A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 11th MARINES
by
Second Lieutenant Robert Emmet, USMCR
Printed 1968
Historical Branch, G-3 Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Original On-Line
Page Page
Preface 5
A Brief History of the 11th Marines 1 6
Notes 49 54
Appendix I 52 58
Appendix II 54 60
Appendix III 56 62
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380
PREFACE
"A Brief History of the 11th Marines" is a concise narrative of the
activities of that regiment since its initial organization 50 years ago.
Official records and appropriate historical works were used in compiling this
chronicle, which is published for the information of those interested in the
history of those events in which the 11th Marines participated.
R. G. OWENS, JR.
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Reviewed and approved: 11 October 1968
DISTRIBUTION: DA
Activation of the 11th Marines and World War I
The 11th Marines, now an artillery regiment of the 1st Marine Division,
traces its origin back to World War I. On 20 August 1917, Lieutenant Colonel
George Van Orden reported to Quantico, Virginia for duty with the Mobile
Artillery Force, which was at that time being reorganized into a brigade of
two light artillery regiments, one of which he was to command. On 3 January
1918, with Van Orden as commanding officer, the 11th Regiment was activated at
Marine Barracks, Quantico. The units of the 11th included a Headquarters
Detachment and three battalions.<1> Most of the original enlisted strength of
the 11th consisted of recruits just out of boot camp, but some experience was
supplied to the regiment when it was decided that all reenlisted men, not
already assigned to other organizations at Quantico, should be placed in the
11th. These were mostly men who had been in the Marines in the past, returned
to civilian life, and signed on again when the United States went to war.
These experienced Marines gave the 11th an "esprit de corps" that it otherwise
would not have had and which benefited immeasurably its training performance.
The veterans helped the inexperienced recruits, and as a result the 11th was
fairly well squared-away at Quantico.
The 11th Regiment, as an outgrowth of the Mobile Artillery Force, was
originally meant to be an artillery regiment, but it did not remain that way
for long. More infantrymen were needed in France, and the 5th Marine Brigade
was formed. The 4th Marine Brigade had already been organized and seen
extensive combat in France. Lieutenant Colonel Van Orden went to Headquarters
Marine Corps in Washington, D. C. to request that the 11th Regiment be
converted to infantry. His plea coincided with a request by the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to send an additional infantry regiment to France. In anticipation of
being switched to infantry, the 11th underwent intensive infantry training
throughout the summer of 1918 at Quantico. On 5 September 1918, the 11th
Regiment was officially designated an infantry regiment, and it joined the 5th
Marine Brigade, which included the 13th Regiment and the 5th Machine Gun
Battalion.
On 28 September, Van Orden received orders stating that the regiment was
to leave Quantico for its port of embarkation
1
for France. The 11th went to France in two sections, the first of which,
consisting of Regimental Headquarters and 1/11, boarded the USS DEKALB in
Philadelphia on 29 September, landed at Brest, France on 13 October, and
arrived at Tours, France on 30 October. The second section, consisting of
2/11 and 3/11, did not leave Quantico until 14 October. It embarked aboard
the USS VON STEUBEN and the USS AGAMEMNON at Hoboken, New Jersey, arrived at
Brest on 25 October, and entered Tours on 2 November. The 11th had been at
Tours for nine days when, on 11 November, the armistice was signed. The
Marines of the 11th saw no combat, and they were dispersed to cities like Le
Havre, Marseilles, and Tours to take care of administrative duties. The
officers of the 11th undertook jobs as regulating officers, entertainment
officers, police officers, and district athletic officers. The enlisted
Marines drew MP duty, or they were clerks, or they did whatever labor was
asked of them. In early July 1919, the 11th returned to Camp Potanegan at
Brest, and, on 29 July, it embarked aboard the USS ORIZABA for home. It
disembarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia on 6 August and was deactivated there
on 11 August.
Reactivation and Nicaragua
The United States greatly decreased its military strength after World War
I, and the 11th Regiment was one of the casualties of this decision. The
regiment remained out of existence until 1927, when unrest in Nicaragua,
involving injury to United States citizens and destruction of their property,
prompted Washington to send Marines into the area. The 2d Marine Brigade, of
which the 11th Regiment became a part, was organized for this purpose. The
11th was the last unit of the brigade to enter Nicaragua.
The political disputes in Nicaragua involved two groups -- the
Conservatives, who were in power and were led by President Diaz, and the
Liberals, or revolutionaries. The Conservative government of President Diaz
was recognized and supported by the United States Government. The leaders in
the Liberal camp were Juan Sacasa, who was at that time in exile, and General
Moncada, but the Marines of the 2d Brigade were to become more directly
involved with a Liberal guerrilla leader named Augusto Sandino.
One of the first actions taken by Washington in this conflict was to send
Henry Stimson to mediate between the antagonists.
2
On 22 April 1927, he began negotiating with Diaz; the plan that they agreed to
contained five main points. First, President Diaz was to remain in office
until after the election of 1928 in which he would be constitutionally
ineligible to run. Second, there was to be a general amnesty proclaimed, and
troops of both sides were to surrender their arms to American forces. Diaz
was to immediately appoint influential Liberals to important positions in the
government. The Nicaraguan constabulary was to be disbanded, and a national
guard was to be organized and initially trained and commanded by American
officers. Finally, sufficient American forces were to stay in Nicaragua to
enforce the provisions of this agreement and to supervise the elections of
1928 and of succeeding years.<2> When this document was presented to General
Moncada and other Liberal leaders, they agreed to it, and it became known as
the Peace of Tipitapa.
Augusto Sandino had by now become the most powerful guerrilla leader in
Nicaragua, and he decided that the Peace of Tipitapa did not coincide with his
own ideas. He felt that the Liberal cause was being destroyed by Stimson
under the cloak of friendly negotiation, and he felt strongly that the
Liberals who concurred in the Tipitapa agreement were traitors to their own
cause. Sandino was not in fact violently anti-American, but he was violently
anti-Diaz, and it was the first point in the agreement that caused him and his
followers to take up arms. He wanted Diaz out of power immediately. Sandino
once said, "I decided to fight, understanding that I was the one called to
protest the betrayal of the Fatherland."<3>
The 11th Regiment, as part of the 2d Marine Brigade, had a twofold
mission in Nicaragua. It was to help crush the resistance of Sandino and
disarm the combatants in accordance with the Peace of Tipitapa. The 11th was
reactivated on 9 May 1927 with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. O'Leary in
command. The 1st Battalion, 11th Regiment was organized with a few Marines
from Quantico and some from Haiti. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters
and Service Company, 1/11 left Quantico and arrived at Corinto, Nicaragua
aboard the USS MEDUSA on 22 May. The other companies of 1/11 came from Port-
au-Prince and the Isle of Gonaive, Haiti. They arrived at Corinto on 19 May.
The 1st Battalion transferred by rail to Leon, Nicaragua to join the 2d
Brigade. The 2d Battalion was organized entirely at Quantico on 9 May. It
embarked aboard the USS AROOSTOCK on 10 May and arrived at Corinto on 21 May.
It also went to Leon to join the 2d Brigade.<4>
3
While in Nicaragua, the 11th Regiment undertook many duties, foremost of
which was constant jungle patrolling. Also, the Marines were used as train
guards and for police duty, they garrisoned towns and points along lines of
communication, they helped to train the Guardia Nacional, and they helped to
disarm the native factions.<5> The summer of 1927 proved to be rough for
Sandino. Too often, he attempted to stand his ground and fight superior
forces. He took defeats at Ocotal, San Fernando, and Santa Clara. Not only
were many of his men killed or wounded, but many deserted. Many of the
guerrillas who fought and survived in these defeats lost their nerve and
decided it would be better to collect $10 for their rifle than to get killed.
Sandino then turned to a type of fighting that has often characterized small,
guerrilla forces fighting against numerous, disciplined troops. He began to
attack only when the odds were heavily in his favor. He would only fight when
he had overwhelming advantage in surprise, cover, and firepower. He would
never stand his ground when losing but would break contact and disappear as
quickly as possible under the cover of the jungle.
As the summer wore on, the Marines began to feel that the Sandino threat
was ended. The 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment wad redesignated as the 2d
Separate Battalion in July 1927. Headquarters and Service Company, 2/11 was
disbanded at Leon, Nicaragua on 31 July. The other companies of the 2d
Separate Battalion arrived at San Diego on 6 August and were disbanded on 10
August. Regimental Headquarters and 1/11 embarked aboard the USS ARGONNE on
10 August and arrived at Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 31 August. The regiment was
disbanded on 6 September.
The Marines definitely underestimated the aggressiveness and tenacity of
Sandino. After he was defeated at El Chipote, the Marines thought that he
would flee to Honduras or deeper into the wilderness of the Nueva Segovia and
Jinotega departments. Instead, he turned south toward the larger towns in
Jinotega and Matagalpa, and he caught the remaining Marines of the 2d Brigade
by surprise. As the year 1928 came around, it became necessary for the 11th
Regiment to reorganize and return to Nicaragua. Sandino was gaining strength,
and he loomed as a tremendous threat to the elections that were to be held
later in the year.
In January 1928, the 11th Regiment was reactivated under the command of
Colonel Robert H. Dunlap. It consisted of two battalions, one from each
coast. The 1st Battalion was organized
4
with Marines from Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Norfolk, Virginia and Marine
Barracks, Parris Island, South Carolina. Those from Norfolk embarked aboard
two transports, the USS Raleigh and the USS TRENTON. The Marines from Parris
Island embarked aboard the USS MILWAUKEE at Charleston, South Carolina. All
of 1/11 arrived at Corinto on 15 January and rejoined the 2d Marine
Brigade.<6> The 2d Battalion was organized at Marine Corps Base, San Diego on
5 and 6 January. It embarked aboard the USS NITRO on 9 January and arrived at
Corinto on 16 January to join the 2d Brigade.<7> While 1/11 and 2/11 were in
Nicaragua, on 21 March, a third battalion was added to the 11th Regiment. It
was organized at Marine Barracks, Norfolk and Marine Barracks, Charleston.
Those from Charleston arrived at Corinto aboard the USS BRIDGE on 30 March,
and the Marines from Norfolk arrived at Corinto on 31 March aboard the USS
OGLALA.
The 11th Regiment moved into the Matagalpa region. Sandino himself was
not there, but he had left a force commanded by one of his most able
lieutenants, Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen, to terrorize the area. Units from
the 11th ran numerous patrols in Matagalpa to destroy Ortez' forces. As time
progressed, Colonel Dunlap and the 11th took increasing responsibility for
suppressing guerrilla activities in northern Nicaragua, and Dunlap moved his
headquarters to Ocotal to be near the fighting in the north.
One of the main reasons for Dunlap's success in neutralizing Ortez' men
was that he used his air support skillfully. The planes were a far cry from
modern types, but they nonetheless devastated Ortez' forces. While the
bandits were stunned by the punch of air power, the Marines of the 11th
assaulted and killed them. It was a deadly and powerful combination.
It became pretty obvious that Sandino was going to do all that he could
to hinder the running of the 1928 elections. The primary mission of the 11th,
as part of the 2d Brigade, was to help keep the elections orderly and make
sure that they were run fairly. The Marines had to work hard to keep
Sandino's men from discouraging voting by terrorism. In order to accomplish
their mission, the Marines of the 11th dispersed to many different polling
places and patrolled their areas continuously. Supervision of the elections
was effective. The results were fair, and 133,000 voters, a substantial
increase over the number of voters in the 1924 elections, turned out. General
Moncada, the foremost Liberal leader and that party's
5
candidate for president, easily defeated the Conservative candidate, Adolfo
Bernard.
The Marines again made the mistake of believing that Sandino was finished
because the election had been a success. One factor contributing to Sandino's
perserverance was that the Marines and the Nicaraguan peasants did not get
along. Many Nicaraguans regarded the Marines as a hostile, occupying force
rather than as protectors from bandits. Some of the peasants reversed the
roles and thought of the bandits as protectors from the Marines. Because of
this resentment, which was substantial but not critical, the Marines found
that they had to fight the "part-time" bandit. By day, he innocuously worked
at his job, but by night he armed himself with any weapon possible to hunt
Marines. Some of these embittered Nicaraguans simply organized into small,
local groups that were for the most part entirely ineffective, but others
joined Sandino's force, either fighting with the leader himself or with one of
his lieutenants. The "part-time" bandit was no more than a nuisance to the
Marines, but it was not a very long step from "part-time" to "full-time," and
throughout 1928 Sandino had no problem getting recruits.
After the election of 1928, the duties of the 11th Regiment continued to
include extensive jungle patrolling to find, kill, or capture Sandino's men.
Another task was the training and developing of the Guardia Nacional, a job
allotted to the Marines by the Tipitapa agreement. All the units of the 2d
Brigade provided Marines to train the Nicaraguans, and Marine staff
noncommissioned officers became officers in the Guardia. The purpose of this
organization was to deal with internal problems and disputes such as the
Sandino problem. The hope was that, eventually, if a guerrilla like Sandino
appeared to threaten the peace of Nicaragua, the Guardia could handle it
rather than calling on Washington for help.
In 1929, when it became evident that the Guardia was strengthening and
that Sandino's strength and popularity was finally diminishing, Marines began
to leave Nicaragua. The companies of 3/11 were at Managua, Yali, Ocotal, and
San Fernando, and they were disbanded in those towns on 15 June. Regimental
Headquarters, 1/11, and 2/11 embarked aboard the USS HENDERSON at Corinto on
20 August and were deactivated on 31 August en route to Marine Barracks,
Quantico.<8>
6
Reactivation and Guadalcanal
After disbanding in 1929, the 11th Regiment disappeared for over a
decade. It did not return until the Marine Corps, living up to its reputation
as a force in readiness, began to greatly increase its strength in 1940. On 1
September 1940, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, FMF was
organized at Marine Barracks, Quantico.<9> On 10 October, 1/11 left Quantico
and sailed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, arriving there on 21 October. On 1
January 1941, 2/11 was activated at Guantanamo, and, three weeks later, on 23
January, 3/11 was organized there.<10> On 1 February, the 1st Marine Brigade
was officially redesignated as the 1st Marine Division, and, on 1 March,
Headquarters and Service Battery, 11th Marines, Colonel Pedro A. del Valle
commanding, was activated in Cuba. The organization of the 11th Marines was
then complete, although two more battalions were added at various times later.
The 3d Battalion was temporarily disbanded at Parris Island on 1 June 1941,
but it was reorganized on 24 January 1942.
The 11th Marines had now become the artillery regiment of the 1st Marine
Division. From 1940 to the present, this has been its role. There were a
few, scattered instances when units of the 11th were used as infantry for
short periods of time, but the 11th was no longer an infantry regiment as it
had been in World War I and Nicaragua. At Guantanamo Bay, the 11th began its
artillery training, starting with 75mm pack howitzers, which were used by 1/11
throughout the war and by 2/11 for most of the war. The 3d Battalion used
105mm howitzers at Guadalcanal and afterwards.
On 22 October 1941, a fourth battalion was added to the 11th Marines as a
105mm howitzer battalion at Marine Barracks, Parris Island.<11> The 4th
Battalion moved to New River, North Carolina in January 1942. The 11th
Marines was completely assembled there along with the rest of the 1st Marine
Division, which underwent intensive combat training until June 1942. During
this time, the 11th exercised with its howitzers and took part in various
training exercises learning to coordinate its fire to support the infantry.
On 21 March 1942, 1/11 was attached to the 3d Marine Brigade, and it went to
Samoa with the 7th Marines, but the rest of the 11th stayed together, and on 9
June it entrained at New River for a transcontinental ride to San Francisco,
where it arrived on 14 June. By this time, the 5th Battalion had been
activated as one more 105mm howitzer unit. On 22 June, the 11th boarded the
USS JOHN ERICSSON at
7
San Francisco and sailed for Wellington, New Zealand with the other units of
the 1st Marine Division.
Shortly after arriving at Wellington, Major General Alexander A.
Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, received word that
his Marines were to conduct an amphibious operation against the Japanese at
Guadalcanal -- Tulagi with a tentative landing date of 1 August 1942.<12> The
initial objective was the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal. General
Vandegrift was understandably surprised that he had to get his division ready
in such a short time because he had expected six months of training in New
Zealand. As a result, Wellington was the scene of much hard work and more
than a little confusion. The main problem was to get the transports and
supply ships unloaded at the docks of Wellington and then combat loaded.
General Vandegrift was disturbed at the slowness of the New Zealand dock
workers, but he passed down the word to organize the Marines into working
parties, and, eventually, the job of unloading and reloading the vessels was
accomplished. The general, in reviewing what he had to do and planning his
time accordingly, decided that he needed one extra week to get his division
ready to assault Guadalcanal. He asked for and received an extension of D-Day
to 7 August.
On 22 July, the 1st Division left Wellington. On the way to Guadalcanal,
General Vandegrift had planned to rehearse amphibious landings at Koro in the
Fiji Islands. Upon arriving, he found that the coral surrounding the islands
would tear the bottoms out of the landing craft. As a result, the Marines
practiced "wet-net" drills, and the landing craft practiced their maneuvers up
to the reef but no further. The Marines were never able to land on the shore.
On 7 August, the 1st Marine Division arrived off Guadalcanal, ready for its
first taste of combat in World War II.
The landing itself was handled smoothly and professionally. There was
very little initial resistance from the Japanese, most of whom had pulled back
into the interior of Guadalcanal conceding the Marines a landing but preparing
to fight hard once the Marines attempted to move inland and threaten the
airfield. Most of the initial defenders were simply the airfield garrison,
but many Japanese reinforcements entered Guadalcanal during the course of the
campaign by way of the "Tokyo Express." This large influx of Japanese troops
after the entry of the Marines enabled the enemy to resist strongly for six
months. For all the Marines except for the "salts" who were veterans of
8
Map of the First Offensive, GUADALCANAL
9
the "Banana Wars," this was their first taste of jungle combat. Many of the
Marines who survived contracted malaria. Not only was sickness a problem but
also, from the very start, the Marines were plagued with logistical troubles.
They had not been able to pack as many supplies in the ships going to
Guadalcanal as they had thought necessary, and, in addition, many of the
supplies that were initially packed never reached the beach because the
transports and cargo ships were forced to leave the area on 9 August under
pressure of Japanese naval and air strength. The initial superiority of the
Japanese on the sea kept the supply situation extremely critical, and not
until the U. S. Navy rallied and drove the Imperial Navy from the area were
the Marines adequately supplied. The only solution to this problem at the
beginning was to capture Japanese rations, which is what the Marines did.
The artillerymen of the 11th, in their battery positions, were not quite
as exposed as the infantry to numerous, banzai charges by the Japanese, but
they were constantly harassed by naval gunfire and air attacks. The mission
of the 11th Marines was to support the infantry of the 1st Marine Division
with as much artillery fire as it could muster, and Colonel del Valle was able
to draw the most possible from his troops and equipment in accomplishing that
mission. There were two battles in which the 11th played an especially
significant part on Guadalcanal, the Battle of the Tenaru and the Battle of
Edson's Ridge.
The Battle of the Tenaru was one of the most desperate attempts made by
the Japanese to evict the Marines from Guadalcanal. Assaulting over the
Tenaru River in massive, human waves, the Japanese attacked the Marine
positions to no avail. One of the main reasons that the Japanese assaults
were not more successful was that the artillery of the 11th, accurate and in
great volume, killed many Japanese before they ever reached the Marine
positions. General Vandegrift gave a very concise account of the battle. He
said, "After laying down a heavy mortar barrage, enemy infantry stormed across
the river, struck our wire, and were decimated from enfiladed machine gun fire
and del Valle's artillery."<13> There was no question that the Marines of the
11th knew their job and were performing it to the best of their ability.
The Battle of Edson's Ridge (12-13 September 1942) was the other battle
at Guadalcanal in which the 11th Marines played a starring role. In this
case, it was specifically the 3d Battalion that delivered most of the
artillery fire in support
10
of the combined 1st Raider and Parachute Battalions, commanded by Colonel
Merritt A. Edson. From approximately 0200, 12 September, to dawn, 13
September, Edson's Raiders were defending a ridge, later named Edson's Ridge
in honor of the colonel for his defense of it. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
pumped rounds from its 105mm howitzers at a rapid rate. The Raiders were
forced to fall back to a series of different positions under the ferocity of
the Japanese onslaught, but the enemy was never able to break Edson's force,
and each assault produced more and more Japanese casualties. Many of the
enemy fell to the fire provided by 3/11, over 2,000 rounds, many at ranges
closer than 1600 yards. General Vandegrift later stated, "Throughout the
night the 11th Marines supported the Raiders and Parachutists by nine hours of
almost constant artillery fire of the greatest accuracy and effectiveness, and
greatly assisted them in standing off the attacks of the enemy."<14> He
labelled the effort of the 11th Marines at Edson's Ridge "a tremendous
contribution to the victory brought by dawn."<15> Colonel Edson was
subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for his defense of the ridge.
Aside from these two major battles, the batteries of the 11th were
involved in firing missions at scattered targets, supporting infantry units
anytime that they needed artillery support. These fires were augmented on 18
September when 1/11, as part of 7th Marines (Reinforced), rejoined the 1st
Division from Samoa. With five battalions now, the regiment was continually
firing in support of the many patrols that had made contact with the enemy.
On 1 October, Colonel del Valle became Brigadier General del Valle. General
Vandegrift was highly impressed with the outstanding leadership that del Valle
gave to the Marines of the 11th, and he retained del Valle as commanding
general of the 11th Marines. This was the only time that the 11th Marines had
a general at its head.
Until December, the fight for Guadalcanal was a matter of finding and
destroying the remaining pockets of Japanese resistance on the island. Relief
for the 1st Marine Division finally began to arrive in November 1942, and, in
December, the Marines began to depart. Their physical condition was such that
many were unable to climb the cargo nets to bet back into the transports. The
11th Marines left Guadalcanal on 15 December aboard the USS HUNTER LIGGETT and
arrived at Camp Cable, Queensland, Australia on 20 December.
11
Australia and New Britain
Camp Cable was not an ideal area for rest and rehabilitation, but the
11th Marines celebrated Christmas of 1942 there.<16> Shortly after Christmas,
the 11th sailed aboard the USS WEST POINT to Melbourne, Australia, where it
arrived on 12 January 1943. While on board the West Point, 5/11 was
disbanded.
Unlike the detestable Camp Cable, Melbourne proved to be almost a
paradise for the battle-weary veterans of Guadalcanal. The first week there
(12-18 January 1943) was spent getting squared away in the new camp and
organizing training schedules. The men were given as much liberty as
possible. The people of Melbourne were hospitable, the weather was good, and
the whole atmosphere around the camp was conducive to restoring the health of
those still sick from malaria. The 11th was finally able to relax. Training
did not begin until 18 January, and then the program was purposely geared to
start slowly, allowing the sick men to regain their strength. The 1st Marine
Division embarked upon a training cycle which began with squad tactics and
then expanded to the regimental level throughout the summer of 1943. The `03
rifle, which had been carried by the Marines at Guadalcanal, was replaced by
the M-1, and training was conducted in the care and use of this weapon. The
11th continued its artillery training with 75mm pack howitzers and 105mm
howitzers. A program of physical training was also implemented for all
Marines. This consisted of daily calisthenics and distance runs and was
supplemented by a series of conditioning hikes with full combat gear that
reached distances of 80 miles. On 1 May, 4/11 was once again reactivated,
employing 105s.
The 7th Marines with 1/11 and 4/11 departed from Melbourne on 19
September 1943 and sailed to Cape Sudest, New Guinea, where it arrived on 2
October. The remainder of the 11th reached there on 24 October to prepare for
the upcoming Cape Gloucester landing. Staging areas for the 1st Marine
Division were at Milne Bay, Oro Bay, Goodenough Island, and Cape Sudest.
Headquarters of the 1st Marine Division was at Goodenough Island, and the 11th
Marines completed its training at Cape Sudest.
The initial mission for the 1st Division at Cape Gloucester was to take a
Japanese airdrome. A light but accurate naval gunfire bombardment preceded
the amphibious assault on D-Day, 26 December 1943. Light opposition met the
11th Marines, commanded by Colonel Robert H. Pepper, as it landed on its
assigned
12
Yellow Beach area. The 1st Battalion provided close artillery support for the
7th Marines while 4/11 similarly supported the 1st Marines. It quickly became
evident that the terrain at Cape Gloucester was very poor for rapid
displacement of the artillery. Landing the 105mm howitzers and the 75mm pack
howitzers and moving to good firing positions was very difficult. The mud was
often thigh-deep, and fallen trees did not make the job any easier. In fact,
one of the characteristics of the fighting on New Britain was that once the
artillery was set up, it was very seldom moved anywhere. The 4th Battalion
never displaced from its initial position in a kunai grass patch throughout
its whole stay on New Britain. LVTs were used to clear paths for the movement
of artillery and often used to move the guns themselves.
Immediately upon landing, the Marines moved out to take the airdrome.
The men of 4/11 crossed 400 yards of swamp and mud to set up their 105s in the
kunai grass patch. The first battery of 4/11 was ready to fire by 1330 on D-
Day in support of the 1st Marines. All batteries of 4/11 were in place and
registered by nightfall on D-Day. Meanwhile, the artillerymen of 1/11 moved
their 75mm pack howitzers to Silimati Point in order to support the 7th
Marines. The 2d Battalion landed at 1325 on D-Day. As the infantry pressed
closer to the airdrome, which was believed to be defended by two Japanese
battalions, 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 massed their fires on the enemy. It was
finally taken on 29 December by the 1st Marines, minus 2/1, and the 5th
Marines.
On D-Day, Landing Team 21 landed at Green Beach. LT 21 amounted to 2/1
reinforced with Lieutenant Colonel James M. Masters, Sr. in command. Included
in LT 21 was Battery H, 11th Marines, organized as three platoons of infantry.
The mission of LT 21 was "to cut the main coastal track to prevent the
Japanese from escaping from the airdrome or to prevent reinforcement of the
Japanese garrison at the airdrome, to discover and control important
subsidiary trails, to create a diversion, and to destroy any Japanese
encountered."<17> There was no initial need for artillery at Green Beach, and
Masters felt that the men of H/11 could be better put to work as infantrymen.
The Japanese attacked the Green Beach perimeter at 0155, 30 December, in an
action that came to be known as the Battle of Coffin Corner. By 0700, the
enemy attack was broken. On 31 December, Masters returned H/11 to its
artillery role, firing in support of patrols.
13
While the 1st and 5th Marines were attacking the airdrome, well-
entrenched Japanese at Suicide Creek, a small stream just inland from the
Yellow Beaches, held up elements of the 7th Marines on 27 December and forced
them to dig in on the opposite bank. Banzai charges across the creek by the
enemy failed to push back the 7th Marines, and artillery from 1/11 was very
useful in breaking the Japanese assaults.
The next mission for the 1st Division, after taking the Cape Gloucester
airdrome, was to push on to Borgen Bay and to destroy all Japanese resistance
in its path. On 4 January, the 7th Marines was finally able to cross Suicide
Creek with the support of armor and artillery and join the attack on the next
pieces of key terrain -- Hill 150, Aogiri Ridge, and Hill 660, which was the
key to the whole Cape Gloucester operation. If the Japanese organized on it,
they could fire artillery all over the area at the Marines, and the hold on
the airdrome would never be secure.
The first attack was against Hill 150, and it began at 1100, 6 January.
The units involved were Weapons Company, 7th Marines, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/5. All
infantry units used tank support. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines fired 15
minutes of preparation fire on Hill 150, which was taken after a short battle.
Next in line was the attack on Aogiri Ridge led by 3/5. On 9 January,
1/11 and 4/11 pounded Aogiri Ridge with artillery fire. The ridge was very
heavily defended, and the slopes were steep and muddy. The infantry slowly
slogged up the hill and took it after a bitter fight. The Japanese attempted
a banzai counterattack at 0115, 10 January, and they tried four more during
the night, but each one was driven back. The 4th Battalion fired 105mm rounds
within 50 yards of 3/5 during the night to help repulse the enemy.
Hill 660, which was the most important objective, proved also to be the
toughest to take. This attack began at 0800, 13 January, and it was
spearheaded by 3/7. As at Aogiri Ridge, 1/11 and 4/11 prepared the hill for
the infantry. The 105s of 4/11 alone fired 1,200 rounds in preparation. The
attack on Hill 660 bogged down on 13 January because of the strength of the
Japanese defense and the constant rain turning the steep slope into almost
untrafficable mud. The Marines dug into the slope of Hill 660 for the night
only to resume the attack at 0900 the following morning. During the day, the
infantry made
14
Map of Capture of Aogiri Ridge, Night Defensive Positions
15
slow but steady progress through the slime as 1/11 and 4/11 rained fire on the
Japanese positions. The Marines finally made it to the top at 1830, 14
January, and consolidated on the ridge expecting the inevitable banzai
counterattack, but this time it did not come immediately because a torrential
downpour prevented the Japanese from sufficiently reorganizing themselves that
night. The heavy rain gave 3/7 time to consolidate effectively, and not only
was the battalion dug in with interlocking fields of fire but also plenty of
81mm mortar fire and artillery fire from the 11th was called on the Japanese
when they finally returned. At 0530, 16 January the Japanese threw all their
reserves at Hill 660 in an attempt to expel 3/7. The attack was a disaster
for the enemy and marked the end of strong Japanese resistance in the Cape
Gloucester area.
The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines supported the 5th Marines in the Natamo
Point operations in late January 1944 while the 5th was trying to cut off
Japanese withdrawal routes. In the Volupai-Talasea operation (6-11 March
1944), two batteries of 75mm pack howitzers from 2/11 landed at Red Beach on
D-Day (6 March). The 11th took its worst casualties of the New Britain
fighting here. The batteries of 2/11 had to set up their howitzers on the
exposed beach because there was no other place to go, and they took a
tremendous pounding from 90mm mortars. Out of a total of 13 Marines killed in
action during this operation, nine were from 2/11. Also, 2/11 sustained 29
wounded in action, more than one-third of the total Marines wounded in the
operation.
An interesting and amusing sidelight to the participation of the 11th on
New Britain came out of the story of the Gilnit Patrol, a battalion-size
patrol led by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller. Artillery had nothing to do
with this patrol in terms of fire support, but some individuals from the 11th
participated. Puller had little patience with anyone, especially junior
officers who did not keep themselves in good physical condition, and fat
artillery lieutenants were fair game for his wrath. Fuller ordered one
bulbous artillery lieutenant from the 11th to go on the patrol because he
thought "the walk would do the artilleryman's girth some good."<18>
In summary, it must be said that the dense rain forest of New Britain
greatly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire on well dug-in Japanese
troops. Many rounds exploded harmlessly high in the trees. During all the
various landings, the 11th showed outstanding speed and proficiency in moving
its howitzers over bad terrain. The proficiency of the 11th at doing this
16
earned it the Navy Unit Commendation, the only unit award issued for the New
Britain fighting. Counterbattery fire by the 11th was excellent and succeeded
in suppressing Japanese artillery. The Army relieved the Marines at New
Britain on 25 April. The cannoneers of the 11th hoped that they would go back
to Australia, but this idea was shattered when they found themselves on Pavuvu
in the Russell Islands.
Peleliu
The Marines could not have been more disappointed when they arrived at
their next camp. Training camps in the FMF have always been known for their
spartan conditions, but few could match Pavuvu in the Russell Islands. It was
here that not only the 11th Marines, but the whole 1st Marine Division, found
itself following the rigorous fighting on New Britain. Sick troops who needed
some rest were unable to get it. No preparations had been made on the island
for the division. There would be no time for relaxation because camps had to
be built, and, when that was done, it was necessary to begin training again.
Health and morale were at an all-time low for the whole division.<19>
Training was very difficult on Pavuvu. One basic problem was that the
area of the island was too small for large-scale training and exercises. The
terrain of Pavuvu was not at all like that of Peleliu, which was the next
target for the 1st Marine Division. As far as the 11th Marines was concerned,
artillery was "reduced to the pitiful expedient of firing into the water with
the observers out in a boat or DUKW."<20> Artillery also had very little time
to practice loading and unloading the 75mm pack howitzers and the 105mm
howitzers in LVT-4s and DUKWs. The division was very short of equipment to
practice amphibious phases of training. The summer of 1944 was chaotic and
uncomfortable for the 1st Marine Division. The training program culminated in
two full-scale rehearsals of amphibious landings in preparation for the
Peleliu operation at Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal on 27-29 August. After
returning to Pavuvu and conducing a few, long conditioning hikes, the 1st
Marine Division was ready for Peleliu.
D-Day at Peleliu was 15 September 1944. At Guadalcanal and Cape
Gloucester, the Japanese had not seriously challenged the division on the
beaches, and the landings were relatively easy compared to the fighting
following the landings. At
17
Peleliu, however, the Japanese strongly opposed the assault force, especially
in that portion of beach where the 1st Marines landed. Before long, the beach
was littered with blazing amphibian tractors. The 1st Marines landed on the
division's left, the 5th Marines in the center, and the 7th Marines on the
right.<21> As a general rule, the further to the left a Marine was, the
greater his chances were of being killed on the beach because that was where
the Japanese had placed their greatest strength. The 1st Marines took
extremely heavy casualties, but it dug in and did not lose ground.
The artillery group for the landing was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
William H. Harrison, commanding officer of the 11th Marines. The group
consisted of two battalions of III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) artillery, the 3d
155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion, in addition to the
11th Marines.<22> The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of
the 1st Marines. It came ashore with the 7th Marines, but its mission was not
altered. The 2d Battalion, the other 75mm pack howitzer battalion, supported
the 5th Marines. The 3d Battalion was originally supposed to be in general
support, but its mission was changed to support the 7th Marines with its 105s.
The other 105mm howitzer battalion, 4/11, was employed in general support
along with the two artillery battalions from IIIAC. The 5th Battalion had
been disbanded again at Pavuvu. All units of the 11th Marines were ashore and
registered by dark on D-Day.<23> The IIIAC artillery was unable to land on
D-Day, but the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on 16 September, and the 8th
155mm Gun Battalion came ashore the following day.
After one week on Peleliu, Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith remarked:
Seven days after landing, all of the southern end of Peleliu
was in our possession as well as the high ground immediately
dominating the airfield. All of the beaches that were ever used
were in use. There was room for the proper deployment of all the
artillery, including the Corps artillery. Unloading was unhampered
except by the weather and hydrographic conditions. The airfield was
available and essential base development work was underway.<24>
In other words, although the 1st Marine Division, especially the 1st Marines,
was taking heavy casualties, the fighting was going well.
18
Map of Korea, as a Battlefield
19
For the first two weeks, all artillery support was handled in a strictly
conventional way. There was a lot of massed preparatory, harassing, and
interdicting fire.<25> On 28 September, for instance, all of the artillery
battalions except 1/11 concentrated intensive preparatory fire on Ngesebus
Island in preparation for the shore-to-shore movement to take that island.
After the first two weeks, however, the artillery was no longer massed. The
enemy resistance was in small pockets, and massed fire was generally more
dangerous to friendly troops than to the enemy in that situation. The 105s
and the 155s were used effectively firing directly into the mouths of caves
where the Japanese were hiding.
Artillerymen not needed on the guns became infantrymen and were quickly
dubbed "Infantillery." This campaign indicated the usefulness of training
every Marine to be an infantryman regardless of what his normal line of work
turns out to be. The Marines of the 11th proved themselves to be competent
infantrymen, filling gaps where the infantry units were taking heavy
casualties. The fighting on Peleliu after a couple of weeks became an
infantryman's campaign, almost, but not quite, to the exclusion of supporting
arms.
After securing southern Peleliu, the division turned its attention to the
conquest of the northern part of the island, There were three main tactical
considerations involved in the drive against northern Peleliu. The first was
to bypass and isolate the pocket of resistance which had effectively held up
both the 1st and 7th Marines in the early fighting and to gain better
approaches to this pocket. The second consideration was to gain good ground
from which to launch a shore-to-shore assault on Ngesebus Island where there
was an unfinished Japanese fighter strip, one of the original objectives of
the campaign. The final consideration was to halt the Japanese reinforcement
of the Peleliu garrison by reserves coming from islands in the north.<26>
By 30 September, northern Peleliu was secured, but, by this time, the
fitness of the 1st Marines for further combat in this campaign was
questionable. Also, the 75mm pack howitzers had not proven to be effective
against enemy taking cover in caves, and so it was decided that the 75s would
no longer be needed. A convoy containing the 1st Marines, 1/11, 2/11, and the
1st Tank Battalion departed from Peleliu for the Russell Islands on 2 October.
The shortcomings of the 75mm pack howitzers at Peleliu had a great bearing on
the subsequent decision to use
20
105mm howitzers in three artillery battalions instead of only in two. After
Peleliu, 2/11 joined the ranks of the 105mm howitzer battalions, and 1/11 was
the only 75mm howitzer battalion remaining in the 11th Marines.
The fighting for the remainder of the 1st Marine Division was far from
over because there were still some tenacious Japanese defenders prepared to
fight to the death in a region called the Umurbrogol, which proved to be one
of the toughest areas to fight in that the Marines ever encountered. There is
a good geological explanation for its amazing terrain. Peleliu was pushed
above the surface of the ocean by the great pressure exerted by subterranean,
volcanic action. Where the pressure was strongest, "the ground had buckled
and cracked to form a maze of ridges and defiles, the whole littered with
jagged boulders and rubble which had been torn adrift by the violent
action.<27> The intense pressure accounted for the broken nature of the
terrain and for many underground faults which had eroded into many natural
caves. The Japanese exploited these caves skillfully in their defense. They
were eventually driven from the Umurbrogol, but only at great cost in American
lives and equipment. This Japanese last-ditch defense on Peleliu was a great
deal more devastating, even in failure, than the most ferocious banzai charge.
Massed artillery fire was not effective in the Umurbrogol because it was too
dangerous to friendly troops, who, of necessity, had to be very close to the
enemy, and it did not hurt the Japanese except to keep them pinned down and to
reduce their visibility. Direct fire of the 105s was effective when it could
be employed, but often the cannons could not be placed in the right position
because of the difficulties presented by the jagged terrain. When it could be
done, the effect on the defenders of a 105mm howitzer pumping high explosive
rounds into a cave from 200 yards away was devastating.
The 1st Marine Division was on Peleliu for one month, and it wrested the
island from the Japanese, but it did not entirely finish the job. There were
still many Japanese for the Army to mop up after the 1st Marine Division
departed. All the Marine infantry regiments took a great number of casualties
with the 1st Marines at the head of the list. The Army permanently relieved
the Marines on 15 October, exactly one month after D-Day, and by 20 October
all the Marines were on their way back to the Russells. The 3d and 4th
Battalions, 11th Marines, joined the first two battalions at Pavuvu.
21
Okinawa
Pavuvu was no better place to train during the winter of '44-'45 than it
had been in the summer of '44. There was still as much mud as before, and
there was still not enough room to maneuver. Pavuvu was so small that
"eventually units were forced to skirmish down company streets."<28> The
difficulties of training the 11th in artillery at Pavuvu were the same as they
had been earlier in the year. During this time, 2/11 was converted to a 105mm
howitzer battalion. The 1st Marine Division made the best of what little
training area it had until March 1945 when it left Pavuvu for its final combat
operation of World War II, Okinawa.
When the 1st Marine Division left the Russells on 15 March 1945, Major
General Pedro A. del Valle, commander of the 11th Marines at Guadalcanal, was
the new commanding general of the division. New Navy transports were used to
carry the men from Pavuvu to Okinawa, and this was a welcome change. They
were in much better condition than the ships used to transport Marines earlier
in the war. First, the division sailed to Ulithi and arrived there on 21
March. It anchored there from 21-27 March, grouping and organizing with the
rest of the naval expeditionary forces headed for Okinawa. L-Day at Okinawa
was 1 April.
The Okinawa operation was a unique one for the 1st Marine Division in
World War II in that it was "the first time it was landing as an integral part
of a much larger landing force, and matters of coordination and control not
met in previous campaigns had to be considered."<29> The main point to be
made was that the Okinawa landing, far from being solely a Marine and Navy
effort, included a great number of Army troops. The 1st and 6th Marine
Divisions provided the assault elements of the III Amphibious Corps, which,
together with the Army XXIV Corps, formed the Tenth Army under the command of
Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, USMC. The 1st Marine Division was to land
right in the center of the Tenth Army beaches between Yontan and Kadena
airfields. Most of the Marines anticipated that the landing would be heavily
opposed at the beachhead. There was a seawall that had to be scaled, and there
was not a man in the assault who did not worry about getting over that wall.
At 0830, 1 April, the first assault troops hit the beach. They simply
stood up and moved quickly across it. There was a little, ineffective, sniper
fire, nothing more. The Yontain
22
Map of Okinawa Shima
23
airfield was secured at 1130 before any unit of the 11th Marines reached the
shore. Securing this airfield was expected to take four or five days, not
three hours. What was even more remarkable was that the airfield was
undamaged, and so were most of the Japanese planes on the runway. Colonel
Wilburt S. Brown was the commanding officer of the 11th at Okinawa, and his
first battalion to land was 4/11, which hit the beach at 1200. Almost all the
artillery was ashore by 1530. Because the enemy was not resisting as strongly
as anticipated, the infantry moved out fast putting a great strain on
communications and making it almost impossible for forward observers to
register their batteries.<30> The infantry was moving too quickly for the
artillery to keep up.
By 2 April, displacement was necessary for all four battalions of the
11th, especially 1/11. The supported units of 1/11 were beyond the effective
range of its 75mm pack howitzers. Displacement on 2 April was impossible,
however, because of a lack of transportation. Two battalions, including 1/11,
displaced on 3 April, and the other two displaced the following day. The
infantry of the 1st Marine Division was moving so fast through its zone of
action that it could not have had artillery support in the first days if it
had needed it. On 2 April, General del Valle said, "I don't know where the
Japs are, and I can't offer you any good reason why they let us come ashore so
easily."<31> The zone of action (ZOA) of the 1st Marine Division, which
stretched across Okinawa, was secured in four days. Only a very few Marines
had been killed or wounded, and only a few Japanese had been killed because
almost none had been seen. There were two reasons for the lack of resistance
encountered by the division. First, enemy strength in the division's ZOA had
been greatly overestimated by the United States military authorities. The
Japanese were critically short on supplies of every kind, and, not wanting to
waste what little they had, they were lying low, hoping that the kamikazes
would cripple the American effort. Secondly, and even more important, the
bulk of the Japanese Thirty-Second Army was holding defensive positions
concentrically ringed about Shuri Castle. The remainder of the enemy force
was located off the Minatogawa beaches in the southeast. The XXIV Corps,
therefore, encountered the real strength of the Japanese.
The first days on Okinawa for XXIV Corps were not as easy as they were
for IIIAC, and, on 9 April, the 11th Marines moved south to join the XXIV
Corps and to provide artillery support for the Army divisions there. The
battalions of the 11th fired
24
supporting missions for the Army, and they helped the Army to slowly push back
the enemy in the south. On 27 April, the rest of the 1st Marine Division was
attached to XXIV Corps in order to aid the Army in the south. The 1st Marine
Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division, which had taken a heavy beating.
One important operation in May was the seizure of Dakeshi Ridge. On 8
May, the 1st Marine Division returned to IIIAC control, but it remained in the
south where it was needed. The attack on Dakeshi Ridge was scheduled for the
early morning of 11 May, but the Japanese attacked the Marines just before the
Marine attack was scheduled to begin. The Japanese assault was repelled
largely because of a heavy volume of accurate fire from the 11th Marines. The
attack on Dakeshi Ridge started on schedule, and, by nightfall of 12 May,
after two days of bitter fighting, the 7th Marines, which led the attack, had
a hold on the ridge. The 11th had expended many rounds in support. On 13
May, the 7th Marines was routing the Japanese out of the town of Dakeshi, and,
on 16 May, the 7th again was in the lead attacking Wana Ridge. After the 7th
took Wana, the enemy returned with a vicious counterattack and drove back some
of the more badly battered units of the 7th. The 11th ceaselessly hurled high
explosive on the ridge and helped the 7th to eventually bend back the Japanese
effort. The exhausted 7th was finally relieved there on 19 May.
It was really the great effectiveness of the Marine tank-infantry team
that meant success in the 1st Marine Division ZOA. As it had done at Peleliu,
the artillery often used direct fire to rout the Japanese out of the caves in
which they were hiding. The howitzers neutralized the enemy and kept him
pinned down, but even the most ardent artilleryman would have to admit that it
was the tanks, grinding and crawling right up to the mouths of the caves,
firing high explosive or spewing flame, that furnished the most effective
support for the infantry in this type of fighting. On 28 May, a Marine patrol
entered Shuri Castle itself. Japanese resistance in that area was broken.
One of the greatest victories for the supporting arms of artillery and
naval gunfire came on 26 May. A naval gunfire air observer spotted a few
hundred Japanese soldiers walking down a road. This proved to be part of a
skillfully planned Japanese withdrawal. Naval vessels pumped rounds into the
area, and all available artillery, including every unit of the 11th Marines,
fired on that area and on the towns of Zahana, Gisushi, and
25
Dakiton, where enemy troops were sheltered. This pummeling resulted in the
loss of 3,000-4,000 Japanese lives.
Japanese resistance in the IIIAC zone next centered around the town of
Itoman and Kunishi Ridge. Itoman was quickly secured, and then Kunishi Ridge
was divided, the 7th Marines taking the west end and the 1st Marines attacking
the east end. The west end was taken in two night attacks by the 7th Marines.
The first occurred at 0330, 12 June, at which time two companies from 2/7 made
it to their objectives. The rest of the 7th Marines reached their objectives
on the following night. The commanding officer of the 7th Marines said, "I do
not believe I would have attempted the night attack without the sure knowledge
that the artillery could have blunted any serious counterattack. Without
artillery, without the excellent artillery we had in support, the night attack
would have been too risky."<32> One battalion commanding officer of the same
regiment said, "It /artillery/ gave them /infantry/ a real sense of security
at Okinawa. If the tank-infantry team was the offensive weapon, our artillery
was our best defense. Not since Guadalcanal had the average infantryman
realized how important it was to him."<33> After effectively supporting the
attack by the 7th on the west end of Kunishi Ridge, the 11th hit the east end
with its cannon in support of the 1st Marines, which gained its objective on
15 June.
The 11th was really most important in a defensive role at Okinawa,
steadily suppressing all Japanese attempts to counter-attack objectives won by
the infantry of the 1st Marine Division or units of the various Army divisions
that it at times supported. The 11th was also effective in counterbattery
fire. The Japanese were very strong in 70mm guns, 75mm and 150mm howitzers,
and 5-inch coast defense guns. This Japanese artillery was often silenced by
the 11th. The batteries of the 11th supported many attacks by infantry
battalions, and the fire that they provided was more than useful, but, in a
role of offensive support, they had to take second place behind the tanks.
Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, commanding the 6th Marine Division, said,
"If any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than
any others during the progress of the campaign, the tank would certainly be
selected."<34>
The number of artillery rounds fired on Okinawa was extraordinary and
indicated in itself the vast importance of artillery as a supporting arm in
that campaign. For example, 1/11 alone fired 100,330 rounds as compared with
the 120,000
26
round total of the whole 11th Marines on Peleliu.<35> The fact that 1/11
fired almost as many rounds with its 75mm pack howitzers on Okinawa as the
11th Marines fired on Peleliu was indicative of the great amount of work
accomplished by the artillerymen in this campaign because the 75s were used
only very sparingly against enemy in caves. The other battalions fired many
more rounds than the 1st in that capacity.
When the fighting on Okinawa was over, a rumor circulated that the 1st
Marine Division was going to Hawaii. Like most other hopeful word, this was
false. The division had to remain on Okinawa, where it constructed its own
camp on Motobu Peninsula. The Marines turned to the new task with an attitude
of, "Well, dammit, if they can dish it out, I can take it."<36> The division
figured prominently in the plans for the invasion of Japan, but these were
unnecessary because, on 14 August, the cease-fire was proclaimed. The next
step for the 11th Marines and the rest of the 1st Marine Division was North
China.
North China
On 26 September 1945, the 1st Marine Division departed Okinawa for North
China. Arriving at the mouth of the Hai River, the 11th Marines disembarked
and moved to Tientsin, where it was billeted in the East French Arsenal. The
Marines received a hearty welcome from the Chinese populace, and the Japanese
garrison that was to be relieved was docile and polite. The mission of all
the Marines in North China, according to James Forrestal, Secretary of the
Navy, was "to accomplish the disarmament of the Japanese and to provide for
their repatriation up to the point where General Wedemeyer considers that the
Chinese Nationalist government troops can alone carry out this mission."<37>
Officially, the Marines were to take no part in the struggle for power going
on in China between the Nationalists and the Communists. They were simply
supposed to assist the Nationalists in solving the problem of relieving and
repatriating the Japanese soldiers who remained in China following the
surrender. The Marines, nevertheless, found themselves involved in many
activities necessary to allow the Nationalist government to bring about at
least some vestige of control over the people in the countryside. The Chinese
Communists in late 1945 were conducting guerrilla warfare effectively among
the peasantry. They were not strong enough yet to face the Chinese
Nationalist Army in a pitched battle, but they were adept at harassment.
27
The 1st and 11th Marines initially took responsibility for the
bivouacking and repatriation of the Japanese soldiers at Tientsin. Units from
the 11th and other regiments of the 1st Marine Division were sent out along
the railroads to Peiping and Chinwangtao in order to suppress the numerous
Communist attempts to disrupt rail traffic. They guarded all lines of
communication around Tientsin, the coal fields, and the coal shipments on the
railroad. Without the Marines to guard all of this, the Nationalists would
have been unable to keep utilities or factories running. In handling this
guard duty, the Marines became involved in many incidents with the Chinese
Communists.
The personnel situation for the Marines, as well as for the rest of the
1st Marine Division, was very poor. Because of a demobilization effort
conducted by all the Services following the end of the war, the Marine Corps
suffered a large cutback of personnel. It was not long before many Marines of
the 1st Division were eligible to go home under the point discharge and
rotation plans. By December 1945, there was a large decrease of Marines in
China. There were some replacements for the veterans who were sent home, but
these were little more than "boots," who were young and still had much to
learn in basic military subjects.<38>
By January 1946, the Marines were no longer responsible for the custody
of Japanese personnel and equipment, or Japanese subsistence and repatriation,
a job that they had efficiently carried on throughout the fall of 1945. They
still continued to aid and advise the Chinese on this project, and, by the
midsummer of 1946, all the Japanese except for a small group of technicians
had been repatriated. The Marines then increased their concentration on
protecting the railways to Chinwangtao and Peiping and the coal fields in the
area, since the Communists were becoming increasingly bold in their attacks.
During August and September, however, the Chinese Nationalist Army took over
full responsibility for the security of the coal fields and the railway
between Peiping and Chinwangtao.
In September 1946, 3/11 moved from Tientsin to barracks in the Peitaiho-
Chinwangtao area joining the 7th Marines. The rest of the 11th remained at
Tientsin. Many of the Marines who had been spread out along the railways were
pulled back into the city of Tientsin, and the Chinese Nationalist Army
undertook greater responsibility for security against the Communists. On 1
October, Colonel Eugene F. C. Collier relieved Colonel Brown,
28
who had led the 11th since the start of the Okinawa campaign, as commanding
officer. On 20 December, 4/11 left Tientsin and joined 3/11 and the 7th
Marines at Chinwangtao. On 2 January 1947, 3/11, 4/11, and the 7th Marines
departed from Chinwangtao for the United States, arriving at San Diego on 22
January. The 4th Battalion was disbanded on 17 February. The rest of the
11th Marines left North China for Guam, joining the 3d Marine Brigade. They
remained in Guam just long enough to construct a camp of Quonset huts before
going home.
Camp Pendleton, California, May 1947-July 1950<39>
On 1 May 1947, the 11th Marines arrived at Camp Pendleton from Guam. The
artillerymen were billeted in the 17 Area, but immediately leave was awarded
to almost all of them. For the most part, the officers received 30 days
leave, and the enlisted men were given 60 days. By 8 May, almost 200 men from
the 11th had gone home for one or two months. The 11th was still part of the
3d Marine Brigade, but, on 17 July, when the remainder of the 1st Marine
Division returned from China, the 3d Brigade was disbanded, and the 11th
Marines reverted to the control of the 1st Marine Division. Throughout the
summer of 1947, the size of the 11th was drastically reduced until it
consisted of only a Headquarters and Service Battery and the 1st Battalion
plus one 4.5-inch rocket battery. The rocket battery was a new addition to
the 11th Marines while at Camp Pendleton. Its purpose was to provide highly
mobile general support for the infantry. The other weapons of the 11th were
75mm pack howitzers, and 105mm howitzers.
The three years at Camp Pendleton between occupation duty in North China
and the Korean War were an endless succession of amphibious exercises, field
problems, firing on the artillery range, parades, and inspections. It was
three years of routine training and garrison duty, but the work included much
of value that enabled 1/11 to maintain itself as an artillery battalion ready
for action anywhere in the world.
Between 20 October and 10 November 1947, the 11th Marines practiced
amphibious landings at Coronado Strand, San Clemente Island, and Aliso Beach,
preparing for the full-scale, combined, amphibious exercises that were to take
place at Aliso Beach on 10-14 November. This was to be Operation DEMON I, the
first of three DEMON operations between 1947 and 1950 that helped to maintain
the 1st Marine Division as a force in readiness. The
29
landing itself was to take place on 10 November, but extremely inclement
weather forced a postponement until 13 November. The landing was accomplished
with no major problems, and reviewing officers felt that the whole exercise
was excellently handled. This landing was typical of all Camp Pendleton
amphibious exercises between 1947 and 1950. The other DEMON exercises
occurred in October 1948 and April 1950.
May 1948 was a period of parades and inspections for the 11th, and it
began with a dress blue parade for the Inspector-General. The 11th was
complimented for its performance and appearance, and Private First Class Billy
D. Glass was personally congratulated on his appearance and named outstanding.
On 13 May, Lieutenant General Thomas E. Watson, the commanding general of the
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, inspected the 11th Marines and other units at
Camp Pendleton. It was a time for sparkling brass and mirror-like shoes, and
every Marine was a poster Marine. It was not long, however, before the
Marines of the 11th again found themselves in contact with good California
earth.
In the end of January and early February 1949, 1/11 accompanied the 7th
Marines to Kodiak Island off Alaska for cold weather amphibious operations.
The purpose was to acquaint the Marines with combat in cold temperatures and
to test the reaction of both men and equipment to the rigors of an Arctic
winter. The exercise was highly satisfactory and was good experience for the
men, some of whom found themselves at the "Frozen Chosin" two years later.
Training in cold climates was a new idea that was more thoroughly explored
after the Korean War.
On 28-29 June 1949, the 11th Marines conducted a two-day, 100-mile field
exercise, the purpose of which was to improve the speed of the Marines at
laying and registering the cannon and to improve the skill of the truck
drivers who were required to tow the weapons along narrow, steep, twisting
mountain trails. On 28 June, the 11th travelled to Camp Talega in the
northwest corner of the Camp Pendleton reservation. Very little of this trip
was over hard-surface road. The cannoneers layed and registered the cannon
and spent the night there. The next day, the truck drivers received the most
demanding part of the exercise as they towed the howitzers through the
roughest terrain at Camp Pendleton to Horno Ridge, where the artillery once
again set up and registered the weapons. The problem was secured on the
evening of 29 June.
30
During July 1949, the most hard-charging Marine of all time, the man who
has assaulted more heavily defended beaches on celluloid than anyone else in
history, the one who always made it through the grazing, enfilade machine gun
fire to display the ultimate in small-unit leadership, John Wayne, arrived at
Camp Pendleton to film "Sands of Iwo Jima." The 11th Marines, along with
other units of the 1st Marine Division, assaulted Aliso Beach while Hollywood
cameras recorded all of the action.
"Airlift 1949," a new type of tactical exercise, was conducted on 24
October 1949. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines assaulted San Nicholas Island,
130 miles off the California coast, from the air. The 11th Marines flew in
with 75mm pack howitzers, which were the only artillery weapons that could be
airlifted into combat at that time. On 15 February 1950, the 11th
participated in "Airlift 1950A," which was simply a repeat performance of the
1949 exercise. These two exercises were concrete evidence of the birth of the
idea that to move artillery by air was feasible. This idea was exploited a
great deal more fully with the increased development of heliborne movement
between the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict.
On 3 July 1950, the 11th Marines took part in a combat parade and review
to demonstrate its readiness. It was well that 1/11 was as ready as it was.
Korea
On 5 July 1950, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was organized at Camp
Pendleton for duty in Korea. This brigade consisted of the 5th Marines,
Marine Aircraft Group 33, and 1/11. All the units prepared to move out, and,
on 13 July, they sailed for Pusan, Korea. The North Korean People's Army
(NKPA) had swept into South Korea, routing the South Koreans and the
understrength U. S. Army troops who were supporting them. By the time that
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived on 2 August, all of Korea was under
the control of the NKPA except for a small area around Pusan. It was the job
of the 1st Brigade to reinforce the Army and to help hold the perimeter. Four
days after arriving at Pusan, 1/11 found itself at Chindong-ni, where it
relieved the Army's 8th Field Artillery Battalion. The battalion position was
partly in the center and partly on the outskirts of the town. NKPA artillery
was already registered on Chindong-ni, and initially 1/11 was heavily shelled.
Nevertheless, 1/11 trained its 105s on the NKPA
31
artillery and successfully outdueled it.
As the 5th Marines moved against NKPA troops, 1/11 was forced to displace
often. Because of the terrain, the 105s had to be placed much closer to the
infantry lines than is normally recommended. When 2,000-3,000 yards would
have normally been the distance between the artillery and frontline infantry
positions, often in the Pusan perimeter the distances were 500-1,500 yards.
By 12 August, 1/11 had built up positions on the outskirts of Kosong, and 12
August proved to be a great day of triumph for these cannoneers. They were
adjusting fire on a crossroad when an enemy motorized force, camouflaged in
the houses near the crossroad, began to move out. The 105s fired on the
convoy until it was out of range, damaging or destroying almost every vehicle.
The artillerymen returned to Chindong-ni briefly on 14 August and then
moved to Miryang, at that time 17 hours away by truck and rail. After an
unusually uncomfortable and grueling trip, 1/11 set up battery positions at
Miryang in order to support the 5th Marines, which was about to launch an
offensive to push the NKPA troops over the Naktong River. The 5th crushed the
NKPA soldiers, and, as the Communists attempted to retreat across the river,
1/11 had a good shoot. One battery was firing with fuze quick, one with
variable-time (VT) fuze, and the others with fuze delay to kill the North
Koreans under the surface.<40> Many North Koreans were shelled to death
attempting to ford the river.
Following the Naktong rout, the 5th Marines moved to Masan for a very
brief rest. The cannoneers, however, moved back to Chindong-ni to support
RCT-5 (Army), which was heavily attacked by NKPA forces from midnight, 31
August, to daylight, 1 September. The 105s of 1/11 were indispensable in
crushing the NPKA assaults on the Army positions. Almost immediately, 1/11
returned to Miryang. This time, the trip took only six hours because of many
improvements made in the road. The reason for the move was that the NKPA was
threatening Yongsan, and, if they took that town, they could break down the
whole defense of the Pusan perimeter. The battle for Yongsan was crucial in
the effort made by the South Koreans and the U. S. soldiers and Marines to
maintain a foothold on Korea, and, from 1-4 September, 1/11 fired
approximately 5,000 rounds in helping deny Yongsan to the Communists. The
targets were generally mortar, machine gun, and artillery positions, plus a
few large troop concentrations.
32
Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood, the commanding officer of 1/11, had
some complaints about Korea with regard to the terrain and the difficulties
that it presented for the artillery. He said, "The Korean terrain certainly
is not the best for artillery position areas. Mountains and rice paddies see
to that. Ground which often looked favorable was found later to be
inaccessible due to lack of solid ground approaches, principally because of
ubiquitous rice paddies."<41>
On 6 September, 1/11 left Miryang for Pusan. From 6-10 September, the
battalion assimilated new men and equipment. On 10 September, 1/11 left Pusan
for Inchon. If the artillerymen of 1/11 throught things had been rough on the
Pusan perimeter, it is best that they did not know what awaited them only a
few months away. In any case, their morale was high. They were ready to
leave Pusan. Lieutenant Colonel Wood felt that he had learned six, valuable
lessons as an artillery battalion commander in Korea. They were:
1) Stay out of villages and towns if at all possible in selecting
position areas for artillery.
2) Wherever possible, so site one gun from each battery that
it may be used in an anti-tank role. Our 155mm high explosive
anti-tank ammunition will stop a T-34 or similar tank.
3) As part of the battalion's standing operating procedure,
carry local security personnel on the battalion commander's
reconnaissance for position. Place local security posts on the
hills commanding the valleys, especially those to the rear and the
flanks. Establish your own patrols, and always have an aggressive
patrol policy in operation. It's good life insurance.
4) Keep civilians, refugees, and especially children, out of
the position area or camp if in a rear area. Children were used
extensively, especially in the early days of the war, to enter camps
for the sole purpose of leaving an armed hand grenade near some
unsuspecting person.
5) Wherever possible, select and organize positions to be
occupied by the battalion so that at least one battery will be able
to fire in any direction.
33
6) Every Marine, regardless of his rank, primary MOS, or job,
is essentially an infantryman when it comes to shooting the weapon
with which he is armed.<42>
Meanwhile, in the States, the rest of the 1st Marine Division was
preparing to mount out, a job that proved to be practically an administrative
miracle. The fact that the job got done testifies to the ability of Marines
to work very long hours at very tedious jobs to get a task done when the chips
are down. As far as the individual Marine was concerned, from the moment he
entered the gates of Camp Pendleton to the moment he departed, he was in a
continuous rush. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines, 105mm howitzer
battalions from Camp Lejeune, arrived at Camp Pendleton and were redesignated
2/11 and 3/11; a 155mm howitzer battalion, 3/10,became 4/11. The 11th Marines
was now organized with three direct support battalions using 105mm howitzers
and one general support battalion using 155mm howitzers. There was
practically no artillery training for the cannoneers of 2/11, 3/11, and 4/11,
the ranks of which were greatly augmented by inexperienced reserves while at
Camp Pendleton. Korea was to be real on-the-job training for them. The 2d
Battalion did a little practice firing, but 3/11 and 4/11 did not have the
time to do any. These three battalions, along with Headquarters and Service
Battery, 11th Marines, sailed from California to Kobe, Japan, and, on 9
September, they left Kobe to take part in the Inchon landing. Six 1sts and
one AKA, the USS WASHBURN, were used to move 2/11, 3/11, and 4/11 to Inchon.
Three 1sts transported 1/11 from Pusan to Inchon.
Colonel James H. Brower was now in command of the 11th, and his first
battalions to land in the Inchon operation were 1/11 and 2/11, which moved
onto Wolmi-do in DUKWs at 1845, D-Day, 15 September. These two battalions
were prepared to fire by 2145 in support of the infantry units that assaulted
Inchon itself. The following day, 1/11 and 2/11 moved over to Inchon and were
trailed by 3/11 and 4/11. The 1st Battalion was in direct support of the 5th
Marines, as it had been at Pusan, and 2/11 was in direct support of the 1st
Marines. When the 7th Marines, which was reorganized and prepared for battle
a little later than the 1st Marines, arrived in Korea, 3/11 took over as the
direct support artillery battalion for that regiment. The 4th Battalion, with
its 155s, was in general support. The artillery was forced to displace
frequently in the first days after landing because of the rapid advances made
by the infantry. The 11th always displaced one battery at a time so that good
support could be provided at all times. Ammunition resupply was
34
very good at this time, and the 11th broke up many enemy troop concentrations
along the Inchon-Seoul highway. Communications were initially the greatest
problem for the 11th because of the great number of inexperienced men handling
worn-out equipment. This problem was alleviated as the men became more
experienced and newer equipment was supplied. Artillery was of very limited
use to the Marines inside Seoul, but the 5th Marines received good support
from the 105s of 1/11 and the 155s of 4/11 in the hills west of Seoul.
After taking Seoul, the 1st Marine Division withdrew and was ordered to
land at Wonsan in an attempt to deliver the "coup-de-grace" to the rapidly
retreating NKPA. Actually, while the Marines were steaming around to the east
coast of Korea, the U. S. Army and the South Koreans were doing such a good
job that by the time the Marines landed at Wonsan everybody else had already
arrived ahead of them, including Bob Hope and the USO. The day that the
Marines landed administratively at Wonsan was a bitter one for the hard-
chargers who considered it almost a disgrace for the Marines not to be the
first ones in enemy territory.
Once at Wonsan, the units of the 1st Marine Division began to spread
widely apart to the north. Major General Oliver P. Smith, commanding the 1st
Marine Division, tried to pull them closer together, but he was limited in
doing this by his own superiors. The great dispersal of the infantry
regiments made it necessary to attach artillery battalions to regimental
combat teams (RCTs). As a result, 1/11 joined RCT-5, 2/11 joined RCT-1, and
3/11 joined RCT-7. The 4th Battalion remained in general support and went
furthest north with RCTs 5 and 7 to Yudam-ni on the Chosin Reservoir. The 2d
Battalion was able to stay a little further south along the Main Supply Route
(MSR) with the 1st Marines. Battery D was at Hagaru-ri with 3/1, Battery E
was at Koto-ri with 2/1, and Battery F was at Chinhung-ni with 1/1. At
Yudam-ni, the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions had many problems, most all of which
stemmed from the bitter cold that the Marines experienced there. When the
temperatures hovered around -20 degrees Fahrenheit, the efficiency of every
Marine was greatly reduced. All of the battalions experienced a shortage of
ammunition. Most of it was air-dropped, but during the whole time at Yudam-ni
only 1,200 rounds of 105mm ammunition was delivered, and 4/11 was never
resupplied with 155mm ammunition. The 4th Battalion was limited to
counterbattery fire and firing on especially heavy troop concentrations. The
extreme cold had an adverse effect on the cannons themselves, and it made
35
Map of Peleliu, Scheme of Maneuver
36
air-dropping of ammunition a wasteful practice. Atmospheric conditions such
as those of a North Korean winter greatly decreased the maximum effective
range of the artillery pieces. "The 105mm howitzer, once fired, will not leap
back instantly into battery. It will creep back in 30 seconds or more.
Ammunition freezes too. Shells do not go off, and, if they have been air-
dropped, perhaps only 25 percent will survive the impact of collision with
that rocklike earth."<43>
While the Marines were strung out along the MSR with the 5th and 7th
Marines along with three battalions of the 11th and other supporting units
extended far to the north, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) penetrated
across the Yalu River into Korea and furiously drove back the U. S. Army
troops there. Exploiting the gaps in the American lines that this created,
many Chinese divisions soon surrounded the 1st Marine Division, which was
forced to withdraw. The only way to do this was to move south along the MSR
through the Chinese positions in the crippling cold of a North Korean winter.
The Marines held several, isolated points along the MSR, but the Chinese
controlled the MSR itself. The problem was to secure high ground along the
route so that men and equipment could travel south along it to safety. The
11th Marines displaced southward in such a way as to give maximum, continuous,
fire support to the infantry fighting for the high ground. Most of the
artillerymen became infantrymen during this march. Only skeleton crews manned
the 105s and the 155s. From 1-11 December, the troops doggedly continued
south, the Marines leaving no scrap of equipment behind for the Chinese to
use. Each battalion of the 11th remained with the RCT to which it had
initially been assigned. On 11 December, all the surviving Marines, carrying
many of their dead and all their equipment, arrived at Hungnam to embark for
South Korea.
The basic problem at Hungnam was to evacuate many thousands of American
Marines and soldiers, South Korean troops, and North Korean refugees who could
not be left to the mercy of the starving, freezing Chinese.<44) With regard
to the enemy situation, Marine air observation showed "continued movement
southward to reinforce, with the presence of a considerable number of
artillery pieces reported for the first time."<45> The evacuation at Hungnam
amounted to a large scale amphibious landing in reverse. In spite of the
great number of Communist forces in the area, surprisingly little Chinese and
North Korean resistance was encountered, and, by 15 December, all the Marines
were gone from Hungnam and North Korea.
37
The men of the 1st Division spent Christmas of 1950 around Masan, which
was a town within what once had been the Pusan perimeter. The 5th Marines had
already spent time there the previous August. The division trained and
reorganized. On 8 January 1951, General Smith was ordered to move the 1st
Marine Division to the vicinity of Pohang in order to block Communist
penetrations south of the Andong-Yongdok Road and to protect the Andong-
Yongchon MSR. The division moved to the Pohang area on 10 January, and the
three RCTs occupied small towns there. The organization of the artillery was
the same as it had been in North Korea, 1/11 supporting the 5th, 2/11
supporting the 1st, 3/11 supporting the 7th, and 4/11 in general support. The
artillery battalions remained attached to the RCTs. The hardest job was
finding the enemy, and this was accomplished by ceaseless and extensive
patrolling. The 11th fired in support of these patrols. This action
continued until mid-February.
On 16 February, the Marines started on a new offensive along with U. S.
Army and other United Nations (UN) troops. They moved to the town of Chungju
by truck and rail at the start of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 5th Marines,
with 2/11 and 1/11 in direct support respectively, led the attack on Wonju on
21 February. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines engaged in a lot of
counterbattery fire as Chinese artillery attempted to break the attack of the
1st Marines. On 1 March, the 1st Marine Division was ordered to secure a
ridgeline running east and west, north of Hoengsong. This time the 1st
Marines and the 7th Marines were in the lead with 2/11 and 3/11 in direct
support. The 3d Battalion fired 54 missions on 24 target areas during 1
March.
By 4 March, all of the objectives for Operation KILLER were secured, and,
on 7 March, Operation RIPPER began. RIPPER was simply a continuation of the
previous effort. On 13 March, 2/11 and 3/11 supported the 1st and 7th Marines
leading the Hongchon envelopment. Hill 356 fell to the 7th with the help of
3/11 on 14 March, as did Hills 246 and 428 to the 1st after 2/11 had worked on
them. All the objectives for Operation RIPPER were taken by 24 March. In a
little over a month, the UN forces had sent the confident Chinese reeling
northward. After 24 March, the 1st Marine Division moved very briefly into
Corps Reserve. RCT-1, including 2/11, went to Hongchon, where the Marines
recuperated. The units took on replacements and did some training. RCT-7,
however, was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division and crossed the 38th
Parallel moving north. On 8 April, the 1st Marine Division crossed the 38th
Parallel and relieved the 1st Cavalry Division, regaining control of
38
RCT-7. The offensive continued, until, on 22 April, the CCF rallied and
smashed through the 6th Republic of Korea (ROK) Division on the left of the
1st Marine Division.
This was the start of the CCF Spring Offensive of 1951 in which the UN
forces traded ground for live bodies. The first four days were tough,
especially for RCT-1 and 2/11, which were on the left of the division. There
was intense pressure on the 1st Marines until 26 April, but the accurate,
voluminous fire of 2/11 prevented the Chinese from mounting a really
conclusive attack. RCTs 1 and 5 dropped back to Chunchon across the Pukhan
River before the Communist onslaught. The 11th rained fire on the Communist
attacks. The 1st Marine Division gave ground, as did other of the UN forces,
but only a small number of lives were lost considering the strength of the
attacks, and the morale of the Marines remained high. Eventually, the Chinese
offensive simply ground to a halt, incapable of further progress. On 17 May,
the Chinese launched a severe assault against the 7th Marines during which the
Communists were battered by the 105s of 3/11. This victory by the 7th Marines
marked the end of the CCF Spring Offensive.
The UN forces reorganized after absorbing the best punch that the Chinese
could offer and marched north again. The Marines moved to Yanggu, and the 7th
Marines controlled that town by 31 May. The infantry regiments hopped
northward from hill to hill while the 11th prepared the ground for them. The
cannoneers had to do almost all of the preparatory work because the weather
was usually too cloudy for close air support. One trick that the 11th found
effective in this offensive was to fire colored smoke rounds. North Korean
and Chinese prisoners said that they believed the colored smoke to be
poisonous gas because that is what they were told by their officers. The
Chinese sacrificed the NKPA as they retreated northward. The North Koreans
were shoved into the front lines, and they held as long as they could while
the Chinese ran to the north.
Negotiations for peace began in the village of Kaesong on 25 June 1951.
The fighting slackened during these negotiations, and the Chinese used this
time to consolidate and reorganize their routed legions. At the end of July,
3/11 was under the control of the 2d Infantry Division, and the rest of the
11th moved into X Corps Reserve. While in reserve, the Marines of the 11th
underwent training, much of which was conducted at night. An order was issued
stating that a minimum of 33 percent of all technical training was to be at
night. The Communist
39
delegates walked out of the Kaesong talks on 22 August, satisfied that their
troops were now reorganized and ready to carry on the fight. This meant a
renewal of activity for the 1st Marine Division.
The 11th Marines, minus 3/11, along with the 196th Field Artillery
Battalion, made up the 11th Regiment Group, commanded by Colonel Curtis
Burton, Jr., USMC. As the Marines pushed northward again to the Punchbowl
area, the 11th often dueled with the Chinese artillery. Artillery was one of
the areas in which the Chinese were able to make great improvements during the
lull in the fighting while negotiations were being undertaken at Kaesong. The
11th used up an extraordinary amount of ammunition from 1-4 September, and
this caused some logistical problems. There was a six-day halt in the
offensive in order to allow the Marines to build up a reserve of artillery and
mortar ammunition. Until 20 September 1951, the Marines continued to hop
hills moving northward, always supported by the 11th. On 20 September 1951,
the Marines continued to hop hills moving northward, always supported by the
11th. On 20 September, "the warfare of movement came to an end, and the
warfare of position began."<46>
After 20 September, the 11th stayed in the area of the Punchbowl for a
long time. Neither the UN forces nor the Communists made any real gains. The
11th was especially important in its effective counterbattery fire and in
breaking Communist assaults. The cannoneers fired many leaflets in the
psychological warfare campaign hoping to win over some of the North Korean and
Chinese troops to the UN side. Mainly the 11th fired at artillery, mortar,
machine gun, and recoilless rifle positions, bunkers, supply dumps, truck
convoys, bridges, command posts, and observation posts. It fired in support
of the many patrols that were sent out to check on the enemy. On 10 November
1951, the 11th along with all other available artillery, naval gunfire, tanks,
mortars, and machine guns fired a grand crescendo on Hill 1052, an important
enemy observation post, in honor of the Marine Corps Birthday.
The situation as the Marines approached their second winter in Korea was
that:
Ground forces operations throughout November seldom varied from
the familiar pattern of squad size patrols nightly and an occasional
daytime raid by a company size task force with the support of artillery
and air. Supporting
40
arms kept enemy strongholds under almost constant fire, and North Korean
activity in the construction or improvement of bunkers provided frequent
targets of opportunity.<47>
The Panmunjom negotiations began in November 1951, and "active defensive
operations" continued. It became a static war. The Marines ran many patrols,
took a few casualties, and gained little. At midnight, 31 December, the 11th
along with other artillery and naval gunfire fired a New Year's toast to the
enemy.
Nothing different happened in January and February 1952. The 11th fired
many propaganda leaflets in the never-ending psychological warfare that was
carried on in the frozen mountains. As the new year began, the Korean Marine
Corps organized a new artillery battalion, consisting of two 105mm and two
155mm howitzer batteries. This battalion was placed in the Punchbowl with the
11th Marines on 9 January.
Operation CLAM-UP began on 9 February 1952. The Marines feigned a large-
scale withdrawal. Throughout the winter, the Marines had done a lot of
patrolling while the Communists for the most part remained securely in their
positions. They now wanted the Communists to think that they were leaving so
that the Communists would do more patrolling to look for them and in that way
come out in the open. On 9-10 February, the 11th fired 471 harassing and
interdicting missions as if covering a withdrawal. The Chinese came out to
check the situation, and the rate of Chinese casualties did briefly increase,
but the operation was not as successful as was initially hoped. Attached to
the 11th Marines during this period was the 92d U. S. Army Searchlight
Company, which provided lighting to enable tanks to snipe at the enemy at
night.
The Marines moved from East Korea to West Korea in March 1952. The
artillery was repositioned across the allied front with as little interruption
of support as possible. The batteries of the 11th moved into their new
positions from 18-24 March. From March 1952 until 27 July 1953, almost
nothing noteworthy happened to the 11th Marines. It supported patrols, fired
leaflets, and engaged in counterbattery fire. During this period, the war
became a fight for outposts on key terrain. The most bitter fighting during
the final year before the armistice occurred over control of these outposts.
One of the most famous, and certainly one of the most bitterly contested,
41
was Outpost "Vegas." The outpost changed hands many times during the final
days of March 1953. The 11th expended a lot of ammunition on "Vegas" in
support of the infantry. By 1 April, "Vegas" was secure. The 11th fired many
rounds in the final months of the war supporting Marines both defensively and
offensively on many outposts like "Vegas." On 18 April 1953, the 11th
announced that it was holding a raffle. Tickets cost 25, and the prize was
the casing of the 2 millionth round fired by the 11th in Korea. It had been
fired during the atruggle for "Vegas." The money went to the Marine War
Memorial Fund.
When the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, the 11th Marines moved to
Inchon, where it remained until 1955. The Marines trained there and undertook
peacetime garrison duty. The 11th fired its cannon at "Bullseye Range."
Often the battalions of the 11th would accompany infantry regiments of the 1st
Marine Division on amphibious training exercises to the eastern coast of
Korea. When they were not on these trips, they remained at Inchon, doing
enough work to remain fit and ready, generally waiting for something to
happen. The various athletic teams fielded by the 11th Marines proved in
almost every case to be the strongest in the 1st Marine Division. In June
1954, a stateside-type rifle range with 200, 300, and 500 yard lines was
constructed in 3/11's area. Animal lovers of Battery M, 4/11 collected
specimens of Korean wildlife while at Inchon. Two of the cannoneers most
notable pets were "Big John," a crow whose wings had been clipped, and
"Scram," a fawn that had been captured in the area. On 15 September 1954, a
party was given by the NCOs of the 11th Marines for the NCOs of the 42d Field
Regiment, Royal Artillery. The British NCOs gave the Americans a sign
featuring a cannon, copied from the British artillery insignia, and bearing
the inscription "Cannon Cocker's Inn."<48> After two years at Inchon, the
11th sailed on 7 March 1955 for Camp Pendleton, which was to be the home of
the regiment for the next decade.
Camp Pendleton, 1955-1965<49>
The battalions of the 11th Marines arrived at Camp Pendleton from Korea
at different times. The first to come home was Headquarters, 11th Marines and
3/11, which entered the gates of the base on 16 March 1955. One week later,
on 24 March, 2/11 and 4/11 arrived, and, on 16 April, one month after the
first of the cannoneers returned, 1/11 moved in with
42
RLT-1. The ten years spent at Camp Pendleton by the 11th Marines between 1955
and 1965 were very much like the three years between 1947 and 1950. Some of
the weapons had changed, but the training routine was not very different, and
the purpose was the same -- to maintain the 11th Marines in a constant state
of readiness so that it could immediately move to and fight effectively in any
trouble spot in the world. The amphibious phases of training for the 11th
were handled in such a way that the artillery batteries would mount out with
BLTs or the artillery battalions would assault the Pendleton beaches in RLT
exercises. The 3d Battalion was not only the first of the 11th to get to Camp
Pendleton but also it was the first to take part in an amphibious exercise.
As part of RLT-5, 3/11 landed at Aliso Beach on 17 June and simulated firing
its 105s in support of the 5th Marines during the exercise that followed.
This was typical of all RLT amphibious exercises from 1955-1965.
Operation MERRY-GO-ROUND, a five-night command post exercise (CPX), began
on 1 October 1956. There were three phases to this training operation --
gunnery, non-firing CPX, and local security firing. New gunnery techniques
and new equipment such as countermortar radar and a new survey system, OBSURV,
were tested. The countermortar radar section was added to 4/11 on a permanent
basis during the summer of 1957.
Early in 1957, a new Table of Organization (T/O) was introduced, the
purpose of which was to make infantry units more mobile. One of the results
of the new T/O was that the 4.2-inch mortar was no longer organic to the
infantry battalion, and it was placed in the artillery instead. The first
four-deuce mortars among the 11th Marines appeared in the four-deuce mortar
battery of 1/11. This was the first of many organizational changes that were
to affect the 11th Marines during its decade at Camp Pendleton.
At the end of September 1957, the 11th moved to 29 Palms for a ten-day
firing exercise (FIREX) which Colonel Robert G. Hiatt, the commanding officer
of the 11th Marines, called "one of the most intensive operations ever
attempted by the 11th."<50> The problem consisted of three parts -- battery
and battalion gunnery, a tie-in at the regimental level, and movement of the
whole regiment keyed to the movement of the 1st Marine Division in the attack.
During the final phase of the exercise, the 11th Marines was dispersed over
400 miles of desert. This type of exercise was conducted by the 11th Marines
from battery to regimental level countless times at 29 Palms between 1957 and
1965.
43
From 3-22 October 1958, 1/11 and 3/11 conducted a FIREX to train the
artillerymen of these battalions in accurately firing the cannon and to train
prospective air observers in spotting targets and adjusting fire. These
trainees were officers of the 1st Marine Division who were learning about
aerial observation at the Aerial Observation School of the 1st Marine
Division. Aerial observation had proved to be a very effective way of
bringing artillery and naval gunfire to bear on the enemy during the Korean
War, and training in this phase of combat was encouraged and intensified.
On 11 December 1958, 1/1, accompanied by Battery A, 1/11, conducted a
heliborne field exercise (HELIFEX) at Horno Ridge. Battery A practiced
displacing its 105s by helicopter. This was one of the earliest exercises in
which the 11th experimented with displacement by helicopter. Heliborne
training increased during the 1960s for the 11th, and it proved to be a highly
valuable means of displacement in the Vietnam conflict where dense jungle and
rice paddies greatly hindered ground movement of heavy cannons. During this
same period, 5-19 December, Battery H was with 2/7 at Cold Weather Training
Center (CWTC), Bridgeport, California. It took part in a cold weather field
exercise (SNOWFEX), and the Marines were instructed in survival techniques in
the extreme cold, oversnow movement, and invasion procedure. All of the
Marines of the 11th underwent training at CWTC at one time or another.
Although the Marine Corps has predominatly fought in hot climates, the "Frozen
Chosin" taught Marines that cold weather training cannot be neglected.
In October 1960, the 4.2-inch howtar was introduced to the 11th Marines.
It was the second new weapon placed at the disposal of the 11th since 1955,
the 4.2-inch mortar being the first. The howtar was expected to combine the
high angle of fire capability and the destructive punch of the 4.2-inch mortar
with the great mobility of the 75mm pack howitzer. Batteries B and C
initially received this weapon.
Operation GREEN LIGHT, a joint, Marine Corps-Navy, amphibious, training
exercise, took place throughout April and May 1961. This was the largest
amphibious exercise that the 11th Marines participated in between 1955 and
1965. The 1st Marine Division was to participate in the third phase of the
operation, but Marines from Headquarters and Service Battery, 11th Marines
were infantry aggressors from 10-15 April during the first phase. All of the
11th Marines landed with other elements of the 1st Marine Division on 20 May
in a surface-air assault of the
44
Camp Pendleton area. This was one of the many times that the 11th practiced
vertical envelopment as well as conventional, amphibious assaults. Until 28
May, the 11th supported the infantry in the hills around Camp Pendleton, and
then it moved to 29 Palms for desert training. The 11th Marines and the three
infantry regiments of the 1st Marine Division took part in a huge, live-fire
exercise from 3-4 June at 29 Palms, and the 11th remained there until 13 June
for a regimental FIREX. During Operation GREEN LIGHT and the subsequent
FIREX, two captains and two lieutenants from the Chinese Marine Corps
undertook on-the-job training with Battery E. This was not the first nor the
last time that Marines from foreign countries joined units of the United
States Marine Corps in order to learn American methods and techniques of
combat.
The year 1962 brought an increase in antiguerrilla training exercises for
all elements of the 1st Marine Division. During April, 1/11 and 2/11 fought a
"guerrilla war" against each other in the De Luz Canyon area. Mainly, this
exercise amounted to patrol practice to provide battery security in a
guerrilla warfare situation.
On 25 June 1962, the 11th Marines underwent extensive reorganization.
The 1st and 4th 155mm Howitzer Batteries at 29 Palms were deactivated as Force
Troops and became the new 4/11. Batteries K, L, and M of the old 4/11
remained at Camp Pendleton and were absorbed by 3/11, 1/11, and 2/11
respectively. For the rest of the time that the 11th was in the United
States, 1/11, 2/11, and 3/11 continued at Camp Pendleton while 29 Palms became
the permanent home of 4/11, which needed the greater space of the desert and
the vast, empty wasteland of 29 Palms in order to use its larger weapons. In
July 1962, 4/11 participated in Operation TIGER, which was the largest, Marine
Air-Ground Reserve, live-fire exercise ever held up to that time.
On 16 April 1963, Battery D took a new, tactical test which was
eventually administered to every battery of the 11th Marines. It was attacked
by guerrilla aggressors, air bombardment, and gas, and the reaction of the
Marines to every problem encountered was noted and timed. The speed of the
reaction by the Marines to each problem was most important.
All of the Marines of the 11th were introduced to the combat village at
Camp Pendleton during September and October 1964. They learned how to search
a village for hidden weapons and
45
guerrillas, and they learned about booby traps. This was simply another phase
of the guerrilla warfare training that all Marines had been undertaking with
increasing intensity since 1962.
Throughout the end of January and early February 1965, the 11th Marines
took a tactical test in which great emphasis was placed on camouflage
discipline and security. Most of January was spent by the batteries preparing
for this test. On 1 March, Operation SILVER LANCE, a combined, surface-air
assault on Camp Pendleton, began. All of the 11th participated, and it was
the last tactical training that many of these Marines received before going to
Vietnam.
Vietnam<51>
In the summer of 1965, most of the 11th Marines left Camp Pendleton and
moved to Camp Hansen, Okinawa. The 3d Battalion, along with Battery M, 4/11,
went to the Republic of Vietnam almost immediately, landing at Chu Lai with
the 7th Marines on 16 August. These units took part in Operation STARLITE in
the Chu Lai Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) during the latter part of
August. It was the first operation in which any unit of the 11th Marines
participated in Vietnam. Until December 1965, the only units of the 11th in
RVN were 3/11 and Battery M. The 1st Battalion remained at Camp Pendleton
until 10 August and then sailed to Okinawa, arriving at Camp Hansen on 28
August. The 2d Battalion, minus Battery D, remained at Camp Pendleton
throughout 1965. Battery D sailed to Kaneohe, Oahu, Hawaii with BLT 2/5.
Battery K, 4/11 remained at 29 Palms working with the new, self-propelled,
M109 155mm howitzers.
Battery A entered RVN with the Special Landing Force to support infantry
operations in the Chu Lai TAOR in December 1965. At the same time, Battery K
departed from 29 Palms and joined 1/11 at Camp Hansen. The 1st Battalion and
Battery K landed at Chu Lai on 17 January 1966. Throughout January and
February, 1/11, 3/11, and 4/11 provided artillery support in the rapidly
expanding Chu Lai TAOR.
On 28 February, Headquarters, 11th Marines arrived at Chu Lai from
Okinawa, and, in May, it moved to the city of Da Nang. The 2d Battalion,
which had previously been in California and Hawaii, landed at Chu Lai.
Throughout 1966, the 11th Marines
46
concentrated its efforts in the vicinity of Da Nang, displacing units to other
areas whenever necessary. The vast majority of fire missions were harassing
and interdicting fires. The artillery organization was such that the 1st
Battalion supported the 1st Marines, the 2d Battalion supported the 5th
Marines, the 3d Battalion supported the 7th Marines, and the 4th Battalion was
employed in general support.
In the battery positions, the artillerymen had to defend against numerous
enemy probes. Battery positions were exposed to sporadic small arms fire and
grenades as the Viet Cong (VC) tested defenses. As a defense against this
type of activity, the artillerymen set up ambushes and conducted security
patrols nightly. Security was good, and only a very few times did the VC dare
to hit battery and battalion positions with a company or battalion-size force.
Actually, the main problem for the artillery was incoming mortar rounds.
Countermortar radar was used effectively and often to enable the artillerymen
to react to mortar attacks.
The conflict in Vietnam brought about a vastly increased employment of
helicopters by artillery both for displacement and resupply. The rugged
terrain of Vietnam, consisting of rice paddies and dense jungles, accounted
for this because it restricted movement of motorized convoys. The roads were
usually either in very poor repair or interdicted by VC activity. Motorized
convoys were still used often because helicopters were not always available,
but to fly the cannons over the many obstacles at ground level was greatly
preferred by artillery commanders. As evidence of the increased use of
helicopters, 3/11 depended entirely on them for displacement and resupply
during Operation SIERRA in January 1967.
Viet Cong activity increased at the start of 1967. In addition to normal
probes and mortar attacks on artillery positions, 60-100 VC attacked 2/11 in a
five-hour battle on 13 January, and an estimated 300 VC attacked 3/11 and
Batteries K and M on the night of 15 January. During the latter attack, 1/11
fired almost continuous illumination and high explosive to help repel the
enemy. These two events gave the artillerymen cause to respect and be
thankful for their basic infantry training. Constructing strong positions and
defending them with accurate small arms fire, the cannoneers repelled every VC
surge.
The artillerymen of the 11th Marines contributed to civic action in
Vietnam in addition to their regular combat duties.
47
The civic action program was designed to peacefully persuade the Vietnamese to
reject the Viet Cong. In 1966-1968, the efforts of the 11th Marines in this
project concentrated almost entirely on the MedCap program. The Marines set
up first aid stations and treated Vietnamese civilians for illnesses or
wounds. Normal participation by the cannoneers in the MedCap program was
severely curtailed during June 1967 because of operational commitments, but it
was fully resumed in July.
The importance of the 11th Marines, in fact of artillery as a whole, as a
supporting arm in Vietnam greatly increased in July 1967. The VC were
beginning to rely more heavily on rockets as a means of restricting artillery
and interdicting airbases. The 11th had initiated a training program
including counter-rocket drills to meet this threat. A rocket attack on the
Da Nang airbase in July gave the 11th its first important chance to silence VC
rockets. From that point on, artillery increasingly became the major means by
which VC rocket attacks were thwarted.
The Tet offensive in early 1968 was responsible for a major change in the
role of artillery as a supporting arm in Vietnam. The Communist forces
attempted during this time to achieve far-reaching gains militarily, not only
in the I Corps Area, but also throughout all of South Vietnam, in order to
discredit the United States forces in the minds of the Vietnamese people. The
11th Marines in support of the 1st Marine Division, was involved only in the I
Corps Area, but it was there, especially in the city of Hue, that some of the
most crucial fighting occurred. In order to cope with the tremendous pressure
placed on it by this Communist drive, the infantry began to rely increasingly
on artillery as its major means of support. The importance of the Tet
offensive as a significant event in the history of the 11th Marines in Vietnam
cannot be overemphasized. Before the offensive, supporting fire by the 11th
Marines was only of a routine nature at best and was often only a minor factor
during the many Operations that were undertaken by the 1st Marine Division up
to that time. After the offensive, artillery became the major means of
support for the infantry in Vietnam.
The story of the 11th Marines has been one of constant readiness and
combat effectiveness. The regiment has fought in all climates of the world
from the steaming jungles of Nicaragua to the frozen mountains of North Korea.
At the time of this writing, the 11th is still in Vietnam where, once again,
it is continuing to distinguish itself in combat.
48
NOTES
<1> Subject Files, 11th Marines, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11 (Historical Reference
Section, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps).
<2> Neill Macauley, "The Sandino Affair" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967),
p. 61.
<3> Ibid.
<4> Subject Files, 2/11, op. cit.
<5> "Marine Corps Gazette," vol. 26, p. 71.
<6> Subject Files, 1/11, op. cit.
<7> Ibid., 2/11.
<8> Ibid., 1/11, 2/11, 3/11.
<9> Ibid., 1/11.
<10> Ibid., 3/11.
<11> Ibid., 4/11.
<12> General Alexander A. Vandegrift, "Once a Marine" (New York: Norton,
1964), p. 105.
<13> Ibid., p. 141.
<14> Ibid., p. 158.
<15> Ibid., p. 155.
<16> Grady Gallant, "On Valor's Side" (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1963),
p. 350
<17> Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough and Major John A. Crown, "The Campaign
on New Britain" (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1952), p. 82.
<18> Ibid., p. 165.
49
<19> Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, "The Assault on Peleliu" (Washington:
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
1950), p. 25.
<20> Ibid., p. 28.
<21> Ibid., p. 94.
<22> Ibid., p. 98.
<23> Ibid.
<24> Ibid., p. 99.
<25> Ibid., p. 103.
<26> Ibid., p. 104.
<27> Ibid., p. 136.
<28> Major Charles S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "Okinawa: Victory in
the Pacific" (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, 1955), p. 33.
<29> Ibid.
<30> Ibid., p. 69.
<31> George McMillan, "The Old Breed: A History of the 1st Marine Division
in World War II" (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p. 362.
<32> Ibid., p. 418
<33> Ibid.
<34> Nichols and Shaw, op. cit., p. 271.
<35> McMillan, op. cit., p. 372.
<36> Ibid., p. 424.
<37> Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "The United States Marines in North China,
1945-1949" (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, 1962), p. 7.
50
<38> Ibid., p. 13.
<39> "The Pendleton Scout," Camp Pendleton, California, 1947-1950.
<40> "Marine Corps Gazette," vol. 35, January 1951, p. 20.
<41> Ibid., p. 22.
<42> Ibid., p. 23.
<43> Robert Leckie, "The March to Glory" Cleveland: World Publishing
Company, 1960), p. 25.
<44> "Marine Corps Gazette," vol. 35, December 1951, p. 19.
<45> Ibid.
<46> Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, USMC, and Major Norman W. Hicks,
USMC, "The East Central Front---U. S. Marine Operations in Korea", vol.
IV (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S.
Marine Corps, 1962), p. 198.
<47> Ibid., p. 220.
<48> "The First Word," Inchon, South Korea, 16 September 1954.
<49> "The Pendleton Scout," 1955-1965.
<50> Ibid., 3 October 1957.
<51> "The Sea Tiger," III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, 1966-1967, and
Edward Hymhoff, "The First Marine Division, Vietnam" (New York: M. W.
Lads Publishing Company, 1967).
51
APPENDIX I
COMMANDING OFFICERS, 11th MARINES
LtCol George Van Orden 3 Jan 1918 - 31 Jul 1918
Col George Van Orden 1 Aug 1918 - 11 Aug 1919
REGIMENT DEACTIVATED 11 AUG 1919
REGIMENT REACTIVATED 9 MAY 1927
LtCol Arthur J. O'Leary 9 May 1927 - 18 May 1927
Col Randolph C. Berkeley 19 May 1927 - 30 Jun 1927
LtCol Arthur J. O'Leary 1 Jul 1927 - 30 Jul 1927
REGIMENT DEACTIVATED 31 JUL 1927
REGIMENT REACTIVATED 7 JAN 1928
Col Robert H. Dunlap 7 Jan 1928 - 19 Aug 1929
REGIMENT DEACTIVATED 31 AUG 1929
REGIMENT REACTIVATED 1 MAR 1941
Col Pedro A. del Valle 1 Mar 1941 - 30 Sep 1942
BGen Pedro A. del Valle 1 Oct 1942 - 28 Mar 1943
Col Robert H. Pepper 29 Mar 1943 - 31 Jan 1944
Col William H. Harrison 1 Feb 1944 - 3 Nov 1944
Col Wilburt S. Brown 4 Nov 1944 - 30 Sep 1946
Col Eugene F. C. Collier 1 Oct 1946 - 2 Jul 1947
LtCol Thomas R. Belzer 3 Jul 1947 - 31 May 1948
LtCol Claude S. Sanders 1 Jun 1948 - 15 Jun 1948
LtCol Bernard H. Kirk 16 Jun 1948 - 15 Aug 1949
Col Bernard H. Kirk 16 Aug 1949 - 28 Jul 1950
Col James H. Brower 29 Jul 1950 - 10 Dec 1950
LtCol Carl A. Youngdale 11 Dec 1950 - 10 Mar 1951
Col Joseph L. Winecoff 11 Mar 1951 - 4 Aug 1951
Col Curtis Burton, Jr. 5 Aug 1951 - 18 Nov 1951
52
Col Bruce T. Hemphill 19 Nov 1951 - 26 Mar 1952
Col Frederick P. Henderson 27 Mar 1952 - 19 Sep 1952
Col Harry N. Shea 20 Sep 1952 - 21 Feb 1953
Col James E. Mills 22 Feb 1953 - 4 Jul 1953
Col Manly L. Curry 5 Jul 1953 - 16 Dec 1953
Col Lewis J. Fields 17 Dec 1953 - 20 Apr 1954
Col John S. Oldfield 21 Apr 1954 - 29 Oct 1954
Col Ernest P. Foley 30 Oct 1954 - 10 Jun 1955
LtCol Roger S. Bruford 11 Jun 1955 - 6 Aug 1955
Col William T. Fairbourn 7 Aug 1955 - 12 Oct 1956
LtCol Alfred M. Mahoney 13 Oct 1956 - 4 Nov 1956
Col Alfred M. Mahoney 5 Nov 1956 - 6 Apr 1957
LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr. 7 Apr 1957 - 1 Jul 1957
Col Robert G. Hiatt 2 Jul 1957 - 31 Jul 1959
Col Earl J. Rose 1 Aug 1959 - 19 Aug 1960
Col David R. Griffin 20 Aug 1960 - 31 Jul 1961
Col Francis F. Parry 1 Aug 1961 - 3 Jun 1962
Col Thomas L. Randall 4 Jun 1962 - 1 Jun 1964
Col Peter J. Mulroney 2 Jun 1964 - 28 May 1965
Col Peter H. Hahn 29 May 1965 - 17 Jun 1966
LtCol John B. Sullivan 18 Jun 1966 - 12 Sep 1966
Col Glenn E. Norris 13 Sep 1966 - 28 Jun 1967
LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks 29 Jun 1967 - 18 Jul 1967
Col Ernest W. Payne 19 Jul 1967 - 27 Dec 1967
LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks 28 Dec 1967 - 2 Jul 1968
Col Clayton V. Hendricks 3 Jul 1968 - 9 Jul 1968
53
APPENDIX II
HONORS OF THE 11th MARINES
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION WITH ONE SILVER AND ONE BRONZE STAR
(Guadalcanal, 7-9 Aug 1942)
(Peleliu, 15-29 Sep 1944)
(Okinawa, 1 Apr-21 Jun 1945)
(Korea, 7 Aug-7 Sep 1950)
(Inchon, Korea, 15 Sep-11 Oct 1950)
(Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov-11 Dec 1950)
(Korea, 21-26 Apr 1951; 16 May-30 Jun 1951; 11-25 Sep 1951)
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION WITH ONE BRONZE STAR
(New Britain, 26 Dec 1943-30 Apr 1944)
(Korea, 11 Aug 1952-5 May 1953; 7-27 Jul 1953)
WORLD WAR I VICTORY STREAMER WITH MALTESE CROSS
(AEF Service, 15 Oct-11 Nov 1918)
SECOND NICARAGUAN CAMPAIGN STREAMER
(22 May-31 Jul 1927; 15 Jan 1928-20 Aug-1929)
AMERICAN DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STAR
(1 Mar-7 Dec 1941)
ASIATIC PACIFIC CAMPAIGN STREAMER WITH ONE SILVER AND ONE BRONZE STAR
(Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings, 7-9 Aug 1942)
(Capture and defnse of Guadalcanl, 10 Aug-22 Dec 1942)
(New Guinea, 15 Oct-25 Dec 1943)
(New Britain, 26 Dec 1943-1 Mar 1944)
(Palau Islands, 15 Sep-14 Oct 1944)
(Okinawa, 1 Apr-30 Jun 1945)
WORLD WAR II VICTORY STREAMER
NAVY OCCUPATION SERVICE STREAMER WITH ASIA CLASP
(2 Sep-26 Sep 1945)
CHINA SERVICE STREAMER
(30 Sep 1945-24 Jan 1947)
NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STAR
54
KOREAN SERVICE STREAMER WITH TWO SILVER STARS
(North Korean Aggression, 18 Sep-2 Nov 1950)
(Communist China Aggression, 3 Nov 1950-24 Jan 1951)
(Inchon Landing, 15-17 Sep 1950)
(1st UN Counteroffensive, 25 Jan-21 Apr 1951)
(Communist China Spring Offensive, 22 Apr-8 Jul 1951)
(UN Summer-Fall Offensive, 9 Jul-27 Nov 1951)
(2d Korean Winter, 28 Nov 1951-30 Apr 1952)
(Korean Defense, Summer-Fall, 1 May-30 Nov 1952)
(3d Korean Winter, 1 Dec 1952-30 Apr 1953)
(Korean Summer-Fall, 1 May-27 Jun 1953)
ARMED FORCES EXPEDITIONARY STREAMER
(Cuba, 7 Nov-17 Dec 1962)
VIETNAM SERVICE STREAMER WITH FOUR BRONZE STARS
(Vietnamese Counteroffensive, 16 Jan 1966-30 Jun 1966)
(Vietnamese Counteroffensive, Phase II, 1 Jul 1966-31 May 1967)
(Vietnamese Counteroffensive, Phase III, 1 Jun 1967-29 Jan 1968)
(Unnamed Campaign, 30 Jan 1968 to date)
KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
(2 Aug-6 Sep 1950)
(15-27 Sep 1950)
(26 Oct 1950-27 Jul 1953)
55
APPENDIX III
MEDAL OF HONOR WINNERS, 11th MARINES
The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF
HONOR to
SERGEANT JAMES E. JOHNSON,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
for service as set forth in the following
CITATION:
"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his live above
and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Squad Leader in a Provisional
Rifle Platoon composed of Artillerymen and attached to Company J, Third
Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action
against enemy aggressor forces at Yudam-ni, Korea, on 2 December 1950. Vastly
outnumbered by a well-entrenched and cleverly concealed enemy force wearing
the uniforms of friendly troops and attacking his platoon's open and
unconcealed positions, Sergeant Johnson unhesitatingly took charge of his
platoon in the absence of the leader and, exhibiting great personal valor in
the face of a heavy barrage of hostile fire, coolly proceeded to move about
among his men, shouting words of encouragement and inspiration and skillfully
directing their fire. Ordered to displace his platoon during the fire fight,
he immediately placed himself in an extremely hazardous position from which he
could provide covering fire for his men. Fully aware that his voluntary
action meant either certain death or capture to himself, he courageously
continued to provide effective cover for his men and was last observed in a
wounded condition singlehandedly engaging enemy troops in close hand grenade
and hand-to-hand fighting. By his valiant and inspiring leadership, Sergeant
Johnson was directly responsible for the successful completion of the
platoon's displacement and the saving of many lives. His dauntless fighting
spirit and unfaltering devotion to duty in the face of terrific odds reflect
the highest credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service."
/s/ Harry S. Truman
56
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes
pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to
SECOND LIEUTENANT SHERROD E. SKINNER, JR.,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE
for service as set forth in the following
CITATION:
"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above
and beyond the call of duty as an Artillery Observer of Battery F, Second
Battalion, Eleventh Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action
against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on the night of 26 October 1952. When
his observation post in an extremely critical and vital sector of the main
line of resistance was subjected to a sudden and fanatical attack by hostile
forces, supported by a devastating barrage of artillery and mortar fire which
completely severed communication lines connecting the outpost with friendly
firing batteries, Second Lieutenant Skinner, in a determined effort to hold
his position, immediately organized and directed the surviving personnel in
the defense of the Outpost, continuing to call down fire on the enemy by means
of radio alone until this equipment became damaged beyond repair. Undaunted
by the intense hostile barrage and the rapidly closing attackers, he twice
left the protection of his bunker in order to direct accurate machine gun fire
and to replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenades. Although
painfully wounded on each occasion, he steadfastly refused medical aid until
the rest of the men received treatment. As the ground attack reached its
climax, he gallantly directed the final defense until the meager supply of
ammunition was exhausted and the position overrun. During the three hours
that the outpost was occupied by the enemy, several grenades were thrown into
the bunker which served as protection for Second Lieutenant Skinner and his
remaining comrades. Realizing that there was no chance for other than passive
resistance, he directed his men to feign death even though the hostile troops
entered the bunker and searched their persons. Later, when an enemy grenade
was thrown between him and two other survivors,
57
he immediately threw himself on the deadly missile in an effort to protect the
others, absorbing the full force of the explosion and sacrificing his life for
his comrades. By his indomitable fighting spirit, superb leadership and great
personal valor in the face of tremendous odds, Second Lieutenant Skinner
served to inspire his fellow Marines in their heroic stand against the enemy
and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He
gallantly gave his life for his country."
/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower
58
