. Antiaircraft fire from
the Jap battleship was very close. In fact the air was so rough from
the fire it was practically impossible to hold the ship in a true
dive. The Jap battleship zigzagged frantically. I tried to release
my bomb but the mechanism did not work. I pulled out of my dive and
headed slightly south to keep from coming too close to a Japanese
transport following the battleship. They were still shooting at me
with an