THE MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATIONS
Prepared by
HISTORICAL DIVISION
U. S. MARINE CORPS
HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON
Foreword
This account of the Marshall Islands Operations is another of a series of
monographs concerning important engagements of the Marine Corps in World War
II.
The information has been compiled from official records and from
interviews with a number of officers who took part in the operation and have
made valuable comments and criticism.
It is believed that in the map of Eniwetok Atoll the island of Yeiri does
not immediately adjoin the island of Rujiyuro, but maps available with code
names and geographical names are sometimes conflicting. It will be
appreciated if Yeiri Island can be definitely distinguished and a correction
made if necessary. Furthermore, in any final issue of this monograph all maps
will show the scale.
A limited number of copies are being sent to officers of various units
who were engaged. It is hoped that the recipients will read the account with
care and that they will forward to the Historical Division any comments
regarding accuracy or omission which tend to make the narrative misleading or
incomplete. It will be appreciated if these comments can be sent forward to
reach this Headquarters not more than sixty days after receipt of the pamphlet
so that revision may be undertaken without too long delay. Please pass the
pamphlet on to any officers you think may be interested and who likewise would
be in a position to make valuable criticism.
The classification is RESTRICTED.
JOHN POTTS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Officer-in-Charge
Historical Division
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATIONS
C O N T E N T S
Original On-Line
Page Page
Section I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6
Section II Kwajalein - Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 11
Section III Preparations for the Attack. . . . . . . . . . . 6 13
Section IV Kwajalein - Northern Attack Force. . . . . . . . 8 15
Section V Kwajalein - Southern Attack Force. . . . . . . . 18 27
Section VI Handling of the LVT's. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 32
Section VII Naval, Air and Artillery Bombardment . . . . . . 27 36
Section VIII Majuro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 40
Section IX Eniwetok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 44
Section X Seizure of the Lesser Marshalls. . . . . . . . . 51 65
Maps
MAPS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ON-LINE BOOKS VERSION OF THIS BOOK
1 The Marshall Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 2
2 Kwajalein Atoll. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 4
3 Roi-Namur Islands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 9
4 Kwajalein Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 18
5 Majuro Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 30
6 Eniwetok Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 33
7 Engebi Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 38
8 Eniwetok Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 44
9 Parry Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing Page 47
Map facing page 2 illustrates Section X
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATIONS
SECTION I
Introduction
As the operations in the Pacific theatre have become clarified by more
complete information, the various assaults arrange themselves into an orderly
plan. The Guadalcanal campaign halted the hitherto unstoppable advance of the
Japanese into the South Seas which threatened the safety of Australia and New
Zealand. The Bougainville campaign turned the tide northward; the heavy
fighting in New Guinea and New Britain (Cape Gloucester) helped additionally
to neutralize the Japanese land based air forces.
To the northeast some 1000 nautical miles from Guadalcanal lay Tarawa,
chief bastion of the Gilbert Islands. This was seized in November 1943 in the
first assault on an atoll by American Amphibious Forces. Lessons were learned
in that costly but successful attack which were put to sound use in the
further advance westward through the Marshalls.
The engagements which come under the general head of the Marshall Islands
Operation are divided into four parts. Of these the two most important--the
seizure of Kwajalein and Eniwetok Atolls--are in turn divided in two. Majuro,
the third atoll seized, was undefended and its capture though strategically
important, is of much less interest as an amphibious operation. The fourth
phase is the reconnaissance of the Lesser Marshalls and the elimination of
enemy forces on them.
Kwajalein Atoll was assaulted by two separate forces--under the
Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps--the Northern Landing Force and the
Southern Landing Force. Each assault, though part of an integrated whole was
separate and must be treated separately. The same holds true for the assault
on Eniwetok where the troops were again divided into a Northern and a Southern
Landing Force, each engaged in the capture of the principal islands of the
atoll and their neighboring satellites.
This account will deal, in turn, with the separate engagements, bearing
in mind their essential coherence and unity which will show what we wished to
do and why and how we did it.
Plans for the seizure of the Marshall Islands had been initiated months
before. There were many elements to consider but transportation was the
paramount problem. It was determined that it would be neither possible nor
strategically
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Map of Marshall Islands
advantageous to capture all of the defended atolls simultaneously. The
question--one requiring finely balanced judgment--then arose as to which
atolls should be seized and held. Two objectives were foremost; to establish
permanent forward bases as staging areas for further advance and to protect
these bases from enemy attacks launched from atolls in the Marshalls which
still remained in Japanese hands.
The vehicles of amphibious warfare made tremendous advances in the latter
part of 1943. It is interesting to note that the highest echelons were by no
means convinced in the summer of 1943 of the practicability of assault
landings with material then at our command as evidenced by the statement of
Admiral Nimitz:
"The practicability of amphibious trucks and amphibious tractors
making landings through surf over coral has not yet been demonstrated
to the satisfaction of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.......In order
to minimize losses to personnel and material which can be expected when
landing through surf the scheme of maneuver should include means of
landing from the lagoon side of the atoll."
Yet not many weeks afterward, Admiral Spruance was writing to the Commander of
the V Amphibious Force, (Rear Admiral R. K. Turner):
"Reports of tests of amphibious tractors and amphibious trucks
have indicated their satisfactory performance in making landings
through surf over coral reefs. These tests are accepted as sufficiently
conclusive for planning purposes."
The plans for seizure of the Marshalls were based on the successful
completion of operations in the Gilbert Islands which had not at that moment
occurred. (The assault on Tarawa began 20 November 1943). The factors
favorable to the assault were summarized as follows:
a. The necessary strength appeared available.
b. The operation would provide for further advance toward communication
lines vital to the enemy.
c. It would strengthen our lines of communication to the South and
Southwest Pacific.
d. It might precipitate fleet action with the enemy on favorable terms
and afford opportunity to inflict attrition losses which the enemy
could ill afford.
e. The projected timing of the operation should cause
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the enemy to divide in considerable degree his available forces
among various theatres.<1>
And as Admiral Nimitz added, "Thus, we get on with the War."
It is a trite saying that distances in the Pacific are vast, and there
most people let the matter rest. But take any large scale map of the western
Pacific and you will discover to your surprise that the Marshalls are at the
extreme east of it and the Philippines near the west, the two groups separated
by apparently little but a vast expanse of blue. Actually the distance from
Kwajalein to Leyte in nautical miles is about 2500 and roughly between them
come the Carolines and the Marianas and the Palaus, the latter two now wrested
from the enemy after desperate fighting. Pearl Harbor is 2125 miles to the
northeast. In turn the little dots on the map which indicate the Marshall
group, resolve themselves on a larger scale into thirty-two atolls, each
containing groups of adjoining islands of considerable extent, clustering
round lagoons up to sixty-five miles long.
From Mille, the principal atoll on the southeast, to Eniwetok at the
extreme northwest, the distance is approximately 650 miles. Kwajalein Atoll
lies in about the center of the group (see map, page 2). From the beginning,
the plans contemplated its seizure and retention as the primary objective of
the operation, thus by-passing strongly held Wotje and Maloelap.
After our capture of Tarawa enemy troops were rushed from Kwajalein to
Mille and Jaluit where the defenses were considerably strengthened. The fact
that they were the nearest Marshalls to the newly won Tarawa and Makin
undoubtedly furthered the enemy expectations that these atolls would become
the next objects of attack. Further, the Japanese undoubtedly were expecting
lagoon landings after the manner of the Gilberts, because the 4th Fleet
(Japanese) Commander ordered the lagoon beaches in the Marshalls mined and
fortified shortly after the Gilberts operation. When the great blow came well
inside his strong Marshalls perimeter and on the end of islands (except in the
case of Roi and Namur) it can safely be said that tactical as well as
strategical surprise were in large measure achieved. At Kwajalein when stock
was taken there was evidence of much hasty preparation for defense.
Quantities of lumber, cement, steel beams and the like and even tubes of guns
of considerable size were found ready for
----------
<1>Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Serial 00151, 20 August 1943.
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Map of KWAJALEIN ATOLL
use. Undoubtedly the repeated bombardment by air and surface forces of Wotje
and Maloelap, as well as Kwajalein (with the intention of neutralizing the
airstrip) not only had a demoralizing effect, but left the enemy confused and
unable to estimate accurately where the landings were coming despite the
realization of their imminence. It seems possible that the attack on
Kwajalein was no more than suspected until D-day itself, when our transports
and landing craft were visible off shore.
In all of the assaults code names were given the atolls and the principal
islands surrounding their lagoons. In most instances only a few of the
islands are of importance to the account of the operations and for purposes of
security the native names have herein been universally employed. However, it
seems fitting here to pay tribute to some sublimated worthy. In modern
warfare the Navy has called upon the talents of many specialists. It is
pleasant to imagine that the preparer of the various code appellations was, in
civilian life, & highly skilled Pullman Car Namer.
SECTION II
KWAJALEIN
Intelligence
Kwajalein Atoll, largest of the Marshalls, lies on a northwest-southeast
axis and surrounds a lagoon nearly 65 miles long. In shape it reminds one
vaguely of Lake Superior. Its maximum width at the center is about 18 miles
and its circumference about 154. There are no natural elevations; the maximum
height of the land is not in excess of 30 feet. There were three principal
islands: Roi-Namur, linked together by a causeway, at the extreme north; and
Kwajalein Island at the extreme south. The distance between the two groups is
roughly 42 miles. To the southwest of Roi important islets which enter into
the story are: Ennuebing, Mellu, and Boggerlapp. To the south and slightly
east of Namur lie the islets of Ennugarret, Ennumennet and Ennubirr. Between
Ennuebing and Mellu is a channel. A second channel divides Mellu and
Boggerlapp.
At the southern end of the atoll, northwest of Kwajalein and distant
about two miles, lies Enubuj. Next, on the westerly side, come Ennylabegan,
Gea, Ninni and Gehh, the first of these lying about 6 1/2 miles from
Kwajalein's western tip. On the eastern side of the atoll and nearly directly
north of Kwajalein lie Ebeye some two miles away, Loi, and the long thin strip
of Gugegwe, which though actually a single island is held together by such
narrow reefs as for all practical purposes to be three separate bits of land.
Immediately beyond the northern tip of Gugegwe comes a channel about a
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mile wide, the northern side of which is defined by Bigej Island.
To return to the principal islands of Roi and Namur, Roi is roughly 1250
yards long north and south, by 1200 yards wide east and west and almost
entirely cleared of foliage. It was just able to contain one of the principal
airstrips in the Marshalls, shaped like a giant figure "4". (See map, page
9). There was little or no room on Roi for anything but defensive
installations and the buildings necessary for the operation of the airfield.
Namur, lying to the east, is about 800 yards north and south by 900 yards
east and west, and is joined to Roi by a causeway about 500 yards long. The
island is heavily wooded and contains a series of well articulated roads;
there, were the barracks and other principal installations of the garrison.
Kwajalein Island itself (see map, page 18 ) is crescent or boomerang
shaped about 2 1/2 miles long by 800 yards wide at its widest point near the
southwest. The northern tip gradually narrows to about 200 yards. There is a
well-knit system of roads. The central and western portions had been
extensively cleared for the construction of an airfield, which, at the time of
the landings, was partially completed, but there were trees and heavy
vegetation along the shore line.
There was a seaplane base on Ebeye and major Naval anchorages at various
points in the we stern portion of the lagoon.
Intelligence had estimated that there were about 24,000 enemy troops in
the Marshalls area, the bulk of whom were on Kwajalein, Wotje, Maloelap and
Mille Atolls. Of these, it was thought, 2,700 to 3,100 men were on Roi and
Namur including 400 to 600 Korean laborers. On Kwajalein and immediately
adjoining islands, it was thought that there were 3,500 to 4,200 combatants
plus 1,200 to 1,600 laborers, the total on both of the principal objectives of
the atoll probably not in excess of 7,100. These forces were believed to
include the 6th Base Force, the 61st Naval Guard Force and the 4th Civil
Engineers (Korean); Rear Admiral Monzo Akiyama was in command. He is said to
have been killed on Kwajalein on 2 February. It was thought not unlikely that
reinforcements might be sent in, but our attack came before this could be
accomplished.
Before the operation there had been photographic coverage by air on a
scale previously not attempted and submarines had also taken photographs from
advantageous points off shore. The terrain had been very carefully studied,
mindful, perhaps, from the experience at Tarawa, of underestimating the
strength
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of the defensive installations. It had been thought that the enemy was much
more formidably prepared than proved to be the case.
Reconnaissance had shown, however, that defenses of the islands were to
seaward rather than on the lagoon, though considerable preparations were under
way toward strengthening the defenses on the inner side.
A smartly conducted search for underwater obstacles disclosed nothing
which was designed by man to impede the approaches.
SECTION III
Preparations for the Attack
The original plans for the simultaneous assaults of Wotje, Maloelap and
Kwajalein were finally abandoned as being too much to bite off, though the two
former atolls remained as alternative objectives to Kwajalein. In addition,
one other atoll thought to be undefended was to be seized. On 17 December
1943, CinCPac designated the 7th Infantry Division, U. S. Army (reinforced) to
assault and capture Kwajalein Island and the 4th Marine Division (reinforced)
to take care of Roi and Namur.
The chain of command was as follows:
Joint Expeditionary Forces - TF 51 - Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Expeditionary Troops - TF 56 - Major General H. M. Smith, USMC
Southern Attack Force - TF 52 - Rear Admiral R. K. Turner
Southern Landing Force - Major General C. H. Corlett, USA
Northern Attack Force - TF 53 - Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly
Northern Landing Force - Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC
The principal elements of the Southern Attack Force comprised the 7th
Infantry Division and the 3d and 4th Army Defense Battalions. The Northern
Force consisted primarily of the 4th Marine Division and the 15th Marine
Defense Battalion. Corps Reserve consisted of the 22d Marines, reinforced,
and the 106th Infantry, reinforced, less the 2d Battalion.
Majuro Atoll was to be seized by an attack group, TF 51-2, under Rear
Admiral H. W. Hill. The landing force under Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Sheldon,
USA, consisted of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry.
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Plans for the operation were even more complicated than usual due to the
fact that various elements of the expeditionary forces were widely separated.
The 22d Marines, RCT 184 of the 7th Division and RCT 106 of the 27th Division,
held intensive training in the Hawaiian area during the latter part of
December 1943. The 4th Marine Division, which had not yet been in combat,
trained in the San Diego area for a month beginning in the middle of November.
Concurrent with the training and planning phases the garrison units were
assembled under the command of Rear Admiral A. D. Bernhard, USN, who was to be
the commander garrison forces at Kwajalein Atoll, and Captain E. A. Cruise,
USN, who was to command the Majuro garrison forces.
The 4th Marine Division held final rehearsals early in January at Camp
Pendleton and San Clemente Island, the latter rehearsal being supported by
actual Naval gunfire and air bombardment.
The 7th Infantry Division, reinforced, and the 22d Marines, reinforced,
held a final rehearsal in the Hawaiian area under conditions of terrain
thought to resemble as nearly as possible the objectives to be seized.
Careful studies were made to insure that:
a. Troops would be embarked in strict accordance with the proposed
tactical plan so that the assault, defense and garrison units
would each arrive at their objective at the proper time.
b. Supplies would be loaded to support the scheme of maneuver.
c. Excess equipment would not be carried.
There was some confusion in the loading plans due to last minute changes;
failure of certain supplies to arrive well ahead of time and the addition of
units to the expeditionary forces, too late to include their equipment in the
complete planning. By and large, however, the preparation was extraordinarily
well done.
The Northern Attack Force, consisting of the Marine elements, departed
San Diego for the Hawaiian area 13 January 1944, and arrived at Maui, T. H.,
21 January. All forces departed the following day for their objectives. So
far as is known the task groups arrived at Kwajalein undetected and thus
gained complete strategic surprise. The movement was so well timed that all
assault forces were on hand early on D-day; the defense battalions on D-day
plus 2, and the garrison forces on D-day plus 5.<1>
----------
<1>There is an entry, however, in a captured Japanese diary that the force
left Hawaii on the date mentioned "to attack us."
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SECTION IV
KWAJALEIN ATOLL
Northern Attack Force
It now becomes necessary to break up the account into divisions, as the
Northern and Southern Forces, though operating concurrently, were each
involved in actions 40 miles apart. Inasmuch as this account deals
essentially with actions of units of the Marine Corps, greater stress will be
laid on them. The operations of the Southern Landing Force were, however, of
equal importance and will receive due comment based on such records as are
available to the Marine Corps. The plans in each case were similar. They
called for very heavy Naval and air bombardment beginning on D-day minus 2.
On D-day, landings were to be made on the smaller islands adjoining the
principal objectives on which, after seizure, artillery was to be placed to
support the Naval bombardment and the landing forces. On D-day plus 1,
assaults were to be made on Roi and Namur by the Northern Landing Force and on
Kwajalein by the Southern Landing Force.
For most of the previous month heavy air strikes had been made on Wotje,
Maloelap, Mille, Kwajalein and Eniwetok with a view to making their landing
fields inoperative. From the lessons at Tarawa, which had been taken to heart
and even more important passed down to lower echelons in a space of less than
60 days, it had been determined that naval and air bombardment would be
delivered with more devastating power.
The Northern Support Group consisted of the Battleships NORTH CAROLINA,
ALABAMA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, COLORADO and MARYLAND; the Heavy Cruisers
LOUISVILLE and INDIANAPOLIS; the Light Cruisers SANTA FE MOBILE, and BILOXI,
and eleven destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral J. B. Oldendorf. This
concentration was in turn supported by the Northern Carrier Force under Rear
Admiral V. H. Ragsdale; by Task Group 58.2 under Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery
consisting of the carriers, INTREPID, ESSEX and CABOT, and Task Force 53 under
Rear Admiral V. H. Ragsdale consisting of the SUWANEE, SANGAMON and CHENANGO.
Installations on Roi-Namur consisted for the most part of concrete
structures heavily reinforced. The islands had been cut up into numbered
target areas and the schedule of ships' fire had been carefully coordinated so
that not a yard of ground would be neglected and was certain to get a thorough
going over at given intervals.
The plan of assault divided itself into three principal
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Map of ROI-NAMUR ISLANDS
phases:
1. D-day, landing of artillery after seizure of islands adjoining
Roi-Namur.
2. D-day plus 1, the assault of Roi-Namur.
3. After successful completion of the main assault the seizure of all
other occupied or unoccupied islands in the northern sector of the
Atoll.
The Northern Attack Force arrived in the transport area to the northwest
of Roi-Namur at dawn on D-day, 31 January. Prior to their arrival the APD
SCHLEY carrying Company "D", 4th Scout Company, had landed the company in the
dark from rubber boats. They made a reconnaissance of Ennuebing and Mellu
Islands to the southwest of Roi on which the artillery was to be emplaced. It
had been determined that these islands would be seized prior to a similar
assault upon Ennumennet and Ennubirr, the islands immediately to the southeast
of Namur. Ennugarret, the island next to Namur was also to be seized on D-day
if time permitted. The weather was clear but the sea was choppy and the LVT's
labored heavily. Landings in the case of the islands adjoining Roi were to be
from the sea; the others from the lagoon. H-hour for the easterly landings
depended on the assembly of light craft after the first attack but presumably
about noon or 1300 at the latest.
LT 1/25 plus the Scout Company was assigned to the westerly landing, LT
2/25 for Ennubirr and LT 3/25 for Ennumennet and subsequently for Ennugarret.
Sufficient LVT (2's) were available for only two landing teams and it was
found necessary to employ ten LCVP's to boat the additional troops. It was
planned that after landing LT 1/25 at their objectives to retract the LVT's
from Ennuebing and Mellu and reboat LT 3/25 in them for the purpose of the
attack on Ennugarret.
Unfortunately, things did not work out as planned and time schedules fell
considerably behind. There were various reasons for this which requires only
brief comment. One thing, it took much longer to debark the troops than was
expected. There had never been time for a thorough rehearsal for this
particular operation and the estimate of time was considerably below
actuality. The respective crews of the LST's and the LVT's did not work
sufficiently well together to know what each was expected to do and who was
running the show.
LT's 2/25 and 3/25 were to go through Ennuebing Pass after assembling in
their respective transfer areas. At a crucial moment in the operation DD
PHELPS, which was marking
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the line of departure, was called to other duties in supporting the mine
sweepers, leaving control of the situation to Submarine Chaser #997 (on which
was embarked Brigadier General J. L. Underhill, USMC, the commanding general
of the landing group). SC #997 unfortunately had neither sufficiently
detailed orders nor communication facilities adequate to act as a substitute
for the PHELPS. In consequence, considerable mix up occurred which resulted
in some of the LVT's following the PHELPS southward whence they were diverted
only after considerable difficulty and misunderstanding. It is not improbable
that high words were used. In consequence, the landings on Ennuebing were not
made until 0952 and on Mellu at about the same time. Opposition was very
light. The islands were reported secured at 1055 and 1209 respectively. The
landing of artillery began one hour later. Meanwhile about noon the Ennuebing
Pass had been swept with negative result and preparations went forward for the
easterly landings. Again considerable confusion resulted due apparently to
imperfect understanding of their orders on the part of some LVT crews and the
fact that they were in some instances stranded without fuel on Ennuebing and
Mellu because of a much greater waterborne trip than had been originally
anticipated.
The time for the easterly landings from the lagoon was set at 1430.
Because of confusion they could not be effected until 1515. Again there was
light opposition and the islands were reported secured by 1628. The delays in
the previous operations might well have made it advisable to delay the capture
of Ennugarret until the following day but at 1600 orders were received to
attack immediately. It was impossible to do so at once because of lack of the
necessary LVT's many of which, after debarking troops on Ennumennet and
Ennubirr had retired to the western side of the lagoon in search of their
LST's. But in spite of all difficulties the attack was launched at 1800. The
landings began about 1815 and the island was reported secured by 2000.
Landing of the artillery on the adjoining islands to the south began in the
afternoon, was carried out through the night and by the morning of D-day plus
1 all batteries had registered on their respective targets on Roi-Namur.
The 3d (75mm Pack Howitzers) and the 4th Battalions (105mm Howitzers) of
the 14th Marines were emplaced on Ennuebing and Mellu Islands, to the west of
Roi and Namur, and the 1st and 2d Battalions (75mm Pack Howitzers) 14th
Marines on Ennumennet and Ennubirr. On D-day plus 1, the day set for the
landings on Roi-Namur, the naval forces again delivered devastating fire on
the islands. At H-hour minus 45 carrier forces delivered a heavy strike.
Then, for a period of fifteen minutes, bombing was concentrated on the
pillboxes near the beaches and strafing the beaches continued until
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the boat waves were within comparatively short distance. The time for landing
had been originally set for 1000 but was later changed to 1100. Actually,
however, the landings were not made until 1200 because again factors of time
and space had been miscalculated. The supporting arms, however, had been kept
informed of the change of time and the weight of the bombardment was not
impaired.
The plan called for RCT 23 to land on beaches Red 2 and 3 on the lagoon
side of Roi, and for RCT 24 to land on beaches Green 1 and 2 on Namur, also
fronting the lagoon. On Roi there was no resistance at the beach and it
remained light until Line 0-1 was reached at 1217. The island had little
vegetation because of the airfield and its accompanying installations, and
appeared completely deserted as the first wave approached. Within an hour
after the landing some of the tanks had progressed beyond the Line 0-1, and
about two companies of infantry had followed them. Fortunately, naval gunfire
had ceased and was solely on call. The movement, it later appeared, was
initiated by the Tank Company Commander, who, finding the going unexpectedly
easy had taken upon himself to find out what enemy lay to the north. The
units were recalled to Line 0-1 without much harm having come to them, but
there had been moments, when they had strayed beyond their intentioned limits,
that the operation might have been jeopardized.
It had been planned to continue the attack beyond Line 0-1 at 1515, but
due to certain delays Landing Team 2/23 on the right did not jump off until
1530 and Landing Team 1/23 to its left could not get away till 1600. This
caused no serious dilemma as the advance was to be made up the east and west
coasts of the island. It showed, however, a lack of coordination in untried
troops that might have endangered the success of the attack. Fire discipline
was far from satisfactory which can be mostly explained by the overwhelming
desire to account for a live Jap. Nevertheless, there were times when it was
somewhat risky to become exposed to fire which was supposedly friendly.
An abused phrase is "opposition was light," because to the people who
haven't been there it sounds like a walk in the park. But fighting the Japs
in any terrain is a task which requires both training and solid hardihood. He
will get you if he can, so try to get him first. During the attack on Roi,
PFC Richard B. Anderson, Company "E", 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, found himself
with five other companions in a shell hole made by a 16" shell. He drew out a
grenade to hurl it at a trench nearby. As he did so the pin caught in his
gear and pulled out. Realizing that the missile had to be thrown instantly,
he dropped it in his haste and it rolled to the bottom of the shell hole,
Anderson threw himself upon it just before it exploded and sacrificed
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himself for the others. The Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously, was his
just due, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."
RCT 23 reorganized and jumped off again at 1630. By 1800 the north edge
of Roi had been reached six hours after the landings and there appeared to be
only sporadic resistance despite much mopping up also left to be done. This
continued through the night and by 0800, 2 February, the island was reported
secured, twenty hours after the landing.
For the assault of Namur, there was a considerable amount of confusion in
getting the waves off from the Line of Departure with the result that LT's
2/24 and 3/24 got away before their respective reserve elements had been
properly lined up. In consequence, many elements of RCT 24 had to be
committed piecemeal, due in large measure to lack of a suitable number of
LVT's and a lack of control over those which were available. Further
tribulation resulted from the fact that two companies of the 1st Armored
Amphibian Tractor Battalion (LVT(A)'s) had been ordered to land and precede
the assault troops 100 yards inland. However, the craft halted before
reaching the beach, forcing the troop-laden LVT's to work their way through
them, and continued to fire through the assault units. It seems a miracle
that no friendly troops were hit.
LT 2/24 on the right received very little fire from the beach when it
first landed and its chief preoccupation was to avoid being cut down from the
rear by the misdirected attentions of the LVT (A)'s. It was necessary to
unload the troops from the tractors due to an antitank ditch close to the
beach. Troops pushed rapidly inland on foot for about 200 yards against light
resistance. LT 3/24 upon landing met more determined opposition from close-in
beach defenses. However, the two companies were able to move inland by
by-passing some pillboxes and blockhouses leaving the mopping up of rear areas
to the reserve company which landed about 1245. Elements of LT 1/24 had been
held in reserve at the Line of Departure about 2000 yards from the beach
awaiting decision as to when and where they should be committed. Upon receipt
of information that LT 2/24 had made a penetration of the beach, they
proceeded to Beach Green 2 and landed at about 1325.
Their progress to the beach was hampered by a terrific explosion which
occurred on the right half of LT 2/24's sector, covering the entire island
with a dense cloud of pungent smoke which at first was thought to be gas.
Fragments of concrete, steel, wood, shrapnel and torpedo heads rained down
over the surrounding area and caused a considerable number of casualties.
This explosion and two others somewhat less violent are thought to have caused
well over 50% of the casualties suffered by LT 2/24.
-12-
The cause of the explosion will probably never be known, but it seems
worth while to give here what amounts to not much more than rumor. The
blockhouse which was actually a storehouse for torpedoes and heavy ammunition
looked much like any other that had proved to be sheltering troops. A
demolition team was hacking away at it, some on the roof, some at the door.
The party at the door finally succeeded in making an opening and revealing the
deadly contents within. One or two men rushed a few yards to the rear to warn
their comrades above to lay off. Just at this moment an opening was made in
the roof and a grenade dropped in before the signals of alarm could be heeded.
It is possible, however, that the Japanese blew up the place themselves
as it is known that the later explosions were not caused by our own troops.
Whatever the cause, the result brought death to many brave men. Meanwhile,
units of LT 3/24 reached the 0-1, which, for our purposes may be called
Sycamore Road, by 1400 and waited on that line for further orders. Tanks and
half tracks had gradually been put ashore with some difficulty due to
operational failures and conditions of terrain. A mortar platoon and a
platoon of the Regimental Weapons Company were landed and proceeded to the
northern tip of the peninsula separating Namur from Roi with orders to support
the attack.
At 1630 LT 3/24 jumped off and immediately encountered moderate
resistance. The vast amount of debris from the ruined buildings and strong
points which had not yet been put out of action gave the enemy ample
opportunities for effective machine gun fire. In addition enemy rifle and
grenade fire made progress extremely slow.
LT 2/24 had not jumped off till 1730 because of the late arrival of their
tanks and found the going equally hard.
By 1930 LT 3/24 had two companies abreast on a line about 175 yards north
of 0-1 and LT 2/24's line was abreast for a short distance and then slanted
gradually southeastward to 0-1 on the eastern shore of the island. At this
time all units were ordered to establish a perimeter defense, to hold the
ground gained and prepare to renew the attack in the morning. Naturally, it
had been hoped that the entire objective could be gained in a single day, but
when this had become obviously impossible, orders to halt the attack might
well have been given earlier than at a time when only half an hour of daylight
remained. When the order came to dig in front lines were left ragged, some
units pulled back in an effort to straighten the lines, leaving other units
isolated. Contact between adjacent units was lost in some instances, and
other units were uncertain as to who was to their front, flank or rear with
the result that complete coordination of defensive fire was impossible. Some
units could not fire
-13-
with the certainty that friendly troops would not be hit. Had a strong enemy
counterattack been directed that night at certain points it might have proved
costly. Considerable firing occurred during the night from rear areas due to
some of the men being "trigger happy." On the right of the perimeter also the
Japs infiltrated or came out of underground shelters and trenches and opened
fire on the troops from positions thought to be free of hostile resistance.
To a somewhat lesser extent the same conditions prevailed in the area of LT
3/24.
At daybreak, 2 February (D-day plus 2) counterattacks were made by small
groups of the enemy before the lines of 3/24. Probably a hundred men
altogether in units of ten or twenty charged fanatically upon our emplacements
for something like thirty-five minutes. The sacrifice was futile; in fact,
the Company which took the brunt of the attacks had gained some ground at
their cessation.
During this time plans had been formulated for a continuation of the
attack at 0900. Due to the condition of the terrain--an indescribable mass of
debris--certain of the Companies had become intermingled and some uncertainty
arose as to the position of others. Nevertheless, considering conditions the
situation could have been described as in hand.
At 0900 LT 3/24 resumed the attack with three companies abreast supported
by medium tanks. These proved of limited use due to the unsuitability of the
terrain, but by 1215 the northwestern extremities of the island had been
secured.
In the right sector the attack was not launched until 1000 due to delay
in the light tanks reaching the Line of Departure. Elements of LT 1/24 and LT
2/24 combined under the Commanding Officer of LT 1/24 took up the front line
leaving the elements of LT 2/24 which were not in the front line to support
the attack and mop up the rear areas. Again, three companies abreast followed
the beach line and made excellent progress. By 1100 the encircling movement
of LT's 1/24 and 2/24 had made it possible to establish visual contact with
the extreme left of the line of advance of LT 3/24. Tanks were then withdrawn
but half tracks continued to support the infantry. By 1215 the end of the
island was reached and organized resistance ceased.
This brief and fragmentary account of wiping out the last Japanese
resistance can convey no proper idea of the difficulties and desperation of
the fighting. It is possible that details exist in official reports that are
not yet to hand, but only eye-witness accounts can, at the moment, supplement
what is now available. However, it seems pretty certain that the success of
the attack launched by Companies "A" and " C" was due in great measure to the
intrepidity of
-14-
the Commanding Officer or 1/24, Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla James Dyess, who
led the advance in person. Whenever the attack was slowed by heavy enemy fire
he placed himself at the head of his men and inspired them to push forward.
By 1040 the battle was almost done. At 1045, while standing on the parapet of
an anti-tank ditch directing a flanking attack against the last enemy
position, he was killed by a burst of machine gun fire.
It is a deep source of pride to all members of the Marine Corps that
Lieutenant Colonel Dyess was awarded, posthumously, the Medal of Honor.
It would seem as if our language, perhaps through abuse of words which
originally held great meaning, is now thwarted in its effort to describe deeds
of gallantry which stand for the highest motives in human nature, the
unhesitating sacrifice of ones life for one's comrades, 1st Lieutenant John
V, Power performed such a deed. While attacking a pillbox on Namur about 75
yards from the beach he was wounded in the stomach while placing a charge.
Despite the wound he continued on to a second pillbox which he blew up with a
satchel charge. Following the explosion he charged alone to the pillbox
entrance, holding his stomach wound with his left hand and his carbine in his
right. Upon entering the door of the pillbox he emptied his carbine within.
While reloading he was shot and killed. The posthumous award of the Medal of
Honor will help to keep his memory green.
It was not until the close of the following day, however, that the
mopping up units had eliminated the numerous snipers who had been concealed in
isolated spots.
While the tanks had been of considerable assistance in instilling
confidence in the infantry, the full effect of their attacks was not driven
home. In some instances tanks rushed through the infantry lines to execute
missions which were not coordinated with those of the infantry they were
supposed to be supporting. Radio communication with them was impossible
because of interference and in many instances it was difficult to persuade
crews to "unbutton" long enough to receive instructions. In a number of cases
also, infantry failed to follow tanks closely enough to protect them from
enemy attack due partly to their speed which made it impossible to keep up
with them over the torn up ground. It was evident afterwards that more
training in this intricate team work was necessary.
Enemy resistance from the first had been disorganized. Before the
landings the annihilating effect of the bombardment had killed very large
numbers of the defending forces--estimates are 50/60 percent--and the
remaining troops were shell shocked and half mad from exhaustion and lack of
food
-15-
and water. They resisted, however, with the utmost bravery and stubborness
and died at their posts almost to the last man. Communications had been
completely knocked out and resistance took the form of sniping from every
possible place of concealment in the rubble and by occasional concerted
charges of small numbers of men who were cut down as they rushed madly
forward. During the night of February 1-2 the enemy tried infiltration
tactics which were counteracted and in large measure vitiated by star shell
illumination from ships placed at appropriate stations to give this fire at
certain regular intervals or on call.
Mopping up--a term which is greatly abused--remained to be done. Some of
the buildings were interconnected and the blocked entrance of one did not
necessarily insure that the enemy within were definitely trapped. It was
necessary, therefore, to approach each ruin with the utmost caution to avoid
an enemy bullet even though it might be his last, and to use flame throwers
and satchel charges with determination and in quantity.
The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, had assumed command ashore
at 1820 1 February. At 0800 on 2 February Phase III of the operation began.
This consisted of the search and seizure of the islands immediately to the
south of Namur, the last being Gagen which marked the separation of the north
and south sectors. At about the same time, the island of Boggerlapp to the
west of Mellu was seized.
BLT 3/25 continued working from LVT's in a westerly direction and by 5
February reached Oniotto. Similar work continued through 6 and 7 February
during which time the relatively large island, Ebadon, at the extreme west of
the atoll was reached. The Southern Landing Force had undertaken similar
maneuvers so that on 7 February the work was pretty much finished.
At 0730 8 February 1944, the Commander, Central Pacific Forces announced
that the capture and occupation phase had been completed. At 0800 command of
the Kwajalein Garrison Force was assumed by Rear Admiral A. D. Bernhard, USN,
In immediate command of Roi-Namur was Captain E. C. Ewen, USN and of Kwajalein
Island, Brigadier General H. D. Gibson, USA.
The enemy casualties amounted to almost their entire garrison.
Killed in action . . . . . . . . . 3472
Japanese prisoners . . . . . . . . 99
Korean prisoners . . . . . . . . . 165
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3736
-16-
Marine Corps losses:
Killed in action . . . . . . . . . 190
Wounded in action. . . . . . . . . 547
------
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
The burial of the enemy dead presented a problem of the utmost importance
to sanitation. Beside the runways of the airfield on Roi were drainage
trenches. They were deepened by bulldozers and the bodies of the fanatical
defenders disposed in them with dignity despite the need for haste. Commander
W. C. Baty (MC) USN, the Division Surgeon was commended by the Commanding
General for his skillful and rapid execution of this distasteful but essential
task.
Despite some things going wrong, chiefly the lack of control over the
LVT's, the operation was brilliantly successful. It seems doubtful if more
could have been accomplished in a shorter time and with less casualties. As
compared to the assault on Tarawa the operation had a number of factors in its
favor.
1. There was more time available for planning.
2. The lessons learned had been taken to heart.
3. There was more appreciation of the problems involved in
sending troops over reefs in amphibious tractors, (which,
again, had been gained by experience).
4. There was more equipment available.
On the other hand, naturally enough, the bitter experience at Tarawa was
still fresh in the minds of the high command and there was perhaps
overemphasis of certain problems which the earlier engagement had established
in the minds of those concerned. This caused in the beginning, general doubt
regarding the effectiveness of our weapons and our tactics, but this doubt was
rapidly dissolved. As an observer of the operation put it, "A continuation of
the policy to send a man to do a boy's job will result in rapid success with
relatively small cost in casualties."
Official reports now at hand are in many instances lacking in sufficient
detail to give an accurate account here of difficulties incurred in the taking
of Namur. The 7th Infantry Division, constituting the Southern Landing Force
was, however, better provided and the reader is referred to six articles by
Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall which appeared in the INFANTRY JOURNAL
serially from August 1944 to January 1945 inclusive, and were later published
in book form under the title of "Island Victory." These articles, written as
the result of what might be called a general seminar of both officers and men
after the fighting had ceased on Kwajalein Island, served to bring out in
great detail the difficulties
-17-
Map of KWAJALEIN ISLAND
and tribulations which the 184th and the 32d Infantry, U. S. Army incurred in
gaining their hard won objective. It is to be regretted that there is nothing
comparable to it for the Northern Landing Force.
SECTION V
KWAJALEIN ATOLL
Southern Attack Force
It now becomes necessary to turn to the Southern Attack Force which was
engaged in the seizure of Kwajalein Island.
Enemy forces on Kwajalein Island had been estimated at 3500-4200 troops
plus 1200-1600 Korean laborers. Ebeye to the north was thought to hold
700-900 men.
The plan of attack was similar to that of the Northern forces; that is,
on D-day (31 January 1944) it was planned to seize and emplace artillery on
Enubuj and Ennylabegan Islands to support the landings on Kwajalein Island
destined for the following day.
The 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop was to land prior to dawn and
secure Gea and Ninni Islands in order to gain mastery of Ninni Pass between
the two. The operation was accomplished successfully except that a landing
was made in error because of the darkness on Gehh Island, about 2000 yards to
the north of Ninni. The detachment was reembarked, reached its proper
destination and secured Ninni by 1235. Gea was captured at 0935.
No enemy had been found on Gehh when the troops reembarked for the Ninni
landing. This proved unlucky for at a later time in the operation, it was
necessary to retake the island to which some of the enemy had managed to make
their way. In its second capture, 65 Japanese were killed.<1>
Ninni was secured without opposition and Gea taken at a loss to us of 1
killed and 1 injured against 13 enemy killed.
Landings on Ennylabegan were made on the northern end from the seaward
side about 0912 by BLT 1/17 and the island was secured by 1310. Meanwhile,
BLT 2/17 had gone for Enubuj at 0915 and, with the assistance of light tanks
which were put ashore an hour or so later, secured the island by 1210.
----------
<1>Reports vary as to the number.
-18-
Immediately afterward, the artillery of the 7th Division began to be
landed. The 31st, 48th, and 57th Field Artillery Battalions (105 Howitzers)
were put ashore in DUKW's by 1500. Two batteries of the 145th Artillery
Battalion of 155m were landed in LCX's by 1700. During the night of 31
January-1 February, all guns were registered and ready to fire before
daylight. Harassing fire by the artillery and by naval gunfire was put down
on Kwajalein throughout the night. LCI's standing close in prevented the
enemy from moving to other adjoining islands. By 1735 31 January, all troops
of RCT's 184 and 32, which were to be landed in LVT's, had been transferred to
LST's.
Phase II began early on 1 February. The plan called for landing at 0930
of the two RCT's 184 and 32 in column of battalions abreast on beaches Red 1
and Red 2 on the western end of the island.
The previous day on two occasions, Beach Reconnaissance Unit #1 had
reconnoitred the beaches for underwater obstacles or mines with negative
results. W-hour, D-day plus 1, was set for 0930. Naval gunfire began at 0615
just as dawn was coming in. This continued in heavy volume until it was
halted to allow for air bombardment. The carrier planes went to work from
0805 until 0830; then for a period of nine minutes beginning at 0830 six
land-based bombers from Makin did their bit in making things miserable for the
enemy.
The carrier planes then took up again, dive-bombing the landing beaches
from 0845-0900 and strafing from 0900-0905. At the end of the air
bombardment, intense naval gunfire was resumed.
The first waves of BLT's 3/184 and 1/32 crossed the Line of Departure at
0900 in LVT's. They were supported by LCI's on the flanks and by a group of
17 LVT(A)'s armed with 37mm cannon and manned by Company "A" of the 708th
Amphibian Tank Battalion. The handling of the landing craft and their
supports was admirable.
Initial opposition at the beach was light and by 0955 it was found
possible to land tanks. Their advent heartened the troops de spite their
difficulty in negotiating the hideously shell-torn terrain. Four waves came
in direct in LVT's and the 5th and 6th were transferred to them from LCVP's
outside the reef and made the landing in two stages.
By 1018, RCT 32 on the right was 250 yards inland and by 1300 troops were
approaching the western end of the air strip, about 1000 yards from Beaches
Red 1 and 2. At 1438, BLT 2/32 passed through 1/32 which had led the advance
for five hours.
By 1700, our troops were about a third of the way up the island,
Regimental CP's of 32 and 184 had been established
----------
Line 2: Add "49th"
-19-
ashore near the beaches by 1800. The CP, 7th Division, was established on
Enubuj about 1700.
BLT 3/184 set up a front line for the night at a point 300 yards west of
Center Pier. BLT 2/32 on its right was 200 yards ahead. At 2245, the enemy
counterattacked on the 184th lines in groups of about 50 men each. There was
considerable tensity for no one could be quite sure who was friend or foe, but
the attacks, for the most part mad and suicidal rushes, were repulsed with
almost complete casualties to the enemy. Moreover, searchlights from ships on
selected stations served to prevent extensive concentrations without the
movement being revealed.
It must be recalled that the shock of the naval bombardment for three
successive days, and the destructive harassment of artillery and air
concentrations had left the enemy in a state bordering on insane despair. As
an officer observer afterwards put it, "The entire island (Kwajalein) looked
as if it had been picked up to twenty-thousand feet and then dropped. All
beach defenses were completely destroyed."
On D-day plus 2 (2 February) at 0630, BLT 2/184 passed through 3/184 and
joined 2/32 in an attack at 0715. The jump off was preceded by air
bombardment and naval gunfire and was supported by tanks. Progress was slow
but steady; resistance was spotty but heavy in certain places.
At 1200, BLT 3/32 passed through 2/32 and continued the attack. By dusk
(about 1930) the leading 2/184 and 3/32 Battalions had established their front
lines and set up a perimeter defense. The line of 3/32 was generally along
Nora Road with 2/184 about 100 yards ahead. Resistance had been stubborn
especially on the seaward side of the island. Meanwhile, the 7th
Reconnaissance Troop had relanded on Gehh (which had been found untenanted on
31 January when first approached) and had killed 65 men and captured 2
prisoners at a loss to themselves of 2 killed and 11 wounded.
During the night of 2-3 February, 1/184 had relieved 2/184 in their
sector.
On D-day plus 3 (3 February), the two battalions jumped off abreast at
0715. Resistance during the day was continually stiffer as the enemy took
advantage of every possible uncertainty of the terrain and concentrated the
fire of such mortars and artillery as were left to them. Despite the havoc
wrought by the bombardments, there was still much cover available and
positions wore concealed with great adroitness. Many of the concrete
installations still stood in partial ruin even though they had received direct
hits from heavy naval guns and the fire from 75mm's had little effect on them.
-20-
It was necessary to employ heavy demolition charges to breach
emplacements sufficiently for the employment of flame throwers and grenades.
In the utter turmoil, it was nearly impossible to maintain contact.
Nothing was any longer recognizable. The situation was made doubly uncertain
from the fact that fire might come from almost any direction at the flanks,
frontally or from the rear. The going was tough.
At 1407, RCT 32 had pushed up to Nathan Road abreast of NOB pier. It
became evident that the battle would not end that day. In consequence, RCT
184 was ordered to wheel to the left toward the lagoon where a considerable
number of the enemy were still concentrated. Just above Nathan Road, RCT 184
was pinched off by RCT 32 which took over the entire front, at that point
something over 300 yards in width.
Ebeye - As the Japanese resistance had become longer drawn out than had been
hoped, it was determined to commit certain of the reserves to the capture of
Ebeye. At 0934, D-day plus 3 (3 February), BLT 1/17 was landed on Beach
Orange 4, on the south end of the island, supported by heavy air and naval
bombardment. There, like devastation to Kwajalein confronted the troops, and
resistance of the same desperate character made itself felt immediately. At
1600, therefore, BLT 3/17 was landed in support. By dusk about half of the
island had been taken and the two tiny islets to the south between Ebeye and
Kwajalein had been cleared of enemy.
At 0700, on D-day plus 4 (4 February) the enemy attacked in some
concentration but made no appreciable progress. The blockhouses, however,
proved extremely difficult to silence. At about 1130 3/17 passed through 1/17
and continued the slow but steady advance. By 1255, organized
resistance--such as it was--ceased and mopping up was completed by 1337.
Meanwhile, on Kwajalein itself the struggle continued but with lessening
fury as the Japanese were gradually cut down. At dawn (0600) on D-day plus 4
(4 February) 1/184 and 2/184 launched an attack to clean up the remaining
forces in the vicinity of NOB pier. By 0852, organized resistance ceased and
by 1200 NOB pier had been secured though only after a hard struggle.
On the lines to the north the enemy had made a counterattack at 0509
which got nowhere. BLT's 2/32 and 1/32 then passed through 3/32 to continue
the attack, leaving 3/32 for the mopping up operations.
After naval gunfire on the northern tip of the island, 2/32 jumped off at
0715. It was still the same hard going,
-21-
discouraging and desolate despite the sense of gradual accomplishment of a
ruthless task. By 1132, 2/32 had advanced to Nancy Road about 400 yards from
the end of the island, and somewhat less than the distance covered since early
morning. At 1450, 1/32 took the lead, and at last gained the certainty after
so many earlier disappointments that the enemy's struggles were nearly over.
Kwajalein Island had produced a war of its own.
Isolated Engagements on D-day plus 5 -- Meanwhile, a detachment of 2/17 landed
on the small island of Loi to the north of Ebeye and secured it after small
resistance. Artillery was landed to support the attack on Gugegwe set for 5
February.
Prior to dawn on D-day plus 5 (5 February), the 7th Reconnaissance Troop
landed by rubber boats on the north end of Bigej, next to the north and across
the channel from Gugegwe. The enemy was first encountered at 0722 and put up
strong resistance from pillboxes and dug in positions. BLT 3/184, which was
in reserve off Gugegwe in two LST's, was ordered to land during the middle of
the morning. Tanks were put ashore at 1123. The Reconnaissance Troop
advanced behind them down the island to the northern pier, methodically
reducing the enemy positions. The 3/184 then passed through the
Reconnaissance Troop, continued the attack, and secured Bigej by 1545.
Earlier in the day, BLT 1/17 had landed from LST's on Center Gugegwe at
0932 against light resistance. By 1520 the central portion was secured and
the troops passed over the reef to north Gugegwe which in turn was in their
hands at 1711.
The squeezing out of possible enemy on the smaller islands to the north
and to the west of Kwajalein was carried on systematically throughout D-day
plus 5 (5 February). At daylight BLT 2/17 sent one reinforced rifle company
in an LST supported by an LCI to clear the islands to the west of Gehh and up
to Eller, the northernmost island on the western side of the lagoon within the
southern sector. Similar forces went northward on the eastern shores from
Bigej to Gellinam. A few enemy were accounted for.
By 0800, 5 February, Rear Admiral A. D. Bernhard, Advanced Base Commander
of Kwajalein Atoll, had established his command post ashore and was preparing
to assume command when Commander, Central Pacific Force (Vice Admiral R. A.
Spruance) had declared the capture and occupation phases were complete. On 8
February this declaration was made, Captain E. C. Ewen, USN, and Brigadier
General H. D. Gibson, USA, became commanders of Roi-Namur and Kwajalein
Islands Areas respectively.
-22-
SECTION VI
Handling of the LVT's
The foregoing brief accounts of the land actions of the Northern and
Southern Forces can hardly give an idea of the dangers and difficulties with
which the troops were confronted. It is true that the operation was completed
rapidly and the men neither were faced with the terrible discomforts of jungle
fighting nor with the prospect of a battle of almost indefinite duration such
as occurred later in the seizure of the Marianas. Still while it lasted the
fighting was bitter as any yet encountered. The enemy's control over their
forces was lost by the shattering of communications and only occasionally were
they able to rally as much as fifty men for some form of concerted attack.
Most of them were killed in individual combat and literally they died to the
last man. The number of enemy troops engaged in the defense of Kwajalein
Atoll was estimated as nearly correctly as possible by the number who were
buried.
It now seems proper to consider in somewhat more detail different
elements of the action. As before consideration will be given first to the
Northern Landing Force and then to the Southern.
As regards the boating of the Marine Corps units and the handling of the
LVT's, there is no question of the superior cohesion of small craft
transportation in the Southern Landing Force.
In that delightful book called "Uncommon Law", by A. P. Herbert, the well
known British wit and Member of Parliament, pokes fun at the laws of his land.
Among others he touches on a case where a man driving along a flooded road in
an automobile, was forced into deep water, to the ruin of his car, by a man
paddling a boat of light draft, who insisted upon observing the "Regulations
for the Prevention of Collision at Sea" and in passing the automobile on the
port side. The question involved--a tricky one--was what law should apply;
the Admiralty Laws governing navigation or the general rules of the road.
It would seem that much the same circumstances existed here. What is an
LVT? The Navy wished to hold that it was a naval vessel and as such subject
to their command. Yet, it was manned by a Marine Corps crew and was destined
to go on land as well as water. At what moment, therefore, should it, as a
vessel, leave naval control and become a vehicle subject to Marine Corps
orders? This question, a grave one in time of stress, was certainly not
satisfactorily settled during the landings on Roi and Namur.
-23-
It must be admitted that the difficulties were very considerable and that
more was expected of the amphibians than they could reasonably be supposed to
accomplish. To review the situation briefly: on D-day, 31 January, landings
were to be made on Ennuebing and Mellu Islands on the former of which, after
both had been secured, artillery was to be landed to support the attacks on
Roi and Namur. As soon as the islands had been secured it was planned that
the LVT's should immediately retract, pick up other troops in the LST area
outside the reef and returning through Ennuebing Pass proceed across the north
end of the lagoon to capture Ennubirr and Ennumennet Islands. If time
permitted, Ennugarret, immediately to the southeast of Namur, was also to be
seized.
In later operations much of this confusion was avoided by transferring
the troops from transports to LST's well prior to the proposed hour of
landings on D-day and launching the fully loaded LVT's from their carriers.
Another element which complicated the situation was the fact that the control
boats appeared to be somewhat uncertain of their duties in regard to
shepherding the LVT's. It does not appear that the limitations of the latter
craft (or vehicle if you prefer) were thoroughly understood. Also the crews
of the LST's and the LVT's were new to each other and the former do not appear
to have exercised or to have held a sympathetic and understanding outlook as
to what their little brood required. As an instance, the commanding officer
of one platoon exhibits remarkable restraint in his account:
"The tractor crews had only been able to get very few hours
rest (D plus 3). By this time they were acutely suffering from
fatigue, but LST _____ refused to give the men any hot chow
or coffee when we returned for refuelling and later in the
operation even refused the men the use of their heads."
Another case:
"Upon reaching LST_____they requested permission to come
aboard telling the ship's Captain two of the LVT's were about out
of gas and having motor trouble. He refused permission to the men
to come aboard saying that he had been ordered to anchorage within
the lagoon. The LVT's tried to follow but two which had been low
on gas ran out and sank."
The craft and their crews were driven beyond limits of endurance of men
and machines. Continuous operation was more than they could stand.
-24-
From Headquarters, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion:
"A man can be overworked, rested and used again readily; a
machine gives only so much and then stops. No consideration was
given the need for servicing vehicles. Demands for machines usually
were on a par with available running equipment. Units had time only
to refuel and keep operating. Oil couldn't be changed or normal levels
maintained, greasing was completely out. Personnel employing tractor
units must be made aware of this need for service if they are to have
vehicles operating more than a few days."
Again the Medical Officer comments:
"Fatigue: It is estimated that about 75% of the personnel of this
organization operated tractors for 24 to 30 of the first 48 hours
of the recent Kwajalein invasion. Continuous operation of tractors
for 14 to 16 hours was not uncommon and several platoons participated
in assaults on three separate islands in one day."
And in a summary he says:
"By far the most important problems and the one most urgently
requiring the attention of all officers is that of fatigue."
Had there been at the beaches the same desperate opposition that had
flashed up at Tarawa, it is possible that things might have gone amiss. It
seems probable that much of the confusion could have been averted had there
been time for more rehearsal. And, as it was, the job managed to get done.
However, the loss of precious tractors was not inconsiderable, 36 out of 140
employed or something over 25%. Of these 23 were sunk, 7 were missing and
listed as probably sunk and 6 were swamped or overturned on reefs. Three of
these went down in endeavoring to land the artillery, with a loss of seven men
and two 75mm Pack Howitzers.
The Southern Landing Force somehow managed to overcome most of the
difficulties which have been noted above in the handling of their LVT's. The
7th Infantry Division so organized its amphibian tractor units that it was
able to retain better operational control and maintenance. As amphibian
tractor units were not available, the 7th Infantry Division converted well
trained tank units into a seagoing force. This worked surprisingly well.
Under the 708th Provisional Amphibious Tractor Battalion four LVT groups were
organized. Each group consisted of 34 LVT's and was designated to land the
first four waves of one Battalion Landing Team.
-25-
One such group was assigned to two LST's, each LST being able to load 17 LVT's
on the tank deck. The assignment of the LVT groups to the LST's was permanent
for the duration of the operation, both for movement overseas and throughout
the initial and subsequent landings. This permanent assignment of LVT groups
to specific LST's contributed to a high degree to the success of their
operation and maintenance. For each group of LVT's one of the LST's was
equipped as a maintenance shop. After each landing LVT's were returned and
reloaded in their assigned LST's for servicing.
After the capture and occupation of Ennylabegan, that island was used as
an LVT base throughout the remainder of the operation and LVT's which could
not immediately be repaired on the LST's were landed there for heavy repairs,
LST's assigned to the LVT groups when not involved in other operations
normally anchored in the lagoon off the Ennylabegan shore. Within each LVT
group, one LVT was employed solely for emergency maintenance and repair. It
operated between the Line of Departure and the beach and rendered immediate
assistance to any craft whose mechanical difficulties its own crew was unable
to rectify.
For the purposes of coordination and command, the Commander of Amphibious
Tractor Battalion had his CP in the flagship of the Transport Group Commander.
The executive officer's CP was in the flagship of the LST Group Commander. By
this arrangement the LVT commander maintained close, direct and personal
contact with the troop and naval commanders with whom he had to work.
During the ship to shore movements the LVT battalion commander moved to
the Line of Departure and remained on or in the vicinity of the control vessel
from which he could observe and supervise the operation of his LVT groups.
The 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion executed five separate
landings precisely on schedule. No LVT's were swamped or lost in the surf but
two were lost as a result of an attempt to tow them at a speed in excess of 10
knots. All of the groups operated at full strength throughout.
One company of LVT(A)1's was employed in the operation. It consisted of
15 vehicles organized into three platoons of five amphibian tanks each. The
entire company was embarked in a single LST which served as its home
throughout the operation in similar fashion to the LVT's. The amphibious
tanks were employed to accompany and support the first wave with positions on
the flanks and in the center. This was a new idea in amphibious landings and
without a doubt a good one, but it is difficult to assess its absolute value
because of the lack of enemy opposition encountered on the beaches.
-26-
DUKW's were used by the 7th Infantry Division for two principal purposes:
(1) to land artillery and its ammunition from its LST's and (2) to land
priority supplies. Four battalions of field artillery, 105mm Howitzers were
embarked in four LST's. The artillery pieces and additional supplies of
ammunition were loaded into the DUKW's which in turn were stowed on the tank
deck of the LST. As soon as the beach was seized on Ennylabegan Island the
artillery was ordered to land and the LST's closed in to within a short
distance of the beach and launched their DUKW's. By the use of "A" frames
with which a certain proportion of the DUKW's were equipped the artillery
pieces were lifted out at the sites selected for emplacement. The tactical
situation required the landing of large quantities of artillery ammunition.
To accomplish this the LST's were beached and the DUKW's employed to shuttle
between the ships and ammunition dumps further inland. For the purpose
employed they proved admirable and their mechanical functioning was
satisfactory. They were not, however, so successfully used in inter-island
traffic because of their low speed and lack of sea-worthiness,
SECTION VII
Naval, Air and Artillery Bombardment
It seems probable that the lessons at Tarawa in attempted neutralization
of enemy beach defenses were foremost in the minds of the high command and the
determination was arrived at that so long as there were ample forces available
they would be employed to the fullest.
From D-day minus 2, until our troops were so firmly established ashore
that only call fire was possible, Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and LCI's
poured forth a crushing weight of shell upon the enemy installations. It was
believed, not unreasonably, that the fortifications might possibly equal those
of Betio Island and that every possible endeavor should be made to reduce
them, before the troops were sent ashore. In consequence, vast quantities of
shell of all weights were thrown at the different islands with almost
completely devastating result. None of the islands adjoining the principal
objectives of both the Northern and the Southern Landing Forces escaped this
rain of fire. In the north, Ennugarret, Ennumennet; Ennubirr on the east and
Mellu on the west of the lagoon, all received thorough and continuous going
over. On Roi, 1434.5 tons were fired and on Namur 1220.6 tons. In the
Southern Group, Bigej, Gugegwe, Loi and Ebeye on the east of the lagoon were
heavily pounded and on the west Ennubuj and Ennylabegan received their due
share. On Kwajalein itself 2656.5 tons were fired. The following table by
size of gun and number of rounds fired
-27-
can only give but small indication of the almost annihilating effect of the
naval bombardment.
Northern Group Southern Group
Bore Rounds Bore Rounds Totals
16" 1527 16" 1022 2549
14" 783 14" 3483 4266
8" 1400 8" 2895 4295
6" 3337 6" -- 3337
5" 21212 5" 27668 48880
2677.4 3926.7
This fire was delivered from the following ships:
Northern Force:
BB's: NORTH CAROLINA, ALABAMA, SOUTH DAKOTA,
TENNESSEE, COLORADO, MARYLAND.
Heavy Cruisers: LOUISVILLE, INDIANAPOLIS.
Light Cruisers: SANTA FE, MOBILE, BILOXI.
11 Destroyers
Southern Force:
BB's; WASHINGTON, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS,
PENNSYLVANIA, IDAHO, NEW MEXICO,
MISSISSIPPI.
Heavy Cruisers: MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO,
NEW ORLEANS.
18 Destroyers
In addition the LCI's formed on the flanks of the boat waves and going
close in discharged rocket and machine gun fire which would have had
shattering effect on the enemy had the beach defenses been manned in force.
This again was a new idea and again a good one. But, as in the case of the
LVT(A)1's it was not possible here to make a calculated estimate of the
beneficial result.
As regards artillery fire from registered emplacements on islands
adjoining the principal objectives the results were highly satisfactory. This
again, was a successful tactical departure. Ground troops like to be
supported by their own artillery. From Ennylabegan the 105mm Howitzers
discharged 73175 rounds from D-day until their services were
-28-
no longer required and the 155mm's, 5236; a total of 78411 rounds. The
forty-eight 105mm Howitzers fired almost continuously for three days and two
nights from an area 150 yards wide by 900 yards long and discharged during
this time 1622 tons of ammunition. The strain on the personnel was almost
beyond endurance but they held up splendidly. The 155mm Howitzers which were
in position 200 yards to the rear of the 105mm Howitzers' area also fired day
and night from D-day plus 1 to the morning of D-day plus 5.
A terrible and disconcerting accident failed to diminish the accuracy and
rapidity of their fire. Early on D-day plus 3 seven men were killed by a
premature burst and the blowing up of one of the 155mm Howitzers. Despite the
fact that no one knew the cause or felt in his heart that it was unlikely to
reoccur, all personnel continued to fire with the greatest hardihood and
enthusiasm. The greatest strain fell on the loaders who moved by hand 4/5 of
a ton of metal in each ten minutes of firing. Casualties in the artillery
were as follows:
Officers Enlisted
Dead from enemy action: 1 2
Dead from own equipment: 1 7
Wounded from enemy action: 1 7
Wounded from own equipment: 0 26
--- ----
Total 3 42
It may be wondered that with this intense and continuous bombardment none
of our own troops or vessels were hit. The smoke arising from the fires of
burning buildings, the dust raised up by the crushing burst of shells, served
to obscure positions on the islands and make observation even from the air
extremely difficult. It is due to this factor that in the opinion of certain
naval officers call fire was not utilized to its fullest possible extent. In
close-in support such as even the largest naval vessels were giving at
point-blank range it was sometimes possible to observe through glasses,
movements of the enemy which were either not seen or could not be properly
interpreted by observers ashore. Fire on such targets of opportunity might
have added more rapidly to the confusion of the enemy. There were times,
however, when frantic troop commanders falsely accused naval gunfire of
landing in our own lines. Some of these cases arose when ships were not
firing and the very rumor of the report served somewhat to lower the ship's
morale. The chances are that the Japanese, with their customary ingenuity
were shooting over our troops with mortars to make them think that our own
fire was falling in rear areas.
-29-
Map of MAJURO ATOLL
The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, in reviewing observers
comments makes, however, an interesting statement, "The dependence on a
rolling artillery barrage for advance has not been concurred in. It is
envisaged that in many cases such a barrage will be impossible and troops
should not be taught to depend upon the artillery to clear the way."
Observation of artillery fire from planes was a marked success, with
certain minor difficulties which, it was recognized, could be overcome in
future operations. This was the third good idea which was put into practice
for the first time.
The capture of Kwajalein Atoll could never have been completed so rapidly
had it not been for the elimination of the enemy's air strength. For a month
previous to the operation the airfields on the principal Marshall Atolls had
received a thorough going over from land based planes. The Japs are hard to
discourage, however, with the consequence that fields which had been put out
frequently refused to stay put. It was left to the Carriers, therefore,
before the assault to prevent effectively all interference with the landing
forces from the air. Before these attacks began, on D-day minus 2, all
airborne opposition had been squashed. Twenty-one enemy planes had been
destroyed in the air and sixty-two on the ground. Our own losses were five
planes in combat and three in operation. Four pilots and one member of a crew
were killed.
The sorties (one complete attack by one aircraft) for all purposes
totalled 1704. Thirteen hundred and seventy-nine bombs totalling tons 274.5
were dropped.
269.035 rounds 50 calibre and 3440 rounds 30 calibre were expended.
No description can surpass the cold facts regarding our mastery in the
air.
SECTION VIII
MAJURO
The importance of the early seizure of Majuro for use as an advanced
naval base and harbor had been realized since the start of planning for the
Marshall Islands operations.
A glance at the map of the Marshalls will show that Majuro Atoll lies in
the eastern portion of the group and in the heart of the more important atolls
which for the time being were to be by-passed. This map will show, too, the
gradual change in complexion which has come over this
-30-
particular family of islands in the Pacific. With the exception of four, all
the other atolls are now in American hands.
The Majuro lagoon is about 24 miles long by 5 miles wide and extends
generally east and west. On the north and west there are long stretches of
reef devoid of islands. Most of the south side of the atoll consists of
Majuro Island which curves snakelike for 21 miles with a width of 2/300 yards
until the head widens out toward the extreme west.
The other important islands, all at the eastern end of the lagoon are
Dalap, immediately east of Majuro, and Uliga and Darrit in line to the north
of Dalap. All have heavy vegetation. The entrance to the lagoon is on the
northern side something over half way to the westward, flanked by the island
of Calalin and the islet of Eroj.
The mission to seize Majuro Atoll was assigned to Task Group 51.2 under
the command of Rear Admiral H. W. Hill. The assault landing force consisted
of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, reinforced by the Reconnaissance Company,
V Amphibious Corps and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Sheldon, USA.
The fire support group consisted of the cruiser PORTLAND and the DD's
BULLARD and KIDD. Two light carriers (CVE's NASSAU and NATOMA BAY were to
provide air support under command of Captain S. J. Michael.
On 23 January 1944 the APD KANE departed Pearl Harbor carrying the
Reconnaissance Company under the command of Captain James Logan Jones (USMC).
KANE remained in convoy until 29 January when she left to proceed alone toward
Majuro, KANE arrived off the northern passage on 30 January and disembarked
the detachments which were to reconnoitre the islands adjoining the channel.
Landing was made not without difficulties because of high seas, on the eastern
tip of Calalin where shortly after (about 2330) a single native was
discovered. From questioning it was gathered that there were 3/400 Japanese
laborers on Darrit Island. The detachment then proceeded across Calalin and
reached the main native settlement at 0100 on 31 January. Questioning of the
natives here disclosed that previous information was inaccurate and that no
Japanese force was present as it had been withdrawn some months before.
Apparently the misunderstanding arose from the difficulty in communication
with the earlier informant rather than to an attempt on his part to mislead.
It came to light, however, that one Japanese officer and a handful of
civilians were on Majuro Island. Meanwhile, a detail had proceeded to Eroj
Island on the west of the channel and found it unoccupied.
-31-
The main body of the Reconnaissance Company meanwhile proceeded in Kane
to Dalap Island where an initial landing was made on the southwest tip at
0330, 31 January. The surf was very high and at various times several of the
rubber boats capsized but fortunately no one was lost. Patrols pushed rapidly
northeastward without flushing any hostile game and subsequently worked across
the reefs to Uliga where they remained prepared to land on Darrit when the
word was given.
Communications had been far from satisfactory and as a consequence the
fire support ships had not been made aware that the earlier report of the
presence of a Japanese force was without foundation.
At 0637 naval bombardment of Darrit began, but at 0655 contact was made
with the ships who desisted from firing at the non-existent enemy. The
proposed air strike was cancelled, but much to their annoyance the
Reconnaissance platoon while crossing the reef to Darrit was strafed by an
observation plane from PORTLAND which luckily caused no casualties. Darrit
was then thoroughly scouted. No Japanese nor natives were unearthed but
several frame buildings in good condition and a considerable amount of
building materials of various character were found. Fortunately the short
bombardment had done them no damage. The island was covered with coconut
palms and thick undergrowth.
There still remained the tasks of capturing the Japanese on Majuro Island
and the reconnaissance and seizure of Arno Atoll lying to the east some ten
miles. Landings were made on Majuro Island from the sea at the western part
of the neck just where the island begins to bulge. Natives led the troops to
the houses occupied by the Japanese. The unusual excitment alarmed the
inhabitants who rushed out and managed to conceal themselves in the bush. A
search of the house produced two machine guns with ammunition which it was
learned had been taken from the wreck of a 3-24, which had crashed at Arno
some time before. The natives, still helpful, assisted a detail to dispose
itself so that within an hour the Japanese officer (who turned out to be of
Warrant rank) was seized without resistance.
Meanwhile, another detachment had proceeded in KANE to Arno where a
landing was made at 0030, 1 February. After a march of 8 miles, which yielded
no result, a stray native was picked up near the landing place and vouchsafed
the information that the village was some ten miles away. The detail, in
ships boats, reached the village at 0830 and found that the few Japanese
families who lived there had taken refuge in the bush. There was no evidence
of military installations. At 1150 the patrol returned aboard KANE and
returned to Majuro.
-32-
Map of ENIWETOK ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS
In three days the Reconnaissance Company had covered a lot of territory
and secured great benefit to the United States. Its Commanding Officer
(Captain James Logan Jones) has twice been awarded the Legion of Merit.
While the Reconnaissance Company was so busily engaged, the main task
force was approaching the Atoll. On D-day (31 January) the channel was swept
and permanent buoys planted at the lagoon entrance for the benefit of such
units of the fleet as might at some time desire its shelter. (It so happened
that the lagoon proved invaluable only a few days later).
After bombardment had ceased on Darrit, as mentioned above, the 2/106
Infantry embarked in CAMBRIA, anchored off the island at 0933. Higher
echelons were immediately advised that no enemy was present and that
debarkation of troops would be deferred pending word that they might not be
needed at Kwajalein. The troops were finally landed on D-day plus 1 (1
February). The same day the first LST's arrived and began to unload troops
and equipment on Uliga and Dalap Islands.
On D-day plus 2 units of the Fleet began to arrive including Casco and
patrol planes. On D-day plus 3 there were about thirty ships in the anchorage
with others due to arrive in considerable numbers. Work had been begun on the
airfield on Dalap.
On 4 February 1944 the Commander, Central Pacific Force announced that
the capture and occupation phases had been completed. The Island Commander,
Captain E. A. Cruise, USN, took over at 0600.
SECTION IX
ENIWETOK
The success of the attack on Kwajalein immediately prompted the High
Command to prepare for the seizure of Eniwetok, even before the earlier
operation had been concluded. On 4 February at a conference aboard USS ROCKY
MOUNT, attended by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Major General H. M. Smith, USMC,
Rear Admiral H. W. Hill and Brigadier General T. E. Watson, USMC, preliminary
plans were drawn up,
The atoll had been under continuous bombing attacks during the period of
the Kwajalein assault and many aerial photographs had been taken. These
apparently showed that the installations above ground had been pretty much
destroyed. However, on Engebi Island the foxhole and trench systems tended to
show increased development, There was no indication
-33-
of troops on Parry Island.
The plan of attack was similar to that of Kwajalein where it was
believed, with justice, that the best methods for the subjugation of an atoll
had been applied. Kwajalein had shown that the job could be done effectively;
the only question was how long would it take for Eniwetok. Preliminary
planning assumed that the forces on Eniwetok and on Parry were small and that
the principal enemy concentrations would be found on Engebi.
Unlike the Kwajalein Atoll, the only passages into the lagoon are toward
the south and as it was determined to assault the northern objective (Engebi
Island) from the lagoon rather than the sea, the approach to it was made
through entrances which were some miles distant. These were Deep Entrance
just to the north of Parry Island and Wide Passage to the west of Eniwetok
Island which was to be attacked only after the northern islands had been
secured. (See map, page 33).
On D-day, Rujiyoru Island and Yeiri, an adjacent island to the northwest,
were to be secured and artillery landed for firing upon Engebi during the
assault fixed for D-day plus 1. This assault would be made by two battalions
of the 22d Marines abreast with one BLT of the same regiment in reserve.
On the day succeeding the capture of Engebi (presumably D-day plus 2) it
was planned to assault Eniwetok Island with one BLT of 106th Infantry, U. S.
Army, with the remaining BLT in reserve. (It will be recalled that BLT 2/106
had been engaged in the seizure of Majuro Atoll and was still employed as
garrison for it). Subsequent to the assault on Eniwetok, but on the same day
if the situation permitted, Parry Island was to be taken by one BLT of the
106th Infantry supported by one BLT of the 22d Marines. In support of the
attack artillery was to be emplaced on Eniwetok.
D-day was set originally for 12 February, then as the Kwajalein operation
dragged unexpectedly on, it was shifted to the 15th and finally fixed for the
17th. Fortunately, a Japanese map of Eniwetok Atoll had been captured during
the Kwajalein operation. Based on the information it contained, it was
decided to proceed with the main elements of the force directly into Deep
Entrance, between Parry and Japtan Islands, and to steam to anchorage areas in
the vicinity of Engebi some 20 miles to the northward.
Supporting measures were airstrikes against Ponape, Jaluit, Kusaie and
Wake and almost continuous air bombardment of Eniwetok itself.
On D-day heavy strikes were made against Truk, Tinian and Saipan by Task
Force 50. The raid on Truk was particularly
-34-
successful and effectually prevented interference with our plans by hostile
submarines or planes.
There was no chance for rehearsal, but the troops were thought to be
sufficiently experienced. The 22d Marines had undergone considerable training
at Samoa and at Maui, T. H. At the latter place training had included field
firing problems, wherein tanks, artillery and aircraft had provided actual
supporting fire. The troops had been aboard ship for about five weeks before
the landing, as in the Kwajalein assault their support ashore had not been
required. During the long period on ship board the time had been well spent
in planning, in preparation of orders and intelligence data and in
disseminating them to lower units. After the fall of Kwajalein Island a good
many officers were permitted ashore to inspect the defenses and the methods by
which they had been reduced. Another favorable factor was the assignment to
the expedition of the LCI group and the DUKW outfit which had done such a fine
piece of work at Kwajalein.
The Eniwetok Expeditionary Group as it was called (likewise designated as
Task Force 51.11) was under the command of Rear Admiral H. W. Hill who had
under him Brigadier General T. E. Watson, USMC, as commander of the ground
forces. The Landing Forces contained as chief components:
22d Marines (reinforced) - Colonel J. T. Walker, USMC
106th Infantry (reinforced) (less 2d BLT) - Colonel
R. G. Ayers, USA.
5th Amph. Corps Reconnaissance Company
Co. "D", 4th Marine Tank Battalion (Scout)
Provisional Amph. Tractor (less 1 LVT group) of the
7th Infantry Division
Company "A", 708 Amp. Tank Battalion, 7th Infantry
Division
Provisional DUKW Battery, 7th Infantry Division
In support were:
Fire Support Group, Section 1, Rear Admiral J. B. Oldendorf
COLORADO
LOUISVILLE 3 DD's
Section 2
TENNESSEE Rear Admiral
PENNSYLVANIA 2 DD's H. F. Kingman
Section 3
PORTLAND Captain A. D.
INDIANAPOLIS 2 DD's Burhans
-35-
Escort Carrier Group Rear Admiral
Van H. Ragsdale
SANGAMON
SUWANNEE
CHENANGO 4 DD's
Carrier Task Group Rear Admiral
S. P. Ginder
SARATOGA
PRINCETON
LANGLEY
Cruiser Division 10 Rear Admiral
L. H. Thebaud
CANBERRA
BOSTON
SAN JUAN
Destroyer Squadron 6 Captain
with eight destroyers J. M. Higgins
to which were added two minesweeping units and a service group.
All units sortied Kwajalein 15 February, the Southern Group in the
morning, the Northern Group in the afternoon. The passage to Eniwetok was
without incident except for some doubtful submarine contacts made by the
Southern Group Screen which necessitated emergency turn maneuvers and slightly
delayed the arrival of the ships off Wide Passage Eniwetok on D-day.
Bombardment of Engebi by COLORADO and LOUISVILLE, of Japtan and Parry
(the islands flanking Deep Entrance) by PORTLAND and TRATHEN, and of the
southwest tip of Eniwetok by INDIANAPOLIS and HOEL, began promptly at 0700 on
D-day (17 February). There was no return fire. At the same time minesweepers
of the Southern Group entered Wide Passage ahead of the LCI-LST column. At
0822 at a point some 1000 yards up the lagoon a mine was swept and movement of
the group was delayed while further sweeping operations were conducted.
At 0915, TENNESSEE, leading the Transport Column and preceded by
minesweepers, entered Deep Entrance. Flanking fire was placed on Parry and
Japtan by 40mm batteries of the battleships and destroyers but, again, there
was no return fire. It subsequently came to light that the Japanese had
received orders to hold their fire and indeed to take every precaution against
revealing their presence to the entering ships. One is tempted here for a
moment to consider the state of mind of the Japanese who lay concealed in the
dense growth of the islands and watched our ships slip by a scant
-36-
halfmile away. They must have watched with unwilling admiration the great
battle ships--which their treachery had shattered on that terrible Sunday in
December 1941--returning for the kill. Perhaps they were doubly haunted by
the thought that these formidable instruments of destruction, these inhuman
masses of steel, could harbor the human instinct of revenge which at long last
they had come to seek. Every man who watched those ships knew that his hours
were numbered. The end had come, not quickly from a bullet in the heat and
delirium of battle, but from an angel of doom, potent, inflexible,
devastating, ready to strike at his pleasure. In every heart there must have
burned a fiery nostalgia which defied every effort to extinguish it and with
each passing hour of life scorched the very vitals of the mind and soul. It's
sweet to die for the Emperor, perhaps they thought, but how much sweeter if
death were softened by one--only one--more look at the homeland, at the small
places and the small people who were so dear.
By 1034 all vessels had entered the lagoon safely and were proceeding to
their initial anchorages.
By afternoon a sea plane base had been established to the west of Piirai
Island.
There was still considerable to be done before the operations of D-day
could be considered as successfully concluded. Chief in importance was the
job of securing Rujiyuro and Yeiri Islands so that the artillery could be
landed at the earliest possible moment for registration on Engebi.
Fortunately there was no opposition. The VAC Reconnaissance Company landed
from LVT's and reported the islands secured at 1354. Artillery began at once
to be put ashore, The 2d Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion landed on Yeiri
Island while the 104th F. A. Battalion (105mm) occupied Rujiyoru, travelling
in faithful DUKW's. At 1602 all artillery had landed and had completed
registration three hours later. While this task was proceeding the VAC
Reconnaissance Company secured the small islands to the northwest and
southeast of the artillery positions.
Meanwhile, Company "D" (Scout) 4th Tank Battalion of the 4th Marine
Division was ordered to land on Bogon, the island immediately to the west of
Engebi in order to secure it and to prevent the possible escape of the enemy
from Engebi. In the darkness and due to the heavy sea the Company was unable
to land on Bogon from rubber boats and became separated, part of them
returning to the APD Schley on which they had been embarked. The other half
managed to land on Teileiripucchi two islands below Bogon and worked its way
in rubber boats up the reefs to its original objective which
-37-
Map of ENGEBI ISLAND
was reached at 0327, 18 February and found to be deserted.
While these interesting events were occurring the Beach Reconnaissance
party closed Engebi supported by fires from COLORADO, TENNESSEE and supporting
destroyers. The mission was accomplished smartly and without casualties in
spite of sporadic machine gun fire from the beaches. Boat lanes and shoal
spots were buoyed and all possible preparations completed to assist the
assault of the morrow.
The Japs must have realized we meant business. Destroyers had fired on
the islands flanking Engebi during the afternoon of D-day and at dawn (0620)
of D-day plus 1 (18 February) TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA moved into their
selected areas and delivered most effective flanking fire against the lagoon
beach defenses of the objective.
Engebi Island is roughly triangular, the southern base fronting the
lagoon for something over a mile of which the landing beaches occupied about
750 yards to the right center. A single runway airstrip extended across the
northwest side and the northern tip of the island was almost entirely cleared.
Otherwise it was covered with evenly spaced coconut palms or low brush.
The Line of Departure was about 4000 yards from the beaches and the
assault waves had been launched in LVT's from their LST's (to which they had
been transferred the previous afternoon) another 1000 yards to the south.
LVT(A1's) equipped with 37mm cannon protected the flanks and center of the
first wave. All possible insurance against loss of landing craft and
personnel was further provided by fires from the LCI's, the Destroyers and
Battleships and from the artillery on Yeiri and Rujiyoru Islands.
At 0842, a touch ahead of schedule, BLT 1/22 and BLT 2/22 landed abreast
on Beaches Blue 3 and White 1 on the lagoon side of Engebi. The dividing line
between the battalions was a pier about half way between "Skunk" Point on the
southeast end and the extension of the airstrip which protruded into the
lagoon. The waves of the second battalion landed pretty much as expected but
because of the smoke which largely obscured the beaches, the first battalion
landed further to the west than planned and caused temporarily a gap between
the landing teams. However, this severance of the line was soon cared for.
There must be mentioned here one of those pathetic episodes incident to
the horrible waste of war. One tank was lost in the landings. It was boated
in an LCM on which, unfortunately, only one engine was functioning. By some
mischance the lever depressing the ramp was operated with the result that the
craft began to flood rapidly while still
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500 yards off shore. The tank crew had "buttoned up" and could gain but small
idea of the accident. Despite the frantic efforts of the LCM's crew to warn
the occupants, the desperate urgency of the situation was not appreciated.
The LCM gradually filled, listed and finally spilled her load into the lagoon,
turning completely over. At the last possible moment one of the crew of the
tank managed to escape as the tank actually hit bottom forty feet down.
The scheme of maneuver called for the 2d Battalion, which had landed on
Beach Blue to bear to the left and clean up the strong points on either side
of the airstrip. Tanks were landed early to knock out the stronger of the
emplacements and the pillboxes. BLT 1/22, on the right, had planned to land
two companies abreast and to push inland to the right in zones generally
parallel to the airstrip. The first two waves met only sniper fire but the
third encountered automatic and rifle fire. Some of the LVT's, which had been
constantly employed without opportunity for overhaul, began to show the
results of wear and tear and in some instances to lose their ability to steer
accurately. In consequence, some of the units were delayed in landing and did
not land on the points on the beach to which they had originally been
directed. The consequence was that "A" Company on the right of the 1st
Battalion found its right flank exposed due to the nonarrival of an expected
platoon, and the attack was held up while assistance of a tank platoon was
called for.
About this time BLT 3/22 was landed and one of its companies was employed
to follow Company "A" in the attack with tanks and later to pass through it.
There was heavy fighting from strong and well concealed emplacements but
the result was never in doubt. Considerable number of Japanese troops who had
held out for a time at "Skunk" Point and from which they could enfilade Beach
White 1 were eventually forced northward along the eastern shore of the
island, gradually isolated and cut down.
It was by no means easy going, however, because of the nature of the
terrain which at that point was covered with heavy brush and the extensive
Japanese defenses which abounded in the area.
Not a few of these defenses were of the "spider web" type to which there
were many entrances. They were constructed by knocking out the heads of empty
gasoline drums and making an impromptu pipe line of them, sunk into the ground
and covered with earth and palm fronds. The tunnels thus constructed branched
off in several directions from a central pit and the whole emplacement was
usually concealed
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with great skill and ingenuity. If the main position was apotted and attacked
the riflemen within could crawl off fifty feet or so down one of the corridors
and emerge at an entirely different and unexpected spot from which they could
get off a shot and drive down to concealment before it was possible to
determine whence the fire proceeded. Every foot of ground had to be gone over
with the greatest precaution and alertness before these honeycombs of death
could be silenced by the literal process of elimination.
At 1450 the island had been secured except for certain isolated snipers,
pillboxes, and underground shelters. Nevertheless, the fighting continued
after darkness fell against small groups of the enemy who struck back all
night long with fire from tree tops and from knee mortars. Some of our own
weapons were directed against ourselves by Japs who had infiltrated and helped
themselves to rifles and ammunition which in the heat of the combat had been
laid down as the troops were occupied with torpedoes and demolition charges.
At 0800 19 February, to the accompaniment of a captured Japanese bugle,
colors were sounded and BLT 1/22 with the permission of the Regimental
Commander raised the first American Flag on Eniwetok Atoll at that moment
nearer than any other captured territory to Japan. Meanwhile, on the previous
day BLT 3/22, which, as has been noted, had landed as reserve at 0955, had
been ordered to reembark about 1700 for the purpose of assisting in the third
phase of the operations: the reduction of Eniwetok Island.
As previously mentioned there is, unfortunately, but little information
at present available regarding details of the fighting on Engebi and Parry and
it seems proper to insert here (with the permission of the Editors) excerpts
from letters of Lieutenant Cord Meyer, Jr., USMCR, to his parents which
appeared in the October 1944 issue of the ATLANTIC, and had previously been
published in the HORAE SCHOLASTICAE of St. Paul's School, Concord, New
Hampshire, of which Lieutenant Meyer is a graduate.
"We arrived here (Eniwetok Atoll) and assaulted the main island
of the group. I, with my MG platoon, was in the second wave of
assault troops, landing three minutes after the first wave. There
was some fire on the beach but we moved inland quickly until we came
to an edge of blasted coconut grove. I was in front line with my
runner, looking for possible machine-gun positions, and had the guns
some fifty yards back.
"We were hard hit there, and with terrible clarity the reality
of the event came home to me. I had crawled forward to ask a Marine
where the Japs were--pretty excited really and enjoying it almost
like a game. I crawled up
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beside him but he wouldn't answer. Then I saw the ever widening pool
of dark blood by his head and knew that be was dying or dead. So it
came over me what this war was, and after that it wasn't fun or exciting,
but something that had to be done.
"Fortune smiled on me that day, or the hand of a divine Providence
was over me, or I was just plain lucky. We killed many of them in
fighting that lasted to nightfall. We cornered fifty or so Imperial
Marines on the end of the island, where they attempted a banzai charge,
but we cut them down like overripe wheat, and they lay like tired
children with their faces in the sand.
"That night was unbelieveably terrible. There were many of them
left and they all had one fanatical notion and that was to take one of
us with them. We dug in with orders to kill anything that moved. I
kept watch in a foxhole with my sergeant and we both stayed awake all
night with a knife in one hand and a grenade in the other. They crept
in among us, and every bush or rock took on sinister proportions. They
got some of us, but in the morning they all lay about, some with their
riddled bodies actually inside our foxholes. With daylight, it was easy
for us and we finished them off. Never have I been so glad to see
the blessed sun.
"So we left that place and went back aboard ship, where we stayed
a day and a night desperately trying to get our gear into shape. Then
the following morning we attacked another island, which was much more
heavily defended. The beach was swept with machine-gun fire and they
had heavy mortars ranged in on us. I was again very lucky to get
through there and proceeded across the ruined, shell-blasted soil
rocked by the continual mortar bursts. The captain to whose company
we were attached suddenly pointed, and above the brush line I saw
150 or so men bending forward, moving steadily parallel to us. We
were fifty yards from them and waved at them, thinking they must be
Marines. They paid little attention to us and seemed to be setting
up machine guns, and we suddenly realized they were Japs.
"We had just half a platoon of men and two MG's. We set the guns
up and started firing at them. One gun wouldn't work, so we buried
the parts in the sand, because we thought they would charge us and we
knew we couldn't stop them. We didn't want them to get the gun. For
some reason, they didn't attack, so we moved in against them. We
threw grenades back and forth for a couple of hours and many were
killed on both sides. Finally we threw a whole volley of grenades
and charged in and got to the
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beach. Down it we could see a whole group of them. So the twelve
of us, standing, kneeling, or lying prone, fired our rifles and
carbines. They fell like ducks in a shooting gallery and the
exhilaration of battle rose in us. They closed in on us and we had
to back out.
"But we got some tanks and reinforcements some half hour later
and moved through them in skirmish line, which brings this tale to
the most extraordinary incident of all. I was following some ten
yards behind the tanks, when a Jap officer came out of a hole
pointing his pistol at me; so instinctively I shot my carbine from
the hip and hit him full in the face. I walked forward and looked
into the trench and saw another with his arm cocked to throw a
grenade. He didn't see me. I was only six feet away. I pulled the
trigger but the weapon was jammed with sand. I had to do something,
so I took my carbine by the barrel and hit him with all my might at
the base of the neck. It broke his neck and my carbine.
"Finally we killed them all. They never surrender. Again the
night was a bad one, but with the dawn came complete victory, and
those of us who still walked without a wound looked in amazement at
our whole bodies. There was not much jubilation. We just sat and
stared at the sand, and most of us thought of those who were gone--
those whom I shall remember as always young, smiling, and graceful,
and I shall try to forget how they looked at the end, beyond all
recognition. . . .
"I don't think I praised my men properly in the last letter. They
obeyed with an unquestioning courage. One of my section leaders was
hit by a bullet in his arm. It spun him clear around and set him
down on his behind. A little dazed, he sat there for a second and
then jumped up with the remark, `The little bastards will have to
hit me with more than that.' I had to order him back to the dressing
station an hour later. He was weak with loss of blood but actually
pleaded to stay.
"My runner was knocked down right beside me with three bullet
holes in him and blood all over his face. Stupidly I said, `Are you
hit, boy?' He was crying a little, being just a kid of eighteen, and
said, `I'm sorry, sir, I guess I'm just a sissy.' I damn near cried
myself at that. I'm trying to get him a citation because he was a
very brave boy and never delivered a false message or failed to do
what I told him. He will live, thanks to our good doctors. . . .
"As to the real significance of the events, it will only come home
to me with time, but this much I do know,
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As we buried our dead, I swore to myself that if it was within my
power I should see to it that these deaths would not be forgotten or
valued lightly. I felt more strongly than ever the wrongness of so
many things. Their motionless young bodies, their inarticulate lips,
seemed a monumental reproach to us the living, seeming to say, `Well,
we did all you asked. We gave up everything, all we might have been
and done, all love, all hope, all laughter, all tomorrows. What are
you going to do now? Is it going to be any different, any better now?
If you don't do what you can, at least you will never forget us. We
will touble your midnight and your noon's repose with the specter of
our speechless gaze. Certainly we can do no more. The rest lies all
with you.' So, remembering them, I find heart for the long road and
the many battles and determination for the peaceful time. . . .
"The newspapers which at one and the same time preach against
optimism and then paint the news in the rosiest hues do nothing to
help. From my own experience, I can assure you that though the
papers do not actually falsify, they do underplay the difficulties
of operations and play to the limit the final success. Actually, we
have only begun out here, as no one can see more clearly than we
ourselves. Ahead of us lie the limitless distances of this colossal
ocean, the bitterly defended fortress that the Japs have made of their
islands, the almost impenetrable jungles where operations must
necessarily move at a snail's pace; and finally, when we have won through
to the China coast, the problem of conquering 200 well-trained Jap
divisions operating on interior lines of supply."
Prior to the assault on Eniwetok Island, the VAC Reconnaissance Company
proceeded to secure the islands on the eastern edge of the lagoon down to
Ruunitto Island and in due course on 19 February secured Japtan Island
immediately flanking Deep Entrance.
On 18 February the Scout Company was similarly employed in securing the
islands to the southwest of Engebi taking all of them down to and including
Bogallua Island. This completed the clean up of the smaller islands in the
northern sector of the atoll. On 19 February taking the SCHLEY to the
southward they landed on Rigili Island where about a dozen Japanese put up a
short and fruitless resistance. Then working their way in a southeasterly
direction they secured all islands down to Igurin across Wide Passage from
Eniwetok some 10,000 yards east.
All islands of the atoll with the exception of Eniwetok and Parry and
tiny Jeroru in the center of Deep Entrance were now under control of the
attacking forces.
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Map ENIWETOK ISLAND
Intelligence had reported that there were more Japanese troops on Eniwetok and
Parry Islands than originally had been supposed, about 600 on the former and
800 on the latter. The Headquarters of Major General Nishida Commanding the
First Mobile Seaborne Brigade was also supposedly on Parry. It was therefore
determined to reduce Eniwetok first rather than to attempt a double operation
and to employ 2 BLT's of the 106th Infantry with 1 BLT of the 22d Marines in
reserve.
Landings were to be made in column of battalions on Beaches Yellow 1 and
2 on the lagoon side of the southwest portion of Eniwetok close to where it
widens out to a width of some 600 yards. During the night of 18-19 February
the assault units moved to anchorages off Eniwetok, and the 104 F.A. Battalion
was reembarked from Rujiyoru. During the operation one gun and one DUKW were
lost when the vehicle capsized.
At 0800 19 February the situation was as follows:
a) The 2d Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion was on Yeiri Island
under control of RCT 22.
b) The Reconnaissance Company and the Scout Company of the 4th Tank
Battalion were engaged in reducing the islands on the eastern and
western sides of the lagoon.
c) RCT 106 and attached units were forming for the landing on Eniwetok.
d) The 104 F.A. Battalion was afloat off Eniwetok.
e) BLT 1/22 was preparing to reembark from Engebi.
Landings were made on Beaches Yellow 1 and 2 at 0915 (19 February) by the
two battalions of 106th Infantry. Enemy opposition at the beach was light.
Some machine gun fire was received from a position on the right flank and some
rifle fire was reported from positions inland. There seems, however, to have
been considerable hesitancy on the part of the infantry to move away from the
sand dunes fifty yards or so from the beaches which afforded excellent cover.
BLT 1/106 was to move to the right to seize the south end of the island
while BLT 3/106 was to move northeast leaving Beach Yellow 1 on its left. The
attack advanced slowly and succeeding waves congested the beach until they had
to be held off shore to come in on order. Tanks were landed promptly but the
field artillery had to be held off. Enemy resistance was stubborn and
consisted of rifle and mortar fire from trenches, undergrowth, shelters and
from dense jungle areas which held up the advance.
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At 1330 BLT 3/22 was landed and shortly afterward was committed, taking
over the eastern half of the southern attack with BLT 1/106 on its right. By
2100 (19 February) it was evident that the capture of Eniwetok could not be
completed before the evening of 20 February at the earliest. BLT 3/22 and
1/106 therefore dug in for the night. Due to the nature of the ground the
lines were indeterminate at the boundary and neither battalion was in position
where the other precisely expected it. In consequence, there was some
infiltration in the lines of BLT 3/22 which resulted in an attack on its
Command Post and the death of two officers.
In order to make the attack on Parry on 21 February it was determined
that the remainder of RCT 22 should be withdrawn from Engebi. Accordingly
orders were issued for the Howitzer Battalion on Yeiri Island to embark and
land on Japtan by 1200, 20 February and to register on Parry. At 2230 RCT 22
was ordered to embark the remaining troops and to proceed to the transport
area off Eniwetok.
That this move was possible was due to the fact that troops and equipment
of the Garrison Forces had begun to arrive at Engebi on 19 February. At 1200
on 20 February responsibility for the defense of the island was placed on the
Commanding Officer (Colonel C. R. Jones) of the 3d Army Defense Battalion.
Companies "A" and "D" of the 111th Infantry, U. S. Army, were sent northward
and debarked so that by nightfall some 900 troops were available.
The situation at about 0800 on 20 February was as follows:
a) BLT 3/22 and BLT 1/106 and the 2d Separate Tank Company were
engaged with the enemy on the Southern end of Eniwetok.
b) BLT 3/106 with the Light Tank Company (Company "C", 706th Tank
Battalion) was proceeding slowly northeast where the island begins
to narrow down.
c) BLT 1/22 was in the Transport Area off Eniwetok.
d) The Reconnaissance Company was on Japtan awaiting the arrival of
the Howitzer Battalion which was en route from Yeiri Island. The
Scout Company of the 4th Tank Battalion was embarked and ready to
proceed to the Transport Area off Eniwetok.
e) The remainder of the 104th F.A. Battalion was preparing to land on
Eniwetok.
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f) The remainder of RCT 22 was reembarking at Engebi.
g) The LVT's had been reloaded on the LST's. By 1200 the Pack
Howitzer Battalion was on Japtan and preparing to register on
Parry.
After a conference about 1400 with the Commanding Officers of RCT's 22
and 106 it was decided among other matters to:
a) Postpone the attack on Parry until 0845, 22 February.
b) Have BLT 1/106 take over the area of BLT 3/106 so that the latter
could reembark if necessary on the morning of 22 February if
required as group reserve.
c) Attach the Reconnaissance Company and the Scout Company to RCT 22.
By 1200, 21 February, the 10th Defense Battalion had arrived in the
Transport Area and the Commanding Officer (Colonel W. O. Thompson, USMC) was
ordered to organize five companies of one hundred men each to be prepared to
land on Parry on 22 February upon Group Order. Lieutenant Colonel R. E.
Hommel, USMC, was placed in command of this special force, whose services as
it turned out were not required: three hundred were armed with rifles and the
remainder with carbines. It was known that they had had but little training
as infantry. Ammunition threatened to run low and definite limits were fixed
for its expenditure for daylight on 21 February and harassing and star shell
fires of the ensuing night. Demolitions and hand grenades also grew scarce
but a supply was flown in from Kwajalein which arrived on 22 February about
1130.
On the afternoon of the 21st a detachment of the Reconnaissance Company
occupied tiny Jeroru Island and later withdrew.
Eniwetok Island was overrun by evening of 21 February and only mopping up
remained to be done. At Engebi all was quiet.
By 2100 all RCT 22 assault battalions had been put aboard LST's in
preparation for the attack on Parry.
Parry -- Perhaps tactics or strategy never work out precisely as intended, but
it would seem that the attacking forces had not been able to guage with
exactitude the weight of opposition to be met in the three principal
objectives. Engebi had been thought to be the toughest, yet it had been
overrun in the comparatively short time of six hours. Eniwetok
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Map of PARRY ISLAND
originally considered as the second most difficult objective proved much more
stubborn than anticipated. And Parry, which had first been thought of as
secondary, in the light of later intelligence reports, had suddenly become the
toughest nut of all to crack.
Preceded by intense gunfire from Tennessee and Pennsylvania who were
firing at a range of 1500 yards, by bombing attacks, and artillery